Johnston v. Usher
Opinion of the Court
In this action of contract the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant upon an account annexed the sum of $560.00 for room and board at $10.00 per week from November 1,1943 to December 1,1944.
The defendant’s answer is a general denial and an allegation of payment.
The plaintiff’s evidence tends to show that she lived with her husband and two minor children on Union Street, in Springfield; that at some time in July 1943, the defendant, at the request of the plaintiff’s husband, came to board and room at the plaintiff’s home, agreeing to pay therefor the sum of $8.00 per week, which amount he paid to the plain-. tiff’s husband until the husband went to the hospital the first of November 1943, and the defendant never paid anything thereafter, although he continued to board and room at the plaintiff’s home until December' 1944; that the husband died on January 24, 1944; that some time in November 1943, the plaintiff told the defendant that she would
The defendant’s testimony contradicted that of the plaintiff and described an altogether different arrangement between the parties but the Report states that his testimony was disbelieved by the court.
The defendant duly made the following requests for rulings: 1. Upon all the evidence the plaintiff is not entitled to recover unless she proves an express contract to pay $10.00 weekly for room and board; 2. Upon all the evidence the plaintiff is not entitled to recover unless there was a mutual intent to contract, either express or implied; 3. Upon all the evidence, if the plaintiff and the defendant were living together illegally, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
The trial judge made the following disposition of the defendant’s requests: 1. First request denied as the plaintiff on an account annexed can recover what the room and board was reasonably worth; 2. Second request granted as a correct statement of law, but the court found an implied contract; 3. Third request granted as a correct statement of law, but the court found there was no illegality in the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.
After the finding for the plaintiff, the defendant duly made a motion for a new trial because of newly discovered evidence and for mistake of law injuriously affecting his substantial rights. He gave as reasons for the motion that the plaintiff, from December 1944 until June 6, 1946, the date of the trial, had in her possession all of the defendant’s bank statements, cancelled checks and bank books covering a period from October 1943 to February 1945; that the plain
The trial judge denied the motion for new trial and has reported for decision his action in refusing the new trial and also his action in dealing with the defendant’s requests.
The defendant’s first and second requests were properly dealt with and refused by the trial judge in view of his Findings of Fact; See Hathaway vs. Cronin, 301 Mass. 419, 421, where the court says “A plaintiff who declares on a count on an account annexed has by legal intendment made, with respect to the items stated in the account annexed, all the allegations contained in all the common counts”. It is to be noted that the defendant paid the plaintiff’s' husband $8.00 -a week until the husband went to the hospital in November 1943 and that thereafter, when the plaintiff' told him that she would have to raise the price to $10.00 per week, he did not decline to make any payment but insisted he would not pay $10.00 a week because of the arrangements he had made with the plaintiff’s husband. On all the evidence we think the judge was warranted in finding an implied contract on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff for his board and room after October 1943, at which time the plaintiff’s husband had left the household never to return.
The third request was properly dealt with as the judge declined to find the facts upon which the request was predicated.
There appears to have been no error in the denial of the defendant’s motion for new trial or in the denial of his Requests for Rulings and the Report is, therefore, ordered dismissed.
The Hon. Charles L. Hibbard, the then Presiding Justice, presided at the hearing in this ease but died before the Opinion was written.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.