Acme Engineering & Manufacturing Corp. v. Airadyne Co.
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25 later published cases cite this decision.
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- Hallaq v. Leaf (Massachusetts Superior Court 2000)
- Greater Boston Legal Service, Inc. v. Haddad (Massachusetts Superior Court 1999)
- Linkage Corp. v. Trustees of Boston University (Mass. 1997)
- Greater Franklin Developers Ass'n v. Town of Franklin (Massachusetts Superior Court 1997)
- Bagley v. Moxley (Mass. 1990)
- Farese v. Segal (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1990)
- Gibbs Ford, Inc. v. United Truck Leasing Corp. (Mass. 1987)
- Radiology Resources, Inc. v. Busfield (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)
- Connors v. Black (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1986)
- Goldstein Oil Co. v. C.K. Smith Co. (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)
- Bragdon v. Bradford O. Emerson, Inc. (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)
- Politano v. Board of Selectmen (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The defendant (Airadyne), which had been a sales representative or distributor for the plaintiff’s (Acme’s) fans and ventilation products for twelve years until it was terminated in August, 1975, appeals from a judgment entered under Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 821 (1974), following the court’s allowance of partial summary judgment for Acme under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(a), 365 Mass. 824
Reserved for trial on the merits was Airadyne’s counterclaim against Acme, which alleged that Acme had induced one of Airadyne’s employees, one O’Brien, to leave Aira-dyne’s employ and set up a competing distributorship; that Acme had made O’Brien its sales representative in the territory formerly covered by Airadyne; that O’Brien, with Acme’s knowledge and participation, had attached certain of Airadyne’s accounts receivable and otherwise engaged in activities intended to damage Airadyne’s business and to interfere with its contractual relationships; and that Airadyne had suffered damages in consequence thereof.
The question remains whether the court erred in determining that there was no just reason for delay in the entry of judgment on Acme’s claim and in directing the entry of judgment accordingly. Absent a certificate conforming to the requirements of rule 54(b), an order for partial summary judgment is not a judgment, but merely an order for judgment, interlocutory in nature, subject to revision at any time by the trial court prior to the entry of a judgment disposing of all claims against all parties to the action. Garbose v. George A. Giles Co., 183 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1950). Sullivan v. Delaware River Port Authy., 407 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1969). 6 Moore’s Federal Practice par. 54.40 at 681-682 (1976).
The entry of such a certificate presents a matter for the trial court’s discretion. J.B.L. Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., ante 250, 252 (1980). The exercise of that discretion is subject to appellate review. Id., citing Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436, 437 (1956). Such a certificate should not be entered “routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel.” Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958). It should be entered only where delay poses a “danger of hardship or injustice.” Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 403 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1968). The preferred practice is to withhold judgment until all claims have been disposed of, and the judge should state his reasons for concluding that hardship or injustice will result if judgment is delayed as to one of several claims in the same action. J.B.L. Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes, supra at 253, and cases cited.
Airadyne’s counterclaim was permissive, not compulsory; that is, it did not arise from the transactions which were the subject of Acme’s claim. Mass.R.Civ.P. 13(a) and (b), 365 Mass. 758 (1974). By itself, that factor is not decisive: “[a
Judgment affirmed.
In an affidavit opposing Acme’s motion for summary judgment Airadyne’s president also asserted that those acts violated Acme’s duty of good faith under G. L. c. 106, §§ 1-203 and 2-311, and constituted unfair trade practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.