ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

This attorney disciplinary proceeding arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, William Yarno, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana. The charges allege respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) (criminal acts adversely reflecting on a lawyer’s honestly) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

UNDERLYING FACTS

The record indicates that respondent was previously employed as executive director of Central Louisiana Legal Services (“CLLS”), a taxpayer funded legal aid service. Sometime in 1990, respondent used funds from CLLS’s client trust fund to pay court costs for two clients who had privately retained respondent to represent them, and did not qualify for CLLS’ legal aid services.1

On August 25, 1993, respondent was charged in the Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, with two counts of theft in excess of $100 but less than $500, in violation of La. R.S. 14:67(B), a felony. On May 16, 1995, respondent entered a plea of nolo con-tendere to a reduced charge of theft of less than one hundred dollars, a misdemeanor offense. The trial court sentenced respondent under the provisions of La.Code Crim. P. art. 894(B),2 ordering him to pay a fine of $200, pay court costs of |2$170.50 and make restitution of $150.00 to CLLS.

On May 15, 1996, pursuant to the provisions of La.Code Crim. P. art. 894(B), the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal. As a result, respondent’s conviction was expunged and the record of the case was sealed.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

On April 16, 1996, ODC filed formal charges against respondent,3 based on the conviction. Respondent filed an answer, denying the charges.

On October 3, 1996, the hearing committee conducted a formal hearing, at which respondent testified.4 Thereafter, the hearing com*453mittee filed its report with the disciplinary board. The committee found respondent’s employment at CLLS was a position of public trust, and that his conviction affected the public’s faith in the legal profession. The committee also felt respondent personally profited to the extent he retained a client who did not have to pay court costs, as those costs were paid by CLLS funds, yet respondent received a fee. The committee also noted respondent admitted he has not paid his bar dues and is not current on his mandatory continuing legal education hours.

As a sanction, the committee recommended respondent be j3publicly reprimanded for his actions and placed on supervised probation for one year. Additionally, the committee recommended respondent fully pay all bar dues, file an annual registration statement and pay his yearly disciplinary assessment.

The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation, finding the recommended sanction “wholly inadequate for the seriousness of an offense which reflects a breach of fiduciary responsibility, as well as a lack of moral fitness to practice law.” The ODC suggested a suspension for one year and one day, with reinstatement subject to one year supervised probation as appropriate discipline under the circumstances.

The disciplinary board filed its recommendation with this court on February 18, 1998. Citing our opinion in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Porterfield, 550 So.2d 584 (La. 1989), the board recognized that an expunged conviction under La.Code Crim. P. art. 894 was still a conviction for purposes of disciplinary proceeding. It further found the expungement should not be considered in mitigation, since respondent, who was originally charged with two felonies, received a significant benefit when he was allowed to plead to one misdemeanor charge. As aggravating fae-tors, the board found (1) dishonest or selfish motive and (2) substantial experience in the practice of law. The sole mitigating factor it identified was the absence of prior discipline. However, the board pointed out that respondent made complete restitution and took minimal amounts of money for the payment of costs.

As a sanction, the board recommended respondent be suspended for six months, deferred, conditioned upon respondent’s payment of all past and currently owed bar dues, disciplinary assessments and completion of his mandatory continuing legal education requirements. The board also recommended respondent be placed on unsupervised probation for one year.

One member of the board dissented, suggesting respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day, with all but six months deferred. Another member dissented, indicating respondent should be suspended for an actual Uperiod, but did not specify the length.

Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation, and the matter was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).

CONCLUSION

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, we conclude the discipline recommended by the disciplinary board is inappropriate under the facts. While we are mindful that the conduct occurred several years ago, and respondent’s conviction was later expunged, we feel that his actions occurred while he was in a position of public trust and caused actual harm to the entity under his charge.5 These actions adversely reflect on respondent’s fitness to *454practice law, and mandate a period of actual suspension.

Accordingly, it is ordered that respondent, William Yamo, Jr., be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against respondent.