*472 This appeal raises several procedural questions concerning appeals of orders allowing attorney's fees pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6F. A judge of the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal of such an order, on the ground that his notice of appeal was untimely. We affirm.

*984 Background . This litigation began with the plaintiff's complaint challenging the issuance of a building permit to the defendants for the construction of an addition to a residence. A judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and a panel of this court affirmed the ensuing *473 judgment. See Holmes v. Andersen , 89 Mass. App. Ct. 1110 , 2016 WL 825543 (2016). The defendants then moved for an award of attorney's fees incurred in defense of that action, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6F. 2 The judge allowed the motion and, in a memorandum of decision and order dated November 15, 2016 (decision), awarded attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $84,000 to the defendants. That decision was entered on the Superior Court docket on November 23, 2016, and was mailed to the parties the same day. Both parties received the decision on November 28, 2016. The record also includes a separate "judgment," dated November 23, 2016, reflecting the award of fees; it was entered on the docket and mailed to the parties on November 28, 2016.

On December 12, 2016, fourteen days after receiving the decision on the fee award, the plaintiff filed with the Superior Court a notice of appeal from the "judgment on attorneys fees and costs ... and all related orders on this issue." On June 20, 2017, the Superior Court clerk sent notice of assembly of the record and, on June 28, 2017, the appeal was entered in the single justice session of this court. In the meantime, however, on June 27, 2017, the defendants had filed in the Superior Court a motion to dismiss the appeal. A single justice of this court allowed the defendants' motion to stay the appeal, pending action by the Superior Court on their motion to dismiss the appeal. On September 6, 2017, the Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal. This appeal from the order of dismissal followed.

Discussion . Appeals from an order awarding attorney's fees under § 6F are governed by G. L. c. 231, § 6G, the provisions of which are set out in the margin. 3 In pertinent part, § 6G requires a party appealing from an order awarding attorney's *985 fees to file a *474 notice of appeal from such an order "within ten days after receiving notice of the decision thereon." In the present case, the plaintiff received notice of the decision on November 28, 2016; accordingly, to be timely his notice of appeal was required to be filed by December 8, 2016. The plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on December 12, 2016, four days beyond the required deadline.

On appeal from the order of dismissal, the plaintiff raises several claims; we address each in turn.

The plaintiff first contends that the ten-day appeal period created by § 6G is actually thirteen days, by reason of the operation of Mass. R. Civ. P. 6 (d), 365 Mass. 747 (1974), which provides that "[w]henever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other papers upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, [three] days shall be added to the prescribed period." As a threshold matter, we observe that the ten-day appeal period, created by statute, cannot be varied by court rule. See Ben v. Schultz , 47 Mass. App. Ct. 808 , 809, 815, 716 N.E.2d 681 (1999). In any event, the rule does not apply by its terms to the appeal period established by § 6G, since that statute provides that the prescribed time runs from the date of receipt of notice, not from the date of service. 4

*475 The plaintiff next suggests that the appeal period should be calculated from the date on which he received the judgment, rather than the date on which he received the decision. 5 The argument finds no support in the language of § 6G, which provides clearly that the appeal period runs from the date on which the appealing party receives notice of the decision. Moreover, the plaintiff has offered nothing to establish that he received notice of the judgment on or after November 30, 2016, the earliest date that would bring his notice of appeal within the required appeal period (even were we to adopt his suggestion). 6

Finally, there is no merit to the plaintiff's suggestion that it would have been "more appropriate" for the single justice, rather than the Superior Court judge, to determine the timeliness of his notice of appeal. It is unclear whether the plaintiff contends that the entry of the appeal on the single justice docket operated to deprive the Superior Court of jurisdiction over the case, or whether he contends that only this court may dismiss an *986 appeal upon determination that the notice of appeal was untimely. The former proposition is incorrect, in light of the well-developed body of law supporting the propriety of staying an appeal in this court to allow the trial court to address matters pending there. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Montgomery , 53 Mass. App. Ct. 350 , 353-354 & n.7, 759 N.E.2d 714 (2001) ; Springfield Redev. Auth. v. Garcia , 44 Mass. App. Ct. 432 , 434-435, 691 N.E.2d 965 (1998). In the present case, by staying the appeal in this court pending action on the motion to dismiss the appeal filed in Superior Court, the single justice expressly recognized the authority of the Superior Court judge to act on that motion. Strictly speaking, the order of the Superior Court judge allowing the motion to dismiss the appeal is best understood as one striking the late-filed notice of appeal; the appeal itself is dismissed by docket entry on this court's docket, following the determination by the Superior Court judge that the notice of appeal was untimely. In any event, even if the plaintiff were correct in his premise it would avail him nothing. The record before us establishes that the *476 notice of appeal was untimely and required dismissal of the appeal, whether by the Superior Court judge or by a panel of this court. 7 ^, 8

Order dismissing appeal affirmed .