Background. To promote the appropriate uses of scarce coastal resources consistently with the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq.),4 the Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management (OCZM)5 has since 1978 promulgated designated port area regulations governing the primary working waterfronts within Massachusetts’s developed coastal harbors. The declared purpose of such designations is “the promotion of . . . water-dependent industrial uses,” pursuant to the following objectives set forth in 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 25.01(2) (1994):

“[Wjhat remains of the industrialized coast should be preserved to the maximum extent practicable in order to meet the long term, cumulative space needs of the water-dependent industries which these areas are so well-suited to accommodate. As a matter of state policy, it is not desirable to allow these scarce and non-renewable resources of the marine economy to be irretrievably committed to, or otherwise significantly impaired by, non-industrial or nonwater-dependent types of development which enjoy a far greater range of locational options.

“Accordingly, within [designated port areas] it is the intent of the [coastal zone management] Program to encourage water-dependent industrial use and to prohibit, on tidelands subject to the jurisdiction of [G. L.] c. 91, other uses except for compatible public access and certain industrial, commercial, and transportation activities that *245can occur on an interim basis without significant detriment to the capacity of [designated port areas] to accommodate water-dependent industrial use in the future.”

Administrative proceedings. The present controversy involves the Mystic River designated port area in Charlestown (the DPA), whose boundaries were designated in 1978. It arises from the petitions of the owners of five properties in the DPA6 (all seeking to develop their properties for nonwater-dependent uses, notably residential condominium complexes), who requested that OCZM conduct what is known as a “boundary review” to determine whether their lands should remain within the DPA or be removed therefrom.7 After completing the requested boundary review, OCZM issued its decision in a boundary review dated October 9, 2002, which concluded that the Schrafft Center at 529 Main Street should no longer continue to be included within the DPA8; that the other four properties all met the designation standards set forth in the regulations for remaining in the DPA; that two of those properties, 425 Medford Street and the Charlestown Commerce Center (the CCC) at 30-50 Terminal Street, should remain in the DPA; but that 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales property at 261-287 Medford Street should be excluded from the DPA upon the owners’ satisfactory compliance with certain specified conditions.9 On December 16, 2002, the director of OCZM (director) (charged under the regulations with making the final *246determination) effectively adopted the conclusions and recommendations of the boundary review as his designation decision.

Proceedings below. That decision triggered three separate suits that were consolidated in Superior Court. United States Gypsum Company (Gypsum), owner of 200 Terminal Street,10 and La-Farge North America, Inc. (LaFarge), owner of 285 Medford Street (both located within the DPA), brought essentially identical complaints seeking reversal of the conditional exclusion from the DPA of 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales property, on the grounds that the director exceeded his authority in excluding those properties and that his decision was not supported by substantial evidence.11 The complaint of Donato Pizzuti, as trustee of the realty trust that owned the CCC, demanded the same relief as the other plaintiffs but also sought a boundary review leading to exclusion of the CCC from the DPA; challenged, as a deprivation of due process, the denial of an exclusion for the CCC in the proceedings under review; and asserted that the CCC’s continued inclusion in the DPA constituted a regulatory taking.

In a lengthy decision (on review under G. L. c. 30A), a Superior Court judge specially assigned to hear the consolidated actions denied Gypsum’s and LaFarge’s respective motions for summary judgment and Pizzuti’s motion for judgment on the pleadings,12 and allowed the defendants’ cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment. Concluding that *247the director of OCZM had discretion so to act, the judge rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the director exceeded his authority in excluding 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales property from the DPA; that the designation decision was not supported by substantial evidence13; and that it should be reversed to the extent that it excluded those properties once the conditions imposed by the director were met.14

On appeal, Gypsum presses its contention that the director *248had no discretion and no authority to exclude the two properties from the DPA and that the decision to do so lacked substantial evidence. LaFarge, focusing only on the Nancy Sales property (contiguous to its own), argues that the decision to exclude it was unsupported by substantial evidence. Intervener Conservation Law Foundation maintains that the director lacked any discretion to remove or exclude properties from the DPA, and that his decision subverts the purpose of the OCZM regulations. Pizzuti has pressed all of his arguments, including denial of due process and regulatory taking.15

We agree with the plaintiffs that the exclusion of 465 Med-ford Street and the Nancy Sales property from the DPA was in excess of the director’s discretionary authority under the regulations and was unsupported by substantial evidence, but we affirm the director’s decision as to all claims raised regarding the CCC.

Discussion. 1. The director’s authority. We acknowledge the familiar, frequently applied standard governing judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of the regulations it administers: the agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own rule is entitled *249to great weight, and “we must apply all rational presumptions in favor of the validity of the administrative action” being challenged. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Wellesley v. Housing Appeals Comm., 385 Mass. 651, 654-655 (1982), quoting from Colella v. State Racing Commn., 360 Mass. 152, 156-157 (1971). Nonetheless, despite an appropriate judicial attitude of deference, “[ojnce an agency has seen fit to promulgate regulations, it must comply with those regulations,” Royce v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 425, 427 (1983), and the “courts will not hesitate to overrule agency interpretations of rules when those interpretations are arbitrary, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the plain terms of the rule itself.” Manor v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 416 Mass. 820, 824 (1994), quoting from Finkelstein v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 370 Mass. 476, 478 (1976).16 An agency’s “considerable leeway in interpreting a statute [or regulation] it is charged with enforcing” disappears if “a statute [or regulation] unambiguously bars the agency’s approach.” Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 627, 633 (2005), quoting from Berrios v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 411 Mass. 587, 595-596 (1992). The “rationale for judicial deference ceases to apply where ... the agency has failed to adhere to its own . . . regulatory framework . . . [or] [made] a decision without sufficient evidentiary support.” Cobble v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Social Servs., 430 Mass. 385, 395 (1999). That is the situation before us.

*250The DPA designation regulations clearly state that “[a]n area of land reviewed under [the regulations] shall be included or remain in a DPA ... if CZM finds that the area is in substantial conformance with the . . . criteria governing suitability to accommodate water-dependent industrial use, as appropriate to the harbor in question” (emphasis added). 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 25.04(2) (1994). It is undisputed that 465 Medford Street, the Nancy Sales property, and the CCC were found by OCZM to “meet the designation standards [set forth] at 301 CMR 24.04(2),” which “establish[ed] the suitability of the subject properties ... to remain in the DPA.”17 Moreover, 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 25.03(5) (1994) similarly provides that:

“Within 60 days after the close of the public comment [on the boundary review], the Director shall issue a final written designation decision stating whether the area(s) under review shall be included within a DPA, in accordance with the designation standards set forth at 301 CMR 25.04” (emphasis added).

Taken together in their plain meaning (and construing “shall” in its common obligatory rather than permissive sense, see Johnson v. District Atty. for the N. Dist., 342 Mass. 212, 215 [1961]), these regulations mandate the inclusion of a property in the DPA when it meets the designation standards. They do not even hint that the director has any discretion to exclude an area that otherwise falls within designation criteria. That plain meaning is reinforced by the admonition in § 25.05(2) authorizing the OCZM to “make minor adjustments of an existing DPA boundary . . . [but] such adjustments generally should not result in a net reduction in the total area of the DPA.”18 It is further buttressed by the stated purposes of DPA regulations “to *251encourage water-dependent industrial use and to prohibit . . . other uses” (with exceptions not relevant to the uses the owners plan at 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales property), so that “what remains of the industrialized coast should be preserved to the maximum extent practicable.” 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 25.01(2).

These several complementary regulatory provisions clearly circumscribe and limit the director’s discretion in matters of designation.19 See Royce v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. at 427. He nonetheless relied on language contained in the third sentence of § 25.03(5) to support his exercise of discretion in this case. That language states: “The [director may qualify, limit, or otherwise condition the designation decision in any manner that serves the purposes of these regulations . . . .” The director, the judge, and the appellees have all asserted at various stages of this case that this discretion to “condition” a designation decision encompasses any condition that arguably ultimately benefits the over-all DPA,20 including conditioning a property’s exclusion from the DPA as was done here.

*252We do not think that the grant of limited discretion can reasonably be so broadly read. As a matter of normal syntax, the discretion to condition applies to “the designation decision” that is specified in the first sentence of § 25.03(5) — the “final written designation decision stating whether the area(s) under review shall be included within a DPA, in accordance with the designation standards” (emphasis added). It would be an extraordinary distortion of ordinary meaning to transform the discretion to condition a decision designating a property that must be included or remain in the DPA because it meets the designation criteria (as in the case of each property here) into discretion to do precisely the reverse, i.e., to exclude otherwise includable property, entirely and forever, from the regulatory framework intended to further the fundamental goal of protecting scarce coastal zone resources, with a result that tends to minimize, not maximize, the shrinking industrialized coast and undermines, not serves, the explicit purposes of the DPA regulations.

Nor do the usual and ordinary meanings of the operative words appearing in § 25.03(5) (meanings which we apply when construing otherwise undefined language of a regulation or statute, Warcewicz v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 410 Mass. 548, 550 [1991]) support the interpretation championed by the director and upheld by the judge below, but inconsistent with the plain terms and purposes of the DPA regulations. All three operative words (“qualify,” “limit,” and “condition”) connote restrictions on, or a degree of modification of, an antecedent object or state21 — here the final “designation decision stating whether ... [a property] shall be included within a DPA, in *253accordance with the designation standards.” 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 25.03(5). They would not, in ordinary usage, appear to encompass a complete change or replacement, particularly one which constitutes the very opposite of the antecedent decision, i.e., exclusion from the DPA rather than inclusion, and which is incompatible with the express public purpose of preserving our diminishing coastal zone from irretrievable commitment to non-water dependent development.22

In short, we conclude that the judge erred in upholding what amounted to unfettered discretion on the part of the OCZM director, with respect to the conditioning of the designation of properties within the DPA so as to exclude 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales property from the DPA.23 Although we must give due deference to an administrator’s “expertise and experience,” pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, the principle of deference does not extend to judicial abdication, Finklestein v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 370 Mass. at 478, particularly when the exercise of that expertise and experience is fundamentally at odds with overarching public policy, here that of protecting and preserving the Commonwealth’s marine economy and nonrenewable coastal resources to the maximum extent practicable. As the Supreme Judicial Court recently stated in an analogous context, “[t]he rights of the public in Com*254monwealth tidelands [and coastal resources] . . . cannot be relinquished by departmental regulation, regardless of the fact that the department has proffered potentially worthy public policy rationales in this regard.” Moot v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 448 Mass. 340, 353 (2007).

2. Substantiality of the evidence. Even were we persuaded that the director had the discretionary authority he claimed under the DPA regulations, his decision would have to be supported by substantial evidence to pass judicial muster. See Cobble v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Social Servs., 430 Mass. at 390; note 13, supra. We disagree with the motion judge on this point, because the record reveals that the director’s conditional exclusion decision was not so supported.24

It was generally undisputed during the proceedings below that the inadequacy of the existing transportation infrastructure was a major problem facing the DPA (the businesses within the DPA creating significant truck traffic that congests the relatively *255narrow Medford Street, which is better suited for residential use). The poor trucking facilities and annoyance to the neighboring community have been a matter of concern for decades, and as long ago as 1990, city of Boston planners studied and proposed roadway improvements in the area. It was, therefore, not illogical for OCZM and its director to conclude that a dedicated transportation corridor diverting industrial traffic off Medford Street into a two-way industrial road with a direct connection to the highway would provide substantial long-term benefits to the current and future industrial uses in the DPA. Overcoming two identified significant obstacles to construction of the roadway — paying for an engineering study and design for the transportation corridor and obtaining the right to build it over the Flatley trustees’ land at 425 and 465 Medford Street — was the rationale for OCZM’s and the director’s exclusion decision here challenged. As the judge summarized:

“Essentially, while concluding that 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales Property met the designation and standards to be included within the DPA, OCZM in its Boundary Review decided that the need for this new transportation corridor is so important to the future of the DPA that it would agree to exclude these two properties from the DPA if their owners would take specific steps [i.e., funding the design study and granting an easement] that would increase the likelihood of such a corridor being built.”

The judge concluded that there was evidence to support the director’s “reasonable decision . . . [and that the] conditions he extracted from the owners of 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales Property significantly increased the likelihood that the critical industrial roadway would be built sooner rather than later,25 and that the remaining businesses in the DPA would economically be healthier in the long run as a result.” We agree with the plaintiffs, however, that the director’s decision fails the substantial evidence test.

*256The director’s designation decision failed to address the single most important issue regarding construction of a new roadway: the financing of its cost, which had been estimated to be $5 million in 1990 and, with inflation, at least $20 million in 2005. The record contains no evidence even suggesting that the Legislature, the Governor, the city of Boston, any public agency, or any private entities would be currently willing or able to pay for the roadway’s construction, or would be willing or in a position to do so at any future time. Even if the owners of 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales property met the conditions imposed by the director as the price of their exclusion from the DPA, construction of the industrial roadway at any foreseeable time in the future remains speculative at best in the absence of any commitment of public or private funds. As even the judge noted, “[tjhere certainly remains the possibility that [the director’s] effort to ‘jump start’ the construction of this roadway will fail for lack of public funds, or that the effort will not bear fruit for many years.”26

In sum, there was no evidence — let alone substantial evidence — that the industrial roadway deemed important enough by the director to take the drastic step of excluding otherwise suitable properties from the DPA will ever be constructed, for want of financing, in the reasonably near, or even in the remote, future. The director’s decision thus failed the test of “rational probability.”27 He was not presented with a choice between two fairly conflicting views. On this record, there were not conflicting views about the clearly stated purposes of the DPA regulations to preserve water-dependent industrial uses and prohibit other uses within the DPA to the maximum extent practicable; *257nor about the subject properties meeting all of the DPA criteria (they did); nor about the director’s decision having the conceded effect of exacerbating the traffic situation; nor about the absence of any reasonably foreseeable source of financing for the industrial roadway.

The judge’s characterization of the decision’s making the roadway a reality “sooner rather than later,” with benefit to the DPA “in the long run,” was impermissibly and reversibly vague and speculative, because the evidence supporting those imprecise predictions pointed to no “appreciable probability” that the roadway would ever be built.28 The judge accordingly erred in failing to reverse the director’s designation decision to the extent it excluded 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales property from the DPA.

3. The Charlestown Commerce Center. Our ruling as to those two properties affirmatively resolves the first of CCC owner Piz-zuti’s alternative demands, for reversal of the decision excluding those properties from the DPA. As to his primary prayer — the reversal of that part of the designation decision which continued the inclusion of the CCC in the DPA, the judge correctly held that there was “more than substantial evidence” in the adminis*258trative record establishing that the CCC met the four regulatory criteria for inclusion within the DPA, as specified in 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 25.04(2) and (3) (1994). Pizzuti’s contention that his due process rights were violated by the OCZM’s failure to include him in the “negotiations” that led to the exclusion of 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales property was correctly rejected by the judge as being without factual or legal basis (the agency having fully complied with its notice and comment obligations under its regulations), and is, in any event, effectively rendered moot by our reversal of that exclusion decision.

Finally, we agree with the judge’s holding that the continued inclusion of the CCC within the DPA does not constitute an unconstitutional regulatory taking that must be annulled.29 Piz-zuti’s claim to have been deprived of all “economically viable use” of his land by virtue of its inclusion is without merit, because he failed to support his motion for judgment on the pleadings30 with any facts (in the form required by Mass. R.Civ.P. 56(e), 365 Mass. 824 [1974]), and rested only on the allegations of his unverified complaint and the conclusory assertions in his memorandum supporting his motion.

Moreover, as OCZM and the judge observed, the facts in the administrative record demonstrate that Pizzuti could not prove a takings claim as to the CCC (even were he entitled to “independent” de nova judicial review), because the DPA regulations permit twenty-five percent of the property (and, under certain conditions, up to thirty-five percent) to be used for nonwater dependent and nonindustrial purposes (so long as they are not incompatible with activities characteristic of a working waterfront).31 See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.02 (1994).

On this record (even viewed in the light most favorable to *259him), Pizzuti could not establish that inclusion of the CCC in the DPA constituted a categorical taking by depriving him of all economically beneficial use. See Zanghi v. Board of Appeals of Bedford, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 82, 83-87 (2004), and cases cited. Compare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992) (acknowledging that loss of even ninety-five percent of use of property in consequence of regulatory restrictions is not deprivation of “all” use for taking purposes).32

Pizzuti argues that he has a valid taking case even if there were not a complete denial of all beneficial use on his property (under the multifactor inquiry of Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-134 [1978], used to determine if a regulation has gone “too far” and become an unconstitutional taking). That claim was also correctly rejected by the judge. In the Penn Cent. Transp. case, the United States Supreme Court identified three principal factors to guide the inquiry: the economic impact of the regulation; the extent to which it has interfered with the owner’s “distinct investment-backed expectations”; and the character of the government actions.33 Id. at 124. Pizzuti’s claim finds no sustenance under any of the factors.

*260The economic impact here (as discussed above), even if causing a substantial diminution in the fair market value of the CCC, is not sufficiently serious or severe to create a right of compensation. See W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. City Council of Cambridge, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 559, 575 (2002); Zanghi v. Board of Appeals of Bedford, 61 Mass. App. Ct. at 89; Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993). Pizzuti could not have had a reasonable investment-backed expectation that his property would be free of DPA restrictions when it was already included as part of the DPA at the time he purchased it in 1992. See Leonard v. Brimfield, 423 Mass. 152, 155, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1028 (1996); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1030. Contrast Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-628, 631 (2001). Finally, since there was no “physical invasion” of Pizzuti’s property, the character of the governmental action here involved was not indicative of a taking. See FIC Homes of Blackstone, Inc. v. Conservation Commn. of Blackstone, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 681, 695 (1996); W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. City Council of Cambridge, supra at 575. Summary judgment was, consequently, properly granted to the defendants on Pizzuti’s taking claims.

Disposition. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, dated March 24, 2005, to the extent it denies the motions of Gypsum, LaFarge, Pizzuti, and the Conservation Law Foundation for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment seeking reversal of the decision excluding 465 Medford Street and the Nancy Sales property from the DPA. In all other respects, that judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.