The central issue on appeal is whether a judge in the Superior Court may grant postjudgment statutory interest on an award of attorney’s fees and costs made pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6E3 This pure question of law is one of first impression. After many years of litigation, with the defendants prevailing on all counts, a Superior Court judge determined that “substantially all, if not all, of the plaintiffs’ claims were wholly insubstantial, frivolous, and not advanced in good faith.” The judge concluded that the defendants are entitled to recover post-judgment interest pursuant to G. L. c. 235, § 8,4 on an award of more than $1.23 million in attorney’s fees and costs made pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6F, from the date the award was entered *328on the docket until the date of execution. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the order.

Background. Robert Fronk, Jack Saltiel, and Maila L. Walter (plaintiffs) brought a civil action against Jeffrey A. Millman, Robert Lee Wolff, Jr., Maple Leaf Cambridge Corp., and the Cambridge Company, Inc. (defendants), in 2002. They asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of partnership opportunities. After a jury-waived trial in Superior Court, the defendants prevailed on all issues in a judgment issued on June 7, 2006, and subsequently affirmed by this court. Fronk v. Fowler, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 502 (2008) (Frank I).

After the plaintiffs appealed the merits of this decision, the defendants filed a motion in Superior Court pursuant to § 6F seeking fees and costs. The trial judge granted the defendants’ motion after finding that “substantially all, if not all, of the plaintiffs’ claims were wholly insubstantial, frivolous, and not advanced in good faith.” Fronk v. Fowler, 456 Mass. 317, 318 (2010) (Frank II) (quoting Superior Court). The judge entered an award for $1.23 million in costs and fees. A single justice of this court vacated that award, but the Supreme Judicial Court ultimately reinstated it. Ibid.5

Following the trial court’s receipt of the rescript, the defendants filed a motion in the Superior Court for the computation of statutory interest on the earlier Superior Court award of fees and costs. A different Superior Court judge ruled that regardless of its descriptive title, a § 6F award of attorney’s fees and costs “qualifies as a ‘judgment for the payment of money.’ ” The judge allowed the motion and entered an order pursuant to G. L. c. 235, § 8, for postjudgment interest at the statutory rate of twelve percent per annum from February 26, 2007, the date the § 6F award had been docketed. The plaintiffs appealed this order to the single justice, who reported the case to a full panel of this court.

Discussion. The defendants contend that an award of attor-

*329As both parties agree, § 6F does not explicitly provide for interest on an award of attorney’s fees and costs to defendants who prevail against frivolous claims. The plaintiffs contend, however, that § 6F evinces an implicit intent to bar interest on the award by allowing enhanced interest in circumstances not present here. The plaintiffs argue that we should apply a principle of statutory construction known as “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” (to express one is to exclude others), arguing that the express provision for interest in one set of circumstances establishes the Legislature’s intent to exclude interest in other circumstances. However, that the Legislature excluded enhanced interest on attorney’s fees and costs where a plaintiff asserts frivolous claims does not require a determination that the Legislature intended to exclude any interest on such an award. Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 615, 620 (1997) (“a maxim of statutory construction is not to be followed ‘slavishly’ where to do so would undermine the legislative purpose behind a statute”). Moreover, we presume that the Legislature was aware of § 8 when it enacted § 6F.6 Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 130 (2003) (“The Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing statutes when it amends a statute or enacts a new one”). Where, as here, another statute provided for interest, the Legislature was not required to provide a redundant provision ordering interest in awards under § 6F. Thus, the plaintiffs’ arguments pursuant to § 6F fail, and we turn to an analysis under § 8.

Section 8 of G. L. c. 235 states that, “[wjhen judgment is rendered upon ... the finding of a justice, interest shall be *330computed upon the amount of the award . . . from the time when made to the time the judgment is entered.” For the award of interest here to be authorized by § 8, the relevant § 6F award below must be considered a “judgment.” See Osborne v. Biotti, 404 Mass. 112, 114 (1989). Without explicitly using the term “judgment,” § 6F provides that “the court shall award to each party against whom . . . claims [found to be insubstantial, frivolous, and not advanced in good faith] were asserted an amount representing the reasonable counsel fees and other costs and expenses incurred in defending such claims.” As discussed in Osborne, supra, § 8 is silent as to the meaning of the term “judgment.” The court in Osborne, in analyzing whether an “award of costs was ‘a judgment for the payment of money’ within the meaning of § 8,” ibid., determined that “an award of costs bears interest from the date of entry to the date of execution.” Id. at 117. We follow the Osborne court and also hold that a “judgment” is “the act of the trial court finally adjudicating the rights of the parties affected by the judgment” and starts the timetable for appellate review. Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(a), 365 Mass. 820 (1974). See Osborne, supra at 114; Ben v. Schultz, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 808, 811 (1999).

Like a formally titled “judgment,” an award of fees and costs pursuant to § 6F is subject to immediate appeal, starting the “timetable for appellate review.” G. L. c. 231, § 6G.7 Compare Mass.R.A.R 4(a), as amended by 430 Mass. 1603 (1999) *331(appeals may be taken from entry of judgment). Whether a § 6F award of attorney’s fees and costs is “the final adjudicating act of the trial court” is a more complicated matter. This court has previously noted that “a motion brought under [§ 6F] is not part of the merits of the underlying action but is collateral to the judgment entered in that action.” Ben, 47 Mass. App. Ct. at 813. The collateral nature of § 6F motions means that “any award granted [pursuant to § 6F] has no freestanding effect until all appeals of the underlying judgment are completed.” Id. at 814. In the case at bar, all appeals of the underlying judgment were completed in 2008 when the Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review of the decision. See Fronk v. Fowler, 451 Mass. 1107 (2008). The order granting the defendants’ motion for interest on the § 6F award was decided in January, 2011. The plaintiffs’ separate appeal of the § 6F award was also final at the time that interest was ordered. See Fronk II, 456 Mass at 336. At the time that the trial court ordered interest on the attorney’s fees and costs, the § 6F award in this case was final. We conclude that when interest was ordered on the § 6F award, this award met the definition of “judgment” for the purposes of § 8.8,9As the Supreme Judicial Court has stated, “[a] judgment will be *332treated on the footing of its substance and not of its name.” Shawmut Community Bank, N.A. v. Zagami, 419 Mass. 220, 224 (1994) (citation omitted). See Gaulin v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 746 & n.6, 748 & n.8, S.C., 401 Mass. 1001 (1987) (“award” of attorney’s fees ordered separately from judgment on underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is like “ordinary money judgment^” entitled to postjudgment interest).

Relying on Patry v. Liberty Mobilehome Sales, Inc., 394 Mass. 270, 272 (1985), and Osborne, 404 Mass, at 116, plaintiffs also argue that awarding interest on attorney’s fees, as opposed to costs,10 is improper.11 We disagree. In Patry, the Supreme Judicial Court held that “[n]o interest should have been allowed on the amount of trial court attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees are not part of the damages suffered in a G. L. c. 93A action.” Patry, 394 Mass, at 272. Subsequent cases, however, have clarified that Patry was only commenting on the availability of prejudgment interest on attorney’s fees, not the postjudgment interest on attorney’s fees that are at issue here. See International Totalizing Sys., Inc., v. PepsiCo, Inc., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 424, 437 (1990); Nardone v. Patrick Motor Sales, Inc., 46 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 453 n.3 (1999).

Because we rule that this § 6F award of attorney’s fees and costs was a judgment for the purposes of § 8, “[t]he addition of postjudgment interest is an automatic ministerial task and a judge need not expressly allow it.” Karellas v. Karellas, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 475 (2002), citing Osborne, 404 Mass, at 117. The defendants are not precluded, therefore, from interest pursuant to § 8 on the award because the judge who ordered the original § 6F award did not mention interest. See Osborne, supra at 117; Karellas, supra at 475.

Finally, we note that Massachusetts courts have ordered post-*333judgment interest on an award of attorney’s fees in a variety of contexts since Osborne and Patry were decided. See, e.g., Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 Mass. 1024, 1028 (2010) (G. L. c. 151B, § 9); International Totalizing Sys., Inc., supra at 436-437 (G. L. c. 93A); Nardone, 46 Mass. App. Ct. at 453 (G. L. c. 15IB, § 9). Postjudgment interest was appropriately ordered on both costs and attorney’s fees.

We turn to the statutory language in § 8 to determine when interest on the § 6F award begins to run. Section 8 provides that “[ejvery judgment for the payment of money shall bear interest from the day of its entry.” Interest on the defendants’ § 6F award runs from February 26, 2007, the date the award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 6F entered on the docket.12 Haddad, 455 Mass, at 1028. “Granting a judgment creditor interest on a money judgment from the entry of the judgment to its satisfaction is intended to place the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor in the same position they would have enjoyed had the debtor paid the judgment promptly.” Osborne, supra at 117. “[Considering the time value of the dollar, the only way in which a fee award will retain its stated worth is by adding interest in order to compensate for delay in payment from that point forward.” Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 660 n.4 (1992), quoting from Foley v. Lowell, 948 F.2d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 1991). If the rule were otherwise and “fees awarded as reasonable were paid after delays, net of interest, the effects as a practical matter would be to reduce those fees by indeterminate amounts without an explicable logic.” Gaulin v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 750, S.C., 401 Mass. 1001 (1987).13

Judgment affirmed.