DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

This disciplinary matter arises from one count of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Winthrop G. Gardner, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana.

The underlying facts were stipulated to by the parties, and involve several instances of conversion of client funds by respondent occurring between January of 1992 and February of 1993. More specifically, it appears respondent did not follow appropriate accounting practices in retaining funds for the payment of third parties, nor in disbursing settlement payments and other funds to his clients when due. The original C.P.A. report, written by Raymond C. Ladouceur, found that $30,468 of client and third-party funds were unaccounted for on February 28, 1993. Another C.P.A., William C. Potter, reviewed Mr. Ladouceur’s report and found he used standard, acceptable accounting practices to arrive at his conclusions. However, it was discovered that Mr. Ladouceur did not have complete access to respondent’s records and financial data when conducting his investigation. Mr. Michael Rice, another C.P.A. hired by respondent who had complete access to respondent’s records, indicated that the actual amount which was not accounted for was approximately $10,000. In response, Mr. Ladouceur agreed that if respondent’s explanations were taken to be true, this would in fact be the appropriate amount not accounted for.1

*1343The parties agreed that despite respondent’s impropriety in conducting his financial affairs, all clients and third-parties have been paid, and no one has suffered any loss of funds.2 However, it was also recognized that respondent’s delay in disbursements for unreasonable lengths of time has deprived his clients and other parties of the time value of their money, and that the commingling and conversion was caused by respondent’s reckless disregard of the standards of professional conduct and gross neglect of proper accounting and bookkeeping practices.3

Formal charges were initially filed against respondent on July 21, 1993. In January, 1994, respondent filed a motion for consent discipline, seeking a two and one-half years suspension, with one and one-half year of the suspension deferred and two years probation subject to conditions. The ODC concurred in the consent discipline, and the hearing committee and disciplinary board recommended adoption of the consent. However, this court rejected the proposed discipline. In re Gardner, 94-2802 (La. 12/9/94), 647 So.2d 1103. Thereafter, the matter was reassigned to a hearing committee, and a formal hearing was held on April 19, 1995.

The hearing committee found that respondent violated Rule 1.15 by commingling and converting his clients’ funds in at least 15 instances. Based on the stipulations of the parties, the hearing committee concluded that the consent discipline originally agreed upon should be imposed. Therefore, it recommended that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for two and one-half years, with one year to be served and the remaining one and one-half years to be deferred, conditioned upon the successful completion of a two-year probation period following the suspension, subject to conditions.4

The disciplinary board concluded that respondent’s conduct is “at best gross negligence, at worst, knowing misconduct.” Furthermore, it noted respondent’s failure to remit the funds to third-party providers ex*1344posed the clients to great risk of harm. The board noted that the baseline sanction under Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La. 1986), for a pattern of conversion is a three year suspension. Weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, and considering that the conduct exhibited gross negligence, but that in almost every instance clients were not deprived of their settlement funds, the board recommended the following sanctions:

1. If respondent provides proof to the Court and the Disciplinary Board within 90 days of the date this Recommendation is submitted to the Court that he has met all requirements to practice law, including but not limited to paying his bar dues and disciplinary assessment and meeting his CLE requirements, that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and that all costs of these proceedings be assessed to the Respondent; or

2. If respondent does not provide the proof as outlined in 1. above, that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 1 year and 1 day, and that all costs of these proceedings be assessed to the respondent.

Neither the respondent nor the ODC filed objections to the board’s recommendations. However, this court ordered the parties to submit briefs to this court, without oral argument, addressing the issue of whether the penalty recommended by the disciplinary board is appropriate under the facts of this case.5

In its brief, the ODC asserted there is no dispute that serious misconduct has occurred in this matter. It pointed out that respondent has been ineligible to practice law since August 16, 1996 based on his failure to comply with the CLE requirements.6 Additionally, he became ineligible on September 2, 1997 for failure to pay dues. The ODC concluded that respondent’s failure to correct his CLE and dues deficiencies, even after being afforded an incentive to do so, demonstrates a lack of rehabilitation and remorse. Based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,7 the ODC suggested a three year suspension is appropriate discipline under the facts of this case.

In his brief, respondent agreed that under Hinrichs, the facts of this case might justify a three year suspension in the absence of mitigating factors. However, he argues there are significant mitigating factors that should be considered. First, he points out that while he acted with gross negligence, there is no evidence he intended to cause harm. He notes he has made full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board. He contends he has established his good reputation and good moral character, and has demonstrated remorse by submitting a letter of apology to the board. Finally, he asserts that delay is a mitigating factor in this proceeding, since the charges date back to 1993. He contends he has done everything in his power to expedite matters by filing a petition for consent discipline. He concludes he has “stood ready to timely face and accept his punishment for the mistakes he had made,” but this has not happened. Based on these *1345factors, respondent suggests that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two and one-half years, with all but one year deferred, conditioned on a two year probation with special conditions.

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, the record filed herein, and the additional briefing of the parties ordered by this court, we conclude an upward deviation in the sanction recommended by the disciplinary board is justified under these facts. As both sides point out, the baseline suspension for respondent’s misconduct, which involves multiple instances of commingling and conversion, is a three year suspension from the practice of law. Nonetheless, we recognize that there are certain mitigating factors in this matter.

Based on these considerations, we conclude a two year suspension from the practice of law, with six months of the suspension deferred, subject to a two year probation period with conditions, is appropriate discipline under these facts.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, it is ordered that respondent, Winthrop G. Gardner, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years, with six months of that suspension deferred. It is further ordered that upon completing the active portion of the suspension, respondent be placed on two years probation, subject to the conditions recommended by the hearing committee. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against respondent.