This case is on appeal to this Court pursuant to La. Const, art. V, see. 5(D) from a finding of the trial court that Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 648(B)(2) is unconstitutional. After reviewing that record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and hold that La.C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(2) violates-the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 20, 1998, the defendant, Shantell Denson, and two other teenage girls, allegedly stole a purse from one victim while armed with metal crutches and a metal baton, and attempted to rob another victim in the same general vicinity while armed with the crutches and the baton. Defendant was .charged with one count of armed robbery and one count of attempted armed robbery. At her arraignment on January 27, 1999, defendant entered a plea of not guilty and the trial court appointed the Tulane University Criminal Law Clinic as counsel. Defense counsel moved for a sanity commission, as it became clear that defendant might , lack the mental capacity to proceed as a matter of La.C.Cr. P. art. 641.1 The trial court appointed a two-_Jmember2 sanity commission to examine the defendant pursuant to La.C.Cr. P. arts. 6432 and 644,3 and the commission issued *807a report recommending that the court find lathe defendant incompetent to stand trial on the basis of the defendant’s mild to moderate mental retardation, unspecified psychosis, and mild paranoia. On May 10, 1999, the trial court entered the commission’s report into the record and found the defendant incompetent to stand trial. In July of 1999, the trial court ordered that defendant be “detained by the Office for Citizens with Developmental Disabilities in a group home in Violet, Louisiana,” until the court “determines the date of her release or until she attains the maximum age for residency in said home.”

Defendant failed to appear for a status hearing on April 10, 2001, resulting in her arrest on June 26, 2001.4 On July 3, 2001, pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. arts. 647 and 648, the trial court appointed two forensic psychiatrists to re-evaluate defendant and determine whether she could be restored to competence. The court found defendant unrestorably incompetent to stand trial and on November 13, 2001, placed defendant on supervised probation for a term of “five years, which may be extended each year after the completion of the fifth year period by a contradictory hearing.” The probation order subjected defendant to the supervision of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Probation and Parole (the “DOC”), and to monitoring by the Department of Health and Hospitals, Community Forensic Services Division. Among the 11 restrictions and conditions of defendant’s probation was the requirement that she live in the Violet Community Group Home under the supervision of a criminal probation officer.

On March 27, 2003, the court revoked defendant’s probation5 based upon, among other things, her arrest on a misdemeanor charge and ordered that she be Devaluated at the Feliciana Forensic Facility in Jackson, Louisiana.6 Defendant then filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that allowing a trial court to impose probation upon her, an unrestorably incompetent defendant, violated her right to due process, and thus the statute authorizing such probation was unconstitutional.

On September 30, 2003, the court clarified that “the probation status in this matter is under article 648(B)(2)” and that defendant “was placed on a probationary *808status, [but] she should have been placed on a probationary status under Article 648 — Code of Criminal Procedure Article 648(B)(2).” The trial judge declined to rule on the petition for habeas corpus until such time as the forensic psychiatrists reevaluated whether defendant was “dangerous.” On January 29, 2004, forensic psychiatrists conducted a psychological assessment of defendant and testified that she was not a danger to herself or others. Relying on this testimony, the trial court found that she was not dangerous to herself or others. After a hearing on February 18, 2004, the trial court granted defendant’s writ of habeas corpus and found La.C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(2) unconstitutional, and ordered defendant’s immediate release from all state supervision. The instant state appeal followed. See La. Const. Art. 5, § 5(D) (granting this Court appellate jurisdiction when lower court declares law unconstitutional).

DISCUSSION

The Due Process Clause of the Louisiana Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.” La. Const. Art. I, § 2. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution similarly states: “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall | sabridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...” Defendant argues, and the trial court found, that La.C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(2), is unconstitutional in violation of the due process clauses of the U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 648 governs the procedure to be followed if a court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to proceed to trial, and provides various types of care, custody, and treatment to which the defendant may be subjected to depending on the type of offense he or she committed and whether the court determines he or she is likely to be restored to competence.7 La.C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(1) attempts to pro*809vide limitations on the length | fiof time that a defendant may be required to submit to such care, custody, and treatment, by providing as follows:

In no instance shall such custody, care, and treatment exceed the time of the maximum sentence the defendant could receive if convicted of the crime with which he is charged. At any time after commitment and on the recommendation of the superintendent of the institution that the defendant will not attain the capacity to proceed with his trial in the foreseeable future, the court shall, within sixty days and after at least ten days notice to the district attorney and defendant’s counsel, conduct a contradictory hearing to determine whether the mentally defective defendant is, and will in the foreseeable future be, incapable of standing trial and whether he is a danger to himself or others.

If it is determined that the defendant will not attain capacity to proceed to trial in the foreseeable future and is not a danger to himself or others, as in this case, La.C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(2) provides:

If, after the hearing, the court determines the defendant is, and will in the foreseeable future be, incapable of standing trial and may be released without danger to himself or others, the court shall release the defendant on probation. The probationer shall be under the supervision of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, division of probation and parole, and subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the court.

On the other hand, if it is determined that the defendant will not attain capacity to proceed to trial in the foreseeable future and is a danger to himself or others, La. C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(3) provides, in pertinent part:

If, after the hearing, the court determines the mentally defective defendant incapable of standing trial, is a danger to himself or others, and is unlikely in the foreseeable future to be capable of standing trial, the court shall order commitment to a designated and medically suitable treatment facility. Such a judgment shall constitute an order of civil commitment....

It is well settled law that “indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial does not square with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.” Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972). In Jackson, the Court held:

|7[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.

Id., 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. at 1858.

This Court first acknowledged the Jackson holding in State ex rel. Lockhart v. Armistead, 351 So.2d 496 (La. 1977), establishing in Louisiana an unambiguous, bright-line rule that “[o]nce it has been determined that a person by reason of a permanent mental defect lacks capacity to prepare his defense to criminal charges,” the state may not continue confinement or *810restraint of the person “solely on account of such mental incapacity.” Lockhart, 351 So.2d at 497. In Lockhart, the Court recognized that:

Jackson clearly holds that, where state commitment is founded solely “upon incapacity to proceed to trial,” it can endure no longer than “the reasonable period of time necessary to determine” the probability of the accused’s attaining capacity in the foreseeable future. 406 U.S. [at] 738, 92 S.Ct. [at] 1858. If (as in the present case) it is determined there is no probability of such recovery, “then the state must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding ... or release the defendant.” Id.

Lockhart, 351 So.2d at 499.

The Lockhart defendant was committed under the authority of La.C.Cr.P. art. 648(A) which then provided that “[i]f the court determines that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to proceed, the proceedings shall be suspended and the court shall commit the defendant to a proper ... mental institution ... for custody, care, and treatment for as long as the lack of capacity continues.”8 The Court took note of two other sections of the statute, one which mitigated the length of confinement and the | «other which permitted the relaxation of it to probation,9 but held that “nevertheless -they do not validate the present continued restraint upon Lock-hart’s liberty: For no other reason than his mental incapacity to undergo trial to determine his innocence or guilt, Lockhart is still subject to state control for the maximum term of the offense with which he is charged but of which he has not been convicted.”

The Court in Lockhart stopped short of holding the statute unconstitutional. Instead, it held that “a commitment to determine mental capacity must be limited to a reasonable period” and released the defendant from any further state custody either by actual confinement or supervised control.

While the legislature subsequently amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 648 several times,10 the current version of La.C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(2) requires that a trial court place non-dangerous defendants not capable of standing trial in the foreseeable future on probation supervised by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”).11 As such, La.C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(2) requires that a court order the defendant held under state supervision even after experts have determined that there is not a substantial probability that he or she will attain the capacity to stand *811trial in the foreseeable future, a practice acknowledged to violate a defendant’s right to due ^process under Jackson and Lockhart, which require in such a case that the state either institute civil commitment proceedings or release the defendant.

We reject the state’s argument the trial court’s probation order of November 13, 2001 was a civil commitment under La. C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(3). As an initial matter, Orleans Parish Criminal Court lacks jurisdiction over civil matters such as commitment. La. R.S. 13:1336. In any event, civil commitment law requires that “[a]ny person of legal age” commence proceedings by filing a petition alleging that the person to be committed “is suffering from mental illness which contributes or causes that person to be a danger to himself or others or to be gravely disable[d].” La. R.S. 28:54. In the instant case, by “sentencing” the defendant to probation under the provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(2), the trial court necessarily found that the defendant posed no danger to herself or to others. Further, the trial court has not yet addressed the issue of whether the defendant meets the definition of “gravely disabled” as provided by La. R.S. 28:2(10),12 or found that the defendant meets such a definition. Finally, the pronouncements in both Jackson and Lock-hart that the state may institute civil commitment proceedings anew strongly cuts against the state’s novel suggestion that this Court could determine in hindsight that the defendant may have been afforded the requisite due process.

CONCLUSION

Under the due process clause, a criminal defendant who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that |inhe will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. Once it is determined that there is no substantial probability that he will attain the capacity to proceed to trial in the foreseeable future, the state must either institute civil commitment proceedings or release the defendant. La. C.Cr.P. art. 648(B)(2), which requires that a non-dangerous criminal defendant who is found to be incapable of standing trial in the foreseeable future be placed on probation under state supervision, violates the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions because it requires that defendant, who has not been convicted of any crime, to be held in state custody after it has been determined that he or she is incapable of standing trial in the foreseeable future, solely on account of his or her incapacity to stand trial.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court, declaring article 648(B)(2) of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional, is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.