dissenting.

| ^though I agree that the attorney general should have been allowed to participate in the proceedings before the trial court, the ultimate issue presented is a legal question, with no facts in dispute. The arguments of the school board, which fully participated in the matter before the trial court, and the arguments of the attorney general are aligned. Given the signifi-*835canee of the issues presented to public education and the opportunity for the attorney general to participate fully before this court, I would schedule this matter for briefing and argument to avoid delay and embrace judicial economy.

IrThe State of Louisiana and the Monroe City School Board invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this court pursuant to La. Const, art. V, 5(D), on the ground the district court declared La. R.S. 17:443(B)(1) and 17:443(B)(2) to be unconstitutional. Pretermitting the merits, we find the judgment at issue is not properly before this court because the underlying proceeding was procedurally defective. In particular, we focus on whether the attorney general was given proper notice and opportunity to participate in these proceedings, as required by La.Code Civ. P. art. 1880.1

Plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief seeking to declare portions of Act No. 1 of 2012 un*834constitutional. Although plaintiff requested service on the attorney general, there is no indication service was successfully completed. Rather, it appears the first actual notice the attorney generals office received was on August 1, 2013, when it was served with a copy of the district courts judgment granting plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction. At that time, the district court allowed the attorney generals office thirty days to |¡>notify the court whether it intended to participate. However, the district court proceeded to try the matter on August 5, 2013, before this thirty-day period elapsed. On the morning of trial, the district court contacted the attorney generals office. From the information presented in the record, there is no indication the attorney generals office declined to participate in the action at that time.2

The matter proceeded to trial without the attorney generals participation, at which time the district court declared La. R.S. 17:443(B)(1) and 17:443(B)(2), as amended by Act 1, to be unconstitutional. Thereafter, the attorney general filed a motion to intervene, and a motion for new trial. The district court denied both motions. This appeal followed.

In Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., 94-1238 at p. 7 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 859, 864, we explained “[t]he attorney general is not an indispensable party; but, he must be served in declaratory judgment actions which seek a declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute.” The purpose of the service requirement in La.Code Civ. P. art. 1880 is to ensure that the attorney general is “afforded the necessary opportunity to be heard as the codal article requires.” Burmaster v. Plaquemines Parish Govt, 07-2432, p. 5, fn. 6 (La.5/21/08), 982 So.2d 795, 801.

In the case at bar, the record indicates the attorney general was - not properly served. Although the attorney general ultimately received actual notice of the suit, the procedural facts reveal the attorney general was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Accordingly, we must vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case to the district for a new trial, at [¡¡which time the attorney general shall be afforded a full opportunity to be heard and participate in these proceedings.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is vacated and set aside. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Ouachita