Stremsky v. Levenson
Opinion of the Court
Action of tort to recover for injuries suffered by reason of a fall caused by an artificial accumulation of snow and ice on a sidewalk adjoining premises owned by the defendant.
The plaintiff declared in two counts: one, basing the plaintiff’s claim on the negligence of the defendant; the other, alleging the maintenance of a nuisance. The court found for the plaintiff on the negligence count and for the defendant on the count declaring a nuisance.
There was evidence that the plaintiff fell on an artificial accumulation of ice on the sidewalk adjoining the premises of the defendant; that said ice appeared to be caused by a flow of water from a gutter on the side of the house; the ice could be seen from the locus of the injury to the wall of the defendant’s house, and thence upward to a point near the gutter where there was a noticeable sag in the level of the gutter. On the day preceding the accident there was a temperature range of 2i° to 32o farenheit.
On these facts a finding for the plaintiff on the nuisance count would have been warranted. Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 106 Mass. 194; Leahan v. Cochran, 178 Mass. 566, 570; Lamereaux v. Tula, 312 Mass. 359. While there are circumstances under which
In the cause under review the court was not obliged to rely on a dogmatic fiction to sustain the claim for negligence. The evidence indicates the presence of a sagging gutter on the defendant’s roof, a gutter that was lower in the middle than at the ends. The overflow from the gutter to the street was directly traceable to this sagging condition and to the failure of the defendant
There is no merit to the claim of the defendant that the finding for the defendant on the nuisance claim bars a right to find for the plaintiff on the negligence count.
The findings of fact made by the court clearly indicate that its disposition of the •nuisance count was for the sole purpose of simplifying the issue. It was unnecessary to the plaintiff’s case. The finding for the defendant on this count had no other effect than to strike it from the pleadings. See: G. L. c. 231, §86. Report dismissed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.