concurs.

|,I concur for the reasons assigned by Justice Crichton.

Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal Dis*181trict Court Div. F, No. 506-037; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0195.

| tWrit denied.

concurs in the denial and assigns reasons.

[TI agree with the concurrence of Judge Bonin in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and the concurrence of my colleague, Justice Crichton. I write separately to specifically inform the trial judge that we are not insensitive to the time constraints under which the district courts operate or to the frustrations caused by the back-strike process. Nevertheless, it is not our function to ignore the law. The dictates of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 799.1 are clear. Perhaps this law should be changed, but such must be the prerogative of the Legislature.

We, the judiciary, are all bound to follow and to respect the law, notwithstanding our disagreement with, or our dislike of, the particular law or precedent. The trial judge herein is a seasoned trial judge who has served the judiciary for several years with distinction. However, her decision to ignore the law in this instance sets a poor example for other less experienced judges. By this concurrence, I encourage and exhort the trial judge to lead, instead, by her good example and faithfulness to the dictates of the law in all situations, no matter how frustrating they may be, so that we do not have to revisit this error once again.

concurs in the denial and assigns reasons.

hi concur in the majority’s decision to deny the writ. I write separately to note I am disturbed by the pattern of this particular district judge categorically denying parties their statutory right to exercise backstrikes. We found that this particular trial judge legally erred in denying a defendant his right to exercise backstrikes in State v. Lewis 1 and sinee our decision in Lewis, the instant writ application now presents to us a third occasion to review precisely the same issue.2 In my view, this practice amounts to defiance of the clear, unambiguous, and above all, mandatory language of La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 799.1. Judge Bonin’s discussion of this issue in his concurrence in the court below articulates the basis for my concern, but the point bears repeating — that is, the fact that appellate courts apply a harmless error standard of review in these cases does not justify a trial judge ignoring the requirements of the Code.