Goldman & Pease, LLC v. Collins
Opinion of the Court
This is the defendants’ appeal of the denial of their motion for an enlargement of time to file a notice of appeal and of the courts dismissal of their appeal.
Plaintiff Goldman & Pease, LLC (“Goldman”), a Needham law firm, brought this action against defendants Ralph and Jennie Collins (collectively, the “Collinses”) to recover alleged unpaid legal fees. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Goldman. Judgment was entered on May 18, 2010. The Dist./Mun. Cts. R. A. D. A., Rule 4(a), ten-day period for the Collinses to file an appeal expired on May 28,2010.
Two months later, on July 30, 2010,
Goldman filed a largely irrelevant opposition to the motion and a request for dismissal of the Collinses’ appeal. Goldman argued that the Collinses had failed to comply with various provisions of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure, inapplicable to appeals to this Appellate Division, and asserted in conclusory fashion that the appeal was “without merit.” After hearing, the judge denied the Collinses’ Rule 4(c) motion on the sole ground that the “appeal by the defendants lacks merit,” and dismissed the appeal.
1. We note at the outset that there is no merit in Goldman’s initial contention on this appeal that the denial of the Collinses’ Rule 4(c) motion was required because it was filed two months after the expiration of the Rule 4(a) notice of appeal filing period. While the Collinses captioned their motion as one pursuant to Rule 4(c),
2. In any event, despite Goldman’s contentions, the denial of the Collinses’ motion was not based on any finding that it was untimely or brought pursuant to the wrong rule. The denial was instead predicated solely on the single determination by the trial judge that the Collinses’ appeal “lacked merit.” The “relative merits of the appeal” is only one factor, however, to be considered in deciding a Rule 14(b) motion. See Georgantis v. Star Mkt. Cos., 2000 Mass. App. Div. 77, 78. And the appli
3. On the basis of the record before us, the judge’s conclusion that the appeal “lacked merit” was, for Rule 14(b) purposes, erroneous.
The present case is not one in which the Rule 14(b) moving party suggested nothing more than his own ignorance or neglect in failing to comply with filing time requirements. The Collinses’ attorney submitted his affidavit that he mailed a timely notice of appeal and filing fee, the clerk’s office initially acknowledged and confirmed receipt of that timely filing,
The denial of the Collinses’ extension motion on the sole ground that their appeal lacked merit was, in the circumstances of this case, an error of law.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the Collinses’ appeal and the denial of their Rule 14(b) motion for additional time to “re-file” their appeal are vacated. This case is returned to the trial court for a reconsideration, by any judge, of the Collinses’ Rule 14(b) motion, consistent with this opinion and upon such evidence as the parties may be provide.
So ordered.
Although both parties refer to an August 4, 2010 filing date for the Collinses’ motion, they have confused the filing date with the date of entry of that filing on the trial court docket. The motion itself bears the trial court’s date stamp of July 30, 2010. A docket entry for August 4, 2010 states that the motion was filed on July 30, 2010.
In addition to its caption, the Collinses’ motion itself was signed under the pains and penalties of perjury by their attorney.
There are no statements, or affidavits, from anyone in the clerk’s office. See Eyster v. Pechenik, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 773, 777-778 (2008).
Rule 4(c) provides: “Upon a showing of excusable neglect or other good reason, the trial court may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal by any party for a period not to exceed ten days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this rule. Such an extension may be granted before or after the time otherwise prescribed by this rule has expired. A request for an extension shall be made by motion with such notice as the trial court shall deem appropriate, and in no event shall the court permit the filing of a notice of appeal later than 180 days after entry of the judgment or post-judgment order of which appeal is sought.”
As this appeal is limited solely to the propriety of the trial court’s denial of the Collinses’ extension motion and the dismissal of their appeal, we express no opinion on the substantive merits of those issues, or on the likelihood of the Collinses prevailing on appeal.
A Rule 14(b) ruling is reviewed first, for possible errors of law, and if none, for abuse of discretion. Troy Indus., supra at 581.
See Samuels v. SUFA Corp., 38 Mass. App. Ct. 922 (1995) (notice of appeal presented to clerk’s office is “filed” even if not docketed).
Goldman argues that the Collinses could have avoided any uncertainty about their filings if they had delivered the documents to the trial court, or sent them by certified mail with a return receipt requested. While the failure to do so exposes a filing party to the risk that his mail could be lost, see Mulhall v. Sheraton Needham Hotel, 2003 Mass. App. Div. 192, 193, the use of regular mail does not per se constitute inexcusable neglect. Moreover, in this case, the clerk’s office initially confirmed the receipt of the Collinses’ mailed documents.
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