When James Hall died intestate in 1735, all of his real property in Raynham devolved to his sons Edmund and David. After more than two hundred years of mesne conveyances, the plaintiff, Mary Jane Pauli, as trustee of SMND Realty Trust (Pauli) — who traces her chain of title to Edmund — and *674the defendant, Kelly C. Kelly, as trustee of Pine Realty Trust (Kelly) — who traces her chain of title to David — are involved in a boundary dispute that bears on the ownership of a 7.7 acre parcel lying between their respective properties.3 A sketch of the relevant parcels, attached as an Appendix to this opinion, provides immediate visual context for the problem. Pauli owns the property directly to the south of the disputed parcel (shown as the Huldah Hall farm/Nathan Williams property). Kelly owns the property to the north of the disputed parcel (shown as the Job Hall property).

On appeal from a declaratory judgment in favor of Pauli, Kelly argues that the Land Court judge erroneously fixed the location of the disputed property line some 393 feet north of where Kelly believes that the boundary should be. In particular, she maintains that (1) an unsuccessful attempt by Pauli’s predecessor in title to fix that boundary in a previous registration proceeding bars the present action through principles of issue or claim preclusion; and (2) the Land Court judge improperly relied on abutter calls4 in a deed in the chain of title of a third party (shown as the Perez Hall property) to determine the location of the disputed boundary. We affirm.

1. Background. The parties agree that Pauli’s property is bounded on the north by Kelly’s land and on the west by the Perez Hall property and that Kelly’s property is bounded on the south by both Pauli’s land and the Perez Hall property. The present controversy centers on Pauli’s contention, accepted below, that the boundary shared by the parties joins with the undisputed northern boundary of the Perez Hall property to form a relatively straight fine across the southern edge of Kelly’s property (represented on the diagram as the northern boundary *675of the disputed parcel). Although Kelly has previously argued that this boundary should be fixed elsewhere,5 her contention here is simply that Pauli has not carried the burden of proving that the boundary between her land and Pauli’s is the northern boundary of the disputed parcel. If the Land Court judgment stands, Pauli’s claim of ownership in the disputed parcel will be established as superior to Kelly’s; otherwise, ownership of the parcel will remain unresolved as between Pauli and Kelly.

None of the ancient deeds in either Kelly’s or Pauli’s chain of title precisely fixes their shared boundary. Instead, the deeds describe the properties primarily by estimations of acreage and abutter calls. Pauli begins the analysis of her chain of title by looking to the will of Huldah Hall (Edmund’s daughter), who died in 1834 and devised “to Asa Hall all my homestead farm where I now live.” The probate inventory of Huldah Hall described the farm as “containing by estimation Sixty Acres.” One year later, Asa Hall granted to Nathan Williams “the same farm that was given me by will of Huldah Hall. . . and contains fifty acres be the same more or less.”6 The deed from Asa Hall to Nathan Williams also identified Joseph Hall, who then owned what is now the Perez Hall property, as the only western abutter. The parties do not dispute that modem surveying techniques would calculate the area of the original Huldah Hall farm to be 58.6 acres if Pauli’s version of the disputed boundary is correct. Alternately, if Kelly’s suggested placement were utilized, the area would total 50.4 acres.

2. The registration proceeding and declaratory judgment action. In 1987, Pauli’s predecessors in title sought to establish ownership of the disputed parcel through a registration proceeding. After two days of trial, the judge issued a decision in which he concluded:

“I find that [Pauli’s predecessors] have not met their burden of proof in determining the northerly boundary of *676the locus and that their petition must be and hereby is dismissed. . . .

“In so finding, I find only that [Pauli’s predecessors] have not proven title to the disputed parcel. I make no finding as to [Kelly’s predecessors’] claim of title other than as herein stated, to such parcel and suggest to all parties concerned that should the disputed parcel be the matter of further litigation, such litigation should probably notice the appropriate Hall heirs as possible parties in interest.”

The judgment provided:

“ADJUDGED and ORDERED that [Pauli’s predecessors] have not at this time provided sufficient credible evidence to prove the northerly boundary of said parcel and therefore have not proven title to said parcel as alleged. Accordingly, the . . . complaint is hereby dismissed.”

Subsequently, Pauli initiated the present action,7 seeking a declaratory judgment that, at least as to Kelly, would establish the disputed boundary favorably to Pauli.8 Kelly moved for summary judgment, arguing that issue or claim preclusion served to bar the action, based on the prior unsuccessful action for registration. The same Land Court judge who had presided over the registration proceeding denied Kelly’s motion, reasoning that while Pauli’s predecessors had been unable to meet *677their burden of proof for registration, “clearly such finding did not determine the boundary at all, certainly not in favor of any party.”

Subsequently, this matter came to trial before a different Land Court judge. In the course of expert testimony, Pauli introduced an 1839 deed in the Perez Hall property chain of title (Perez Hall deed) that was in neither Pauli’s nor Kelly’s chain of title.9 The Perez Hall deed described the northern boundary of the Perez Hall property as running eastward along the boundary shared with Kelly’s property “to land of Nathan Williams,” a predecessor in title to Pauli. The Perez Hall deed further described an eastern boundary that ran south “thence in Williams line . . . one hundred fifty six rods to the road.” According to these descriptions, the Perez Hall property and Pauli’s predecessor shared an eastern boundary of a defined length that originated at the northwest comer of the disputed parcel, ran along the entire western edge of the disputed parcel, and continued to the road.

Relying substantially on these abutter calls, the trial judge ruled that the Perez Hall deed established the disputed boundary favorably to Pauli. Central to the judge’s decision was her determination that despite the failure of extensive oral testimony10 to assist in fixing the boundary, the abutter calls in the 1835 deed from Asa Hall to Nathan Williams and the Perez Hall deed provided corroborating evidence that “the [disputed [pjarcel was originally part of [Pauli’s property] and was never part of [Kelly’s property].” A judgment issued declaring that the northern boundary of the disputed parcel was the boundary between Pauli’s and Kelly’s parcels, in effect placing ownership of the disputed parcel in Pauli.

3. Issue and claim preclusion. Kelly contends that the prior *678registration proceeding established conclusively that the northern boundary of the disputed parcel does not exist in the location advocated by Pauli. As a result, Kelly maintains, res judicata principles bar Pauli from again attempting to fix that same boundary to the disputed parcel in this action. This contention misconstrues what was resolved in that prior failed attempt to register title and the effect of that action on subsequent actions to resolve the boundary.

Whether that prior failed attempt has preclusive effect is determined by G. L. c. 185, § 44, as amended by St. 1981, c. 658, § 24, which provides in pertinent part: “[I]f the court finds that the plaintiff has not title proper for registration, a judgment shall be entered dismissing the complaint, and such judgment may be ordered to be without prejudice, in whole or in part, but unless so ordered it shall bind the parties, their privies and the land in respect of any issue of fact which has been tried and determined.” After examining the judge’s decision and the judgment dismissing the complaint in the registration action, we conclude that the complaint was not dismissed with prejudice and that the location of the disputed boundary was not “tried and determined” in that proceeding. Accordingly, G. L. c. 185, § 44, does not bar Pauli from seeking to determine the location of that boundary in this action.

General Laws c. 185, § 44, makes clear that an unsuccessful registration proceeding can have two possible effects — one that is preclusive and one that is not. If the judge dismisses the action without prejudice, the failed attempt at registration has no preclusive effect and will not bar either a subsequent attempt at registration or any other method to determine or declare title. If the judge dismisses the action with prejudice, the statute precludes relitigating issues of fact that were “actually tried and determined” in the registration proceeding.

Here, the prior complaint for registration was dismissed “without prejudice,” even though the decision and judgment did not expressly use those talismanic words. The judge’s decision focused on the inability of any party to prove the northern boundary of the disputed parcel and he observed that any future litigation should provide notice to other putative parties in interest. The judgment states that Pauli’s predecessors in title *679“have not at this time provided sufficient credible evidence to prove the northerly boundary of said parcel” (emphasis supplied).11

Even were we to assume, arguendo, that the express words “without prejudice” must appear in the judgment, the statute still would not bar Pauli from seeking to establish the disputed boundary here. When a boundary line is in controversy, it is “a question of fact on all the evidence, including the various surveys and plans . . . where the true line originally ran, and was to be established.” Hurlbut Rogers Mach. Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 235 Mass. 402, 403 (1920). See Baker v. Miller, 284 Mass. 217, 222-223 (1933). Although the location of the disputed boundary was a fact at issue in the registration proceeding, G. L. c. 185, § 44, only precludes relitigation of a factual issue that was “actually tried and determined.” Compare Lombard v. United States, 194 F.3d 305, 312 (1st Cir. 1999) (interpreting § 44). The prior attempt at registration failed because, at that time, Pauli’s predecessor in title did not meet the requisite burden of proof to establish the boundary, not because the boundary was fixed elsewhere.12 Compare McCarthy v. Oak Bluffs, 419 Mass. 227, 232, 236 (1994) (subsequent suit precluded when earlier registration fully considered and resolved factual question of relevant boundary’s location). Far from concluding that the disputed boundary existed in a particular location, the judgment in the registration action simply left resolution of that question of fact for another day.13 See Hunter v. Cayer, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 729 & n.5 *680(2004) (litigant’s failure to demonstrate ownership of title interest did not compel conclusion that litigant held no title interest).

4. Abutter calls in the Perez Hall deed. Kelly next argues that the judge erred in first considering, and then giving disproportionate weight to, abutter calls in the Perez Hall deed. We disagree.

Rules of deed construction provide a hierarchy of priorities for interpreting descriptions in a deed. Descriptions that refer to monuments control over those that use courses and distances; descriptions that refer to courses and distances control over those that use area; and descriptions by area seldom are a controlling factor. See Holmes v. Barrett, 269 Mass. 497, 499-500 (1929); Ryan v. Stavros, 348 Mass. 251, 258-259 (1964). Moreover, when abutter calls are used to describe property, the land of an adjoining property owner is considered to be a monument. Holmes v. Barrett, supra at 500; Ryan v. Stavros, 348 Mass. at 259. Here, because the trial testimony had “failed to assist” in determining the true location of the disputed boundary, the judge’s decision rested, ultimately, on an interpretation of various deeds. When the judge’s decision is based on an interpretation that arises “solely from the documentary evidence,” an appellate court has the “same interpretive powers as the Land Court judge.” Darman v. Dunderdale, 362 Mass. 633, 637 (1972). See Lowell v. Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 715 (1948).

Applying these principles, we agree with the Land Court judge that the deeds in both Pauli’s and Kelly’s chain of title are facially neutral regarding ownership of the disputed parcel. With respect to descriptions that utilize monuments, various deeds describe Pauli’s land as bounded on the west by the Perez Hall property, and on the north by Kelly’s property. At the same time, various deeds describe Kelly’s parcel as bounded on the south by the Perez Hall property. These abutter calls in Pauli’s and Kelly’s direct chains of title depict a situation where either Pauli or Kelly could own the disputed parcel. Courses and *681distances are unhelpful in determining the boundary because deeds in Pauli’s and Kelly’s chains of title do not use that descriptive method.

Besides taking note of the rule that area seldom controls deed interpretation, we observe that the estimations of area in the pertinent documents do not prove or disprove Pauli’s claim of ownership. As previously noted, Huldah Hall’s 1834 will left Edmund Hall’s original farm, “containing by estimation Sixty Acres,” to Asa Hall; and in 1835, Asa Hall conveyed “the same farm” to Nathan Williams by deed but, without explanation, described the estimated area as fifty acres, an acreage repeated in subsequent deeds. Pauli’s contention that the farm contained 58.6 acres resembles the acreage in the 1834 will. Kelly’s view that the farm contained 50.4 acres resembles the subsequent estimations. In both the registration and this action, the judges considered reliance on area, but determined that several possible but unproven hypotheses made it an inapposite basis for judgment. We agree, particularly because the “more or less” language suggests that the area call is not exact and that the grantor did not intend the acreage call to be a rehable measure of what was conveyed. See Overly v. Treasurer & Recr. Gen., 344 Mass. 188, 192 (1962) (in the usual case, “[u]se of the words ‘about,’ ‘more or less,’ and the like, to qualify a statement of quantity indicates that the quantity of land is not the essence of the contract”).

Where the deed descriptions in both Pauli’s and Kelly’s chains of title are ambiguous regarding the location of their common boundary (and hence ownership of the disputed parcel), the Land Court judge properly considered the abutter calls in the Perez Hall deed as extrinsic evidence.14 See Temple v. Benson, 213 Mass. 128, 132-134 (1912); Baker v. Miller, 284 Mass. *682at 220; Ellis v. Wingate, 338 Mass. 481, 485 (1959); Ryan v. Stavros, 348 Mass. at 259-260 (resort to extrinsic evidence is appropriate to assist interpretation of ambiguous deed descriptions). The abutter calls in the Perez Hall deed resolve any ambiguity as to the location of the disputed boundary in favor of Pauli. More precisely, these abutter calls establish that northern boundary because they (1) describe the undisputed northern boundary of the Perez Hall property as running eastward along Kelly’s southern property line “to the land of Nathan Williams”; (2) identify Nathan Williams as the sole eastern abutter of the Perez Hall property15; and, most importantly, (3) accurately measure the course of the shared eastern boundary that originates at the northwest comer of the disputed parcel and then mns southerly a defined distance (156 rods) to the road.16 Accordingly, entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of Pauli was proper.

Judgment affirmed.

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