Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 495-666; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-1436.

| jWrit denied.

KNOLL, J.,

concurs in the denial and assigns reasons.

hi agree with the concurrence of my colleague, Justice Crichton. Just last week, the court handled an identical issue with another district judge from the criminal bench in Orleans Parish who, like the trial judge in this case, had prohibited the defendant from exercising his right to use back-strikes. Again, although we are not insensitive to the time constraints under which the district courts operate or to the frustrations caused by the back-strike process, it is not our function to ignore the law. The dictates of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 799.1 are clear. Perhaps this law should be changed, but such must be the prerogative of the Legislature.

We, the judiciary, are all bound to follow and to respect the law, notwithstanding *830our disagreement with, or our dislike of, the particular law or precedent. The trial judge herein has served the judiciary with distinction for over a decade. However, his decision to ignore the law in this instance sets a poor example for other less experienced judges. By this concurrence, I encourage and exhort the trial judge to lead, instead, by his good example and faithfulness to the dictates of the law in all situations, no matter how frustrating they may be, so that we do not have to revisit this error once again. In this particular instance, this judicial error has caused harm in that the defendant has to be retried, which is a ^burden to the public, as it is inefficient, time consuming, and a waste of judicial resources.

concurs in the denial and assigns reasons.

1,1 agree with the concurrences of my colleagues that emphasize the role of the trial judge in ensuring the law is followed, even when that law, as in the case of permitting back strikes,1 is time-consuming in its implementation. The failure to allow statutorily mandated back strikes seems disproportionately systemic within certain divisions of one jurisdiction.

I write separately to point out that all participants in the judicial process have a responsibility to follow the rule of law. Although demanding adherence to the law is and remains the primary responsibility of the trial judge, the State also has an obligation to ensure that the dictates of the law are followed. In this case, it appears the'State may have been complicit in the trial judge’s refusal to allow back strikes, even going so far as to remind the judge that he had prohibited back strikes over defense objection at the outset of jury selection. (“And I’m pretty sure the judge said ‘no back strikes’ at the beginning of trial.”). The end result in this instance is an overturned verdict, which could have been avoided simply by acknowledging the requirements of the law.

additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

|,I concur in the unanimous decision to deny this writ but write separately to once again express my concerns over what appears to be a disturbing pattern by Criminal District Court, specifically, in its noncompliance with the law as set forth by La.C.Cr.P. art. 799.1.

In this case, over the objection of defense counsel, the trial judge refused to allow the exercise of “backstrike” peremptory challenges. At one point during deliberations, the six person jury announced its inability to reach a unanimous verdict; however, after deliberations were resumed, they reached a verdict of guilty of possession of cocaine. Following a multiple offender adjudication, the defendant was sentenced to 27 years hard labor. Finding a violation of the mandate of La. C.Cr.P. art. 799.1, the court of appeal concluded the error “was not harmless as there was a reasonable possibility the outcome could have been different if the trial court had not disallowed backstrikes.”1

Although this court has, on occasion, found the refusal to allow backstrikes to be harmless error,2 this court has also, on occasion, had the unpleasant task of | ¿reversing convictions out of Criminal Dis*831trict Court and remanding for new trials.3 Now having occurred over two years ago, this court in State v. Lewis4 reversed convictions of two counts of second degree murder because of La.C.Cr.P. art. 799.1 violations. On that very same day, this court issued its opinion in State v. Patterson,5 affirming the court of appeal’s reversal and remand for the same violation and concluding that the violations were not harmless error. Thus, both Orleans murder cases were reversed because of La. C.Cr.P. art. 799.1 errors that could not be deemed harmless. Recently, I concurred in the majority writ denial in State v. Allen, noting “my concern about what appears to be a pattern in the Criminal District Court of denying parties their statutory right to exercise backstrikes.”6

La.C.Cr.P. art. 799.1 is clear, unambiguous, and above' all, mandatory. Besides this noneompliance with the law, it amounts to inefficient administration of criminal justice. As my colleague Justice Jeannette Knoll has observed: “We, the judiciary, are all bound to follow and to respect the law, notwithstanding our disagreement with, or our dislike of, the particular law or precedent.”7 Hopefully, this trend will stop such that we will not have cause to visit this error again.