In 2014, after a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of larceny from a person.2 In 2015, the defendant's motion for new trial was denied without a hearing. The defendant appeals from his conviction and the denial of his new trial motion. We affirm.

1. The identification procedures. The defendant claims the Commonwealth withheld two facts about the identification procedures: (1) that the police showed the victim his keys before the showup; and (2) that the victim made a tentative identification at the end of the showup. We disagree with both claims as the defendant has failed to offer any evidence in support of the allegations.

It is the defendant's burden to prove that the Commonwealth withheld evidence it was required to disclose. Commonwealth v. Caillot, 454 Mass. 245, 261-262 (2009). As the Commonwealth has argued, the defendant has not provided any affidavits, documents, or other competent evidence of what materials were or were not disclosed to him. Thus, he has not met his burden of proof.3

2. Assistance of counsel. The defendant claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to correct the erroneous implication that the defendant had a criminal record. We disagree. First, the photograph at issue did not suggest that the defendant had a criminal record like the booking photograph did in Commonwealth v. Gerald, 356 Mass. 386, 388 (1969), the case upon which the defendant relies. The detective testified that, if the police enter a known suspect's name, "the system generates a series of photographs." There was no dispute that the defendant was already a suspect in this case, and the detective never suggested that a prior arrest was a prerequisite for having a photograph in the system.

Second, even if the testimony did leave the suggested impression, defense counsel did not possess fertile ground for impeachment of the detective's testimony because evidence that the defendant had no prior criminal record would have been irrelevant to any issue in this case, and thus inadmissible. The defendant has cited no authority, and we are aware of none, that would permit a defendant, during trial, to introduce evidence that he does not have a prior criminal record.

Third, defense counsel reasonably chose to address the photograph by asking the judge to give the jury a limiting instruction regarding it, which the judge did both during the relevant testimony, and in the final jury charge. These instructions informed the jurors that the police obtain photographs from many sources for many reasons, and that the jurors were not to infer from the fact that the police had a photograph of the defendant that he had committed any crime. The strategic choice made by defense counsel was by no means manifestly unreasonable, and not below what is expected of an ordinary fallible lawyer. See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).

The defendant also claims that counsel was ineffective because he did not file a motion to suppress the pretrial identifications and the defendant's statements in a case where the defense was mistaken identification. We disagree.

There was a reasonable tactical justification for not moving to suppress the showup identification. As stated above, counsel's strategy was to show that the defendant had been misidentified. In support of that, counsel used the victim's reported statement at the showup that he did not think the defendant was the robber. Therefore, counsel reasonably could have concluded that moving to suppress the showup would be counterproductive. See Commonwealth v. Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 104 (2001).4

The defendant also claims counsel should have moved to suppress the victim's recognition of the defendant's photograph on his identification card, and the victim's later selection of the defendant's photograph from an array because they were tainted by the original showup. Because we have concluded that the showup was not tainted, this claim must fail. In this light, those later identifications need not have been premised on an independent source. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 254-255 (2009).

Finally, the defendant claims that counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress the defendant's statements to the police. More specifically, the defendant claims that he was subjected to custodial interrogation-without the benefit of Miranda warnings-in an interior stairwell of 70 Tennis Road. We disagree.

First, putting aside the defendant's exaggeration of how many officers met him in the stairwell, the defendant was not handcuffed at the time of questioning. The questioning took place in a residential building, not a police station. The officers never mentioned the robbery or implied that he was a suspect, and there was no evidence that the officers were hostile or aggressive. Given these circumstances, the factual predicate for a finding of custody was absent, and questioning the defendant without Miranda was permissible. See Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211-212 (2001). A motion to suppress on these grounds would have failed and, thus, counsel was not ineffective for not filing one. See Commonwealth v. Vieux, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 527 (1996) (failure to pursue futile motion not ineffective assistance).5

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.