Pray v. First Nat. Bank of Jefferson Parish
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Louisiana Board of Massage Therapy v. Fontenot (La. Ct. App. 2005)
- Morgan v. Simon (La. Ct. App. 2001)
- Willie Covington and April Covington v. Clark Sand Co., Inc.; Clemco Industries Corporation f/k/a Clemco Services Corp.; Dependable Abrasives, Inc.; E.D. Bullard Company; Empire Abrasive Equipment Company, L.P.; Ingersoll-Rand Corporation; Leroi International, Inc., a subsidiary of Gardner Denv (La. Ct. App. 2024)
- Johnson v. University Medical Center in Lafayette (La. Ct. App. 2012)
- Reed v. Columbia/HCA Information Service, Inc. (La. Ct. App. 2000)
- Laborde v. Presbyterian Village of Homer (La. Ct. App. 2000)
- Perkins v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. (La. Ct. App. 2016)
- Joseph v. Wasserman (La. Ct. App. 2016)
- Johnson v. University Medical Center (La. 2013)
- Lela Johnson v. University Medical Center in Lafayette (La. Ct. App. 2012)
- Johnnie M. Lefear v. Herbert Paul Simons (La. Ct. App. 2010)
- Peacock v. Peacock (La. Ct. App. 2005)
- Schmolke v. Clary (La. Ct. App. 2004)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
Horace Clint PRAY and Superport Marketing Corporation
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF JEFFERSON PARISH.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
PER CURIAM.
Granted. The primary purpose of La.Code Civ.Proc. art. 2126's authorization to dismiss appeals for non-payment of costs is to dismiss the appeal as abandoned, in those cases in which the appellant files a timely appeal and thereafter decides not to pursue it. A secondary purpose is to ensure prompt payment of costs of appeal by dilatory appellants. The focus of district courts in deciding Article 2126 motions to dismiss should be on securing payment of costs in order to move appeals forward rather than on dismissing appeals, although obviously not abandoned, simply because a motion was filed (as in this case) immediately after expiration of the twenty-day period for paying the costs.
The district court abused its discretion in this case by immediately dismissing the appeal, which the appellant clearly had not abandoned, without affording the appellant a brief extension of time for payment of costs.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing the appeal is reversed, and the appeal is reinstated on the condition that the appellant pay the estimated costs within twenty days of this order. If the appellant fails to do so, the district court, upon appropriate motion, shall dismiss the appeal.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.