Commonwealth v. Murphy
Commonwealth v. Murphy
Opinion of the Court
The defendant was convicted after a jury trial in Middlesex County for a series of crimes based upon his appropriating the identities of other persons (mostly named Murphy) in order to obtain money and other property. He was sentenced, in effect, to nine to ten years in State prison on these offenses.
The defendant was arrested on the Middlesex charges on July 30, 1997. He was released after posting bail in the amount of $7,500 on January 6, 1999.
The defendant was due back in Superior Court in Middlesex County on April 26, 1999, for a hearing on a motion to suppress. In the interim he committed a new series of larcenies and frauds enabled by other acts of appropriation of the identities of others (not necessarily named Murphy this time). This activity attracted the attention of the Boston police, who arrested him on April 22, 1999.
On April 26, 1999, the defendant’s hearing in Superior Court
The defendant was eventually indicted in Suffolk County on June 24, 1999.
The defendant spent a total of 546 days in custody from the time of his arrest in Suffolk County (April 22, 1999) to the date of his sentencing in Superior Court in Middlesex County (October 19, 2000). Upon his sentencing in Middlesex County, although he requested full credit for those days, he received only one day of credit, reflecting the time between the guilty verdict on October 18, 2000, and sentencing on October 19, 2000.
Credit for 532 days. The Commonwealth relies upon the records of both the Suffolk County and the Middlesex County sheriffs, which seem to regard the defendant as a Suffolk prisoner and not a Middlesex prisoner. Relying on such cases as Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, supra; Commonwealth v. Carter, supra; and Commonwealth v. Blaikie, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 956 (1986), the Commonwealth argues that the defendant is not entitled to time he spent in custody awaiting trial in unrelated matters.
There are two unstated premises to the Commonwealth’s argument. The first is that the sheriffs’ records establish conclusively that the defendant was being held pursuant to the Suffolk charges and not the Middlesex charges. The second is that the defendant’s custody could be based only on one set of charges, not both. Neither premise is correct.
The docket entries of the Superior Court in both Middlesex and Suffolk counties
As stated in Commonwealth v. Carter, 10 Mass. App. Ct at 620, a defendant is generally entitled to all of the time he spent in custody awaiting trial, but not more than that. Once it is understood that the defendant was being held for trial on cases from both counties, it is incumbent on the sentencing judge to ensure that the defendant receives credit for that time against the higher sentence.
Credit for thirteen days. The defendant is not entitled to credit on the Middlesex sentences for the thirteen days from the date of arrest on the Suffolk charges to the date of the Middlesex bail increase. During this time, the defendant was held solely on the unrelated Suffolk charges and the defendant remained free on the bail he posted for the Middlesex charges. See Commonwealth v. Aquafresca, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 975, 976-977 (1981); Commonwealth v. Boland, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 451, 455 (1997). See also Commonwealth v. Blaikie, supra at 957 (“crediting the defendant on his Suffolk sentences with the Middlesex presentencing confinement would result in a perverse twist”).
The order denying the defendant’s motion to correct the mit
So ordered.
His convictions were affirmed by this court on appeal in Commonwealth v. Murphy, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 571 (2003).
General Laws c. 279, § 33A, as amended through St. 1961, c. 75, provides: “The court on imposing a sentence of commitment to a correctional institution of the commonwealth, a house of correction, or a jail, shall order that the prisoner be deemed to have served a portion of said sentence, such portion to be the number of days spent by the prisoner in confinement prior to such sentence awaiting and during trial.”
General Laws c. 127, § 129B, as amended by St. 1961, c. 74, provides: “The sentence of any prisoner in any correctional institution of the commonwealth or in any house of correction or jail, who was held in custody awaiting trial shall be reduced by the number of days spent by him in confinement prior to such sentence and while awaiting trial, unless the court in imposing such sentence had already deducted therefrom the time during which such prisoner had been confined while awaiting trial.”
Although there is a discrepancy regarding whether the defendant posted bail on January 6, 1999, or January 22, 1999, we do not address the issue of jail credits for these days, as the defendant’s appellate counsel neither asks for these days to be credited nor provides verification of detention during this time.
He was presumably held on bail or without bail on an appropriate District or Municipal Court complaint after he was arrested and until he was indicted. The record is not clear on this point.
The Superior Court in Middlesex County also gave the defendant credit for 108 days for other time held in jail, thus totaling 109 days credit toward the Middlesex sentences. These credits are not in contention. See note 4, supra.
There is no significance to the fact that different counties were involved. The point is that the defendant was being held in separate unrelated cases.
In the context of this case, a mittimus (from the Latin “we send”) is “a warrant, executed on behalf of the court by a clerk, addressed to the sheriff who ha[s] custody of the accused . . . , that directs where the prisoner shall be taken for incarceration, states what the sentence is, and states how many
Although the Suffolk cases are not before us, we note that the defendant is, however, entitled to thirteen days of credit on the Suffolk sentences. This will
Although the defendant does not receive any apparent benefit, this is not a situation where the thirteen days can be considered “dead time.” Commonwealth v. Milton, 427 Mass. 18, 24 (1998). If, for example, the longer Middlesex sentences had been reversed or vacated, then the remaining Suffolk sentences with the thirteen days credit would be beneficial. The thirteen days is thus not dead time, but it is also not time that he can bank and apply toward the unrelated Middlesex charges. See ibid.; Gardner v. Commissioner of Correction, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 31; 37-38 (2002).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Commonwealth v. John D. Murphy
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