The defendant, Manuel R. Miranda, was convicted of operating under the influence of alcohol after being stopped when he appeared to try to evade a sobriety checkpoint by making an illegal turn. Rejecting his challenge to the seizure of his person and to the impanelment of his jury, we affirm.

1. Suppression. The defendant, upon approaching a sobriety checkpoint, stopped at a green light and then made an illegal left turn, causing oncoming traffic to slow or stop. Observing this, a State police sergeant promptly stopped the defendant's vehicle. Detecting numerous indications of the defendant's intoxication, the sergeant placed the defendant into his cruiser and drove him to the checkpoint for further investigation by officers conducting the checkpoint. At the checkpoint, the defendant made an incriminating statement, failed two field sobriety tests, and took a breathalyzer test. Ultimately, the motion judge allowed the defendant's motion to suppress the statement and the breathalyzer results, but denied his motion to suppress the field sobriety tests.2

Having observed the motor vehicle infraction, the sergeant was entitled to stop the defendant. Commonwealth v. Rosado, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 212 (2013). Once the sergeant developed reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was operating under the influence of alcohol, extending the seizure to allow for field sobriety tests was appropriate. Commonwealth v. Eckert, 431 Mass. 591, 598 (2000).

The defendant's citation to the law governing sobriety checkpoints is unavailing, as the defendant was stopped for an independent motor vehicle infraction prior to arriving at the checkpoint.3 Even were we to apply that body of law, nothing in the record suggests any violation of the principle that "a sobriety checkpoint must 'be governed by standard, neutral guidelines that clearly forbid the arbitrary selection of vehicles to be initially stopped.' " Commonwealth v. Gray, 466 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2013), quoting from Commonwealth v. Murphy, 454 Mass. 318, 322-323 (2009). See Commonwealth v. Baker, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 445, 447-448 (2017) (minor deviations that do not introduce possibility of arbitrariness and discretion may be disregarded). The judge properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress as to the stop of the vehicle and the field sobriety tests.

2. Voir dire. The Supreme Judicial Court has left the decision whether to ask potential jurors about attitudes towards persons of Hispanic ancestry to the sound discretion of trial judges. See Commonwealth v. De La Cruz, 405 Mass. 269, 274 (1989) ; Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 407 Mass. 553, 554-557 (1990). Accord Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 777, 780-781 (1999). We reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon "a demonstration that the judge 'made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.' " Commonwealth v. Driscoll, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 476 (2017), quoting from L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). We discern no such abuse of discretion in the trial judge's decision not to ask the potential jurors here about such attitudes, in a case without a victim and with no indication of racial or ethnic issues.4

Judgment affirmed.