NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT 22-P-751 S.M.

vs. R.M.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0 The defendant appeals from an order extending a G. L. c. 209A abuse prevention order. She contends that the extension of the order should be vacated because: (1) the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proof, (2) the judge failed to address the plaintiff's "false statements," and (3) the judge violated her due process rights. We affirm.

Background. On March 8, 2022, following an ex parte hearing, a District Court judge issued an abuse prevention order (order) on behalf of the plaintiff, S.M., and against the defendant, R.M.1 On March 18, 2022, following a hearing attended

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review the extension of a 209A order "for an abuse of discretion or other error of law." Noelle N. v. Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, (2020), quoting E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass. 558, 562 (2013). "[A] judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge made 'a clear error of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of

reasonable alternatives" (citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

2. Analysis. The defendant first argues that evidence at the extension hearing did not demonstrate a basis for a finding that the plaintiff was in reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm within the meaning of G. L. c. 209A. She further contends that the judge failed to address the plaintiff's "false statements." The arguments are unavailing.

As noted above, a judge has discretion to issue a protective order under G. L. c. 209A if the defendant is "placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm." Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 737 (2005), quoting G. L. c. 209A, § 1. The touchstone of the court's analysis is whether the plaintiff is "currently in fear of imminent serious physical harm" and whether that "fear is reasonable." Id. "In evaluating whether a plaintiff has met her burden, a judge must consider the totality of the circumstances of the parties' relationship." Id. at 740. Here, the judge could have found, and did find, that the defendant threw a "slate" at the plaintiff; that the slate shattered and struck the plaintiff on the left hip; that three years earlier the defendant had thrown a large beer mug at the plaintiff; and that five months prior to the plaintiff's testimony at the extension hearing, the defendant had thrown a "Blue Moon pint glass" at the plaintiff.

The plaintiff testified to repeated assaultive behavior by the defendant and the judge explicitly credited the plaintiff's testimony.4 The judge determined that the plaintiff had "met his burden" and was "in fear of harm from the [d]efendant regarding her assaultive behavior on the date in question that gave rise to the [underlying] criminal case." The record supports the judge's findings, and we cannot substitute our judgment for hers. Indeed, when determining the continuing need for the order, the judge was in the best position to examine the parties and weigh their credibility. See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 526 (1997). See also Yahna Y. v. Sylvester S., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 185 (2020) ("We accord the credibility determinations of the judge who 'heard the testimony of the parties . . . [and] observed their demeanor,'. . . the utmost deference" [citations omitted]).

Finally, the defendant contends that the judge deprived her of her due process right to a fair hearing. This argument is likewise unavailing. Evidentiary rulings are committed to the sound discretion of the judge. See A.P. v. M.T., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 161 (2017) (judge has broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary issues). In addition, the guidelines for abuse

prevention proceedings state, in relevant part, "[e]ach party must be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the other party's evidence in any contested hearing." Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Proceedings § 1:02(f) (Oct.

2021). Here, the transcript reveals that the judge conducted a comprehensive hearing, considered the defendant's arguments, allowed substantial and detailed cross examination of the plaintiff, credited the plaintiff's testimony, and determined that the plaintiff was "in fear of imminent serious physical harm." G. L. c. 209A, § 1. Furthermore, the defendant neither testified nor called any witnesses to testify. The transcript does not reveal any evidentiary rulings that constituted an abuse of discretion or deprived the defendant of the meaningful opportunity to examine the plaintiff's evidence or be heard.

See A.P., supra at 161. The defendant received a fair hearing

and thus we affirm the May 3, 2022, extension of the abuse prevention order.5 Order entered May 3, 2022, affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Neyman & Walsh, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: November 17, 2023.