Kaplan v. Arbella Mutual Insurance
Opinion of the Court
Michael H. Kaplan, D.C. (“Kaplan”) commenced this action against Arbella Mutual Insurance Company (“Arbella”) seeking payment under G.L.c. 90, §34M of personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits for chiropractic services he provided to Arbella’s insured. The trial court allowed Arbella’s Mass. R. Civ. R, Rule 56 motion for summary judgment based on the failure of Arbella’s insured to cooperate by submitting to an independent medical examination (“IME”) ,
Arbella’s insured, Chantal Monge (“Monge”), a minor, was injured in a motor vehicle accident on April 12, 2003 while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Arbella’s policyholder, Maria Santiago.
Copies of the May 29 and June 13,2003 IME letters were sent by Gateway to both the attorney and Arbella. Arbella received its copies. There is no proof that either Monge, or the attorney, received theirs.
Arbella’s insurance contract with Maria Santiago, issued in accordance with the PIP statute, §34M, afforded Arbella the “right to require [the injured] person to be examined by [medical providers] selected by” Arbella, and provided that “ [f] ailure to cooperate with [Arbella could] result in the denial of the claim.” The same obligation to undergo an IME is imposed by the statute, and noncooperation in attending an IME is an affirmative defense available to an insurer defending against a §34M PIP claim. The sole question on this appeal is whether there exists a genuine factual issue as to noncooperation by Monge due to her failure to participate in the IME.
Arbella’s case clearly fails at the very outset, for Monge did attend the first scheduled IME. It was the examining chiropractor’s decision, not Monge’s, to send her away and not to proceed with the IME. His stated reason was that she was a minor, three months short of her eighteenth birthday, and needed to be accompanied by a
After terminating the IME for which Monge had dutifully appeared, Gateway sent the next two letters to reschedule the IME to the wrong street address. See Barron Chiropractic & Rehabilitation, P.C. v. Premier Ins. Co. of Mass., 2009 Mass. App. Div. 1, 3 (discrepancy in zip codes raised question whether injured party received INIE notices). There is nothing in the record to establish that Monge ever received those letters. While Arbella argues that Monge’s attorney was also sent copies of the notices, it had no knowledge of the extent of the attorney’s contacts with Monge. At most, it appears that the attorney’s contacts were with Monge’s mother.
Significantly, neither Gateway, nor Arbella, sent a copy of the IME notice to Monge’s mother, whom the examining chiropractor wanted to accompany Monge to his office. Even if it could be proved that Monge received the notices, and on the record presented it has not, Arbella can hardly claim, on the one hand, that this minor was not competent to be given a medical examination without a parent present but, on the other hand, was competent, without a parent, to receive and act upon a legal or medical notice. In its quest to defeat Kaplan’s §34M claim, Arbella may not have it both ways.
In allowing summary judgment in favor of Arbella, the motion judge opined at the hearing that even without any evidence presented by Kaplan, Arbella’s defense of noncooperation was overwhelming. We must, respectfully, disagree. Even without a counteraffidavit from Kaplan, based on Arbella’s evidence alone, it is clear that a genuine issue of material fact critical to Arbella’s defense remains to be resolved. Arbella failed to satisfy its Rule 56 burden, and the case must go to trial.
Summary judgment for the defendant is vacated. The case is returned to the Lawrence Division of the District Court Department for trial.
So ordered.
Kaplan also sought damages on additional complaint counts pursuant to G.L.c. 93, c. 93A, c. 176D, and c. 90, §34A. While summary judgment was entered for Arbella on all of his claims, Kaplan has appealed only the judgment against him on his §34M claim.
Counsel stated at oral argument that Maria Santiago is Monge’s mother.
Unlike subsequent notices, this initial notice to Monge is not included in the record and was not before the motion judge. It is not known what mailing address was used, a factor of some significance, as recited below
The attorney purportedly represented Monge, but see note 5 infra.
According to Arbella’s claims adjuster, Arbella received notification, most likely in the form of a letter of representation, from the attorney “[o]n or about May 30, 2003” that he “was representing Monge in her claim for PIP benefits.” However, the second IME notice to Monge was dated the day before receipt of this notification, on May 29, 2003. While a copy of the second IME notice was sent to the attorney, it is unclear what Arbella understood the attorney’s role to be, to wit, whether on May 29, 2003 he represented Monge or her mother, or both, or neither.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.