11 Granted. This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. In accord with the criteria and procedures set forth in La.S.Ct. Rule 17, § 13, the district court is directed to enroll Edward Q. Cas-siday, of the firm of Fredrikson & Byron, Minneapolis, Minnesota, as co-counsel of record pro hac vice associated with the Capital Post-Conviction Project of Louisiana to represent relator, Michael Weary, in post-conviction proceedings. The district court is further directed to provide counsel with 180 days from the date of enrollment in which to file a supplemental application for post-conviction relief on relator’s behalf.

dissenting in part and concurring in part from the granting of the writ.

| Relator was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in March 2002. On April 24, 2006, this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal1 and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 27, 2006.2 In December 2006, relator filed a “shell” application for post-conviction relief in the district court.3 The district court denied relator’s pro se application in February 2007. This Court, however, issued an order setting aside the district court’s ruling, directing that court to appoint the Capital Post Conviction Project of Louisiana (CPCPL) to represent relator, and to provide counsel “reasonable opportunity to prepare and litigate expeditiously a supplemental application for post-conviction relief’4 On April 1, 2008, the district court subsequently appointed CPCPL to represent relator, and gave it 45 days in which to file a supplemental application for post-conviction relief. CPCPL then requested a status conference with the court. The trial court refused to conduct the conference, but gave CPCPL until October 17, 2008 to *969file its supplemental application. On October 6, 2008 CPCPL moved to vacate the ^court’s order, and the trial court denied that motion on October 14,2008. The instant application to this Court followed.

According to the CPCPL,5 it is overworked, understaffed, and underfunded. To help relieve its burden, CPCPL, in the instant ease, has secured outside counsel, Mr. Edward Q. Cassiday, of the firm Fre-drikson & Byron, Minneapolis, Minnesota, who has agreed to enroll as pro bono counsel for relator’s post conviction proceedings. I recognize that newly appointed counsel, whether secured by CPCPL or assigned by the district court, needs adequate time to review a case.6 However, the CPCPL maintains that relator must be afforded time to relaunch a reinvestigation of the entire case, citing current American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (“ABA Guidelines”)7 as authority. I note that many of the ABA Guidelines are merely suggestive and not law.8 Indeed, I do not believe the law requires that counsel rein-vestigate the entire case, as though the case had never been investigated, brought to trial, and affirmed on appeal:

“[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 589 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (applying the rule to capital cases). Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of ■ counsel in such proceedings. See Wainwright v. Toma, 455 U.S. 586, |a102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982) (where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance).”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2566, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).

Instead of steeping himself in precatory guidelines, I would suggest allowing newly appointed counsel for relator no more than 90 days to file a supplemental application for post-conviction relief on relator’s behalf, during which time counsel focus his review of the record consistent with the rules for post-conviction relief of Louisiana, addressed in our State’s law, i.e. La. C.Cr.P. art. 924 et seq., in particular La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3.9

*970The delays caused in post-conviction proceedings by filing “shell” applications and the granting of continuances have unreasonably delayed the finality of death penalty cases. This practice has effectively stopped the State from carrying out the sentence in capital cases at a great expense to the State. It appears our courts have had little effect in discouraging these delaying techniques. It is probably appropriate now for the Legislature to address this aspect of post-conviction proceedings if this State is going to continue to have capital sentences.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part and concur in part.

dissenting in part and concurring in part.

|,I believe ninety (90) days would be adequate time in which to file a supplemental application for post-conviction relief on relator’s behalf.