27 Ramsdell Ave., LLC v. Brown
27 Ramsdell Ave., LLC v. Brown
Opinion of the Court
This appeal follows a series of proceedings in the Superior Court, Federal District Court, and Housing Court arising from the contested foreclosure of a home formerly owned by the defendant, Fitzroy L. Brown, and his wife.
1. Standard of review. "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo." Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC,
2. Discussion. The defendant's initial argument, both on appeal and in opposition to summary judgment, is that the plaintiff has no right to title or possession of the property and lacks standing to bring the summary process action because it acquired title through an invalid assignment to its predecessor in interest, CitiMortgage, Inc. (CitiMortgage). This matter could have been litigated in the Superior Court action brought by the defendant on January 13, 2012 (2012 action), against CitiMortgage. Indeed, any claim or issue related to the plaintiff's title is predicated on the validity of CitiMortgage's title, which was questioned in the defendant's third amended complaint in the 2012 action, and could have been resolved in that proceeding. The Superior Court judge entered judgment against the defendant, and he did not appeal. As a result, the defendant's claim in the Housing Court action is precluded by res judicata. See DeGiacomo v. Quincy,
Nonetheless, the defendant argues that claims related to title and foreclosure are not precluded because they could not have been litigated in the initial Superior Court action decided before the foreclosure process began on June 30, 2016. The problem, however, is that the alleged invalidity of the December, 2011, assignment of the mortgage to CitiMortgage could have been litigated even before the foreclosure began. Given that the defendant was aware of the assignment, openly questioned its validity, and the right of CitiMortgage to foreclose on the defendant's home was fundamental to the defendant's 2012 action, this matter could and should have been litigated in the proceedings prior to the foreclosure. Likewise, the only other challenge specifically discussed in the Housing Court was the 2009 "Home Affordable Modification Program"
Beyond this, the defendant's opposition to summary judgment did not raise any other independent title defect or matter arising out of the foreclosure that could now be litigated.
We recognize the defendant represented himself before the Housing Court and on appeal. "[A]lthough some leniency is appropriate" in determining whether a pro se litigant complies with procedural requirements, Brossard v. West Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dept.,
Judgment affirmed.
The defendant's wife, Dawne Brown, did not file a responsive pleading or appear at trial in the Housing Court. As a result, she was defaulted and is no longer a party to this action.
This program is also referred to in the materials before us as the "Home Affordable Mortgage Program."
The only reference to strict statutory compliance in foreclosure proceedings relates specifically to the defendant's already-foreclosed title defect argument.
The plaintiff's request for double costs is denied.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.