Stevenson v. Education Credit Management Corp. (In re Stevenson)
Cases that cite this one
5 later published cases cite this decision.
- Parvizi v. U.S. Department of Education(Great Lakes Borrowers (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts 2021)
- Parvizi v. U.S. Department of Education(Great Lakes Borrowers (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts 2021)
- Schatz v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Acs Loan Servicing, Inc. (In re Schatz) (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts 2018)
- Ablavsky v. United States Department of Education (In re Ablavsky) (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts 2014)
- Rossman v. United States (In re Rossman) (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts 2012)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se appellant Janice Wilson Stevenson appeals from the entry of an order by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts finding that her student loan debt owed is non-dis-chargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The Bankruptcy Court conducted an exhaustive analysis of the circumstances under which student loan debt may be discharged, and ultimately determined that Appellant Stevenson’s debt was non-dischargeable because she did not demonstrate that the failure to discharge her debt “would impose an undue hardship....”
First, after careful review of the record, and for the reasons stated by the Bankruptcy Court, this court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that Appellant failed to prove an undue hardship.
Second, the District Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court’s exclusion of evidence fof abuse of discretion. Here, after the close -of discovery, Stevenson raised alleged post-petition FDCPA violations by Appellee for the first time.
Lastly, there is no evidence on the record that Appellant raised her retaliation and racial stigma argument before the Bankruptcy Court. It is settled law “that, ‘absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.’”
The order by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts is AFFIRMED. Consequently, Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss [# 10] and Appellee’s Motion to Strike the Appellant’s Appendix [# 14] are DENIED AS MOOT. Because Stevenson appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling and this court affirms that ruling, Stevenson has fourteen days from the date of this order to inform the Bankruptcy Court, in writing, whether she will participate in the United States Department of Education William D. Ford Direct Loan Repayment Program. If Stevenson does so, and represents that she will, in good faith, abide by the provisions of the Income Based Repayment Plan Option, then the Bankruptcy Court has the authority to amend its original order and enter a judgment partially discharging her student loan debt to the extent any remains at the expiration of the repayment plan under the Ford Program.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
. In Appellant’s Brief, Appellant lists four separate issues in her "Statement of the Issues.” Two of these issues focus on whether the Bankruptcy Court failed to properly apply the law. Read in the context of the rest of Appellant’s Brief, these two issues seem to be asking whether the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion by failing to consider evidence of a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The court analyzes them as one issue on appeal.
. Appellant’s Br. at 6 [# 13],
. Appellee’s Designation of Additional Docs, for the R. on Appeal [# 5], attach. 2, pp. 4-5.
. Appellee’s Designation of Additional Docs, for the R. on Appeal, attach. 2, pp. 1-3.
. Appellee’s Designation of Additional Docs, for the R. on Appeal, attach. 5.
. See Goldstein v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. (In re Goldstein), 201 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr.D.Me. 1996); cf. Wilkinson v. EMC Mortg. (In re Wilkinson), Bankr.No. 07-50189, Adversary No. 11-05056, 2012 WL 112945, at *11 (Bankr.W.D.Tex. Jan. 12, 2012) ("Because the Wilkinsons’ unreasonable collection efforts and FDCPA claims arose post-petition ... this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address these claims.”); Frambes v. Nuvell Nat’l Auto Fin., LLC (in re Frambes), 454 B.R. 437, 438 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. 2011) ("The factual allegations which give rise to the Debtors’ claims for violations of the FDCPA ... have all occurred post-petition and are not properly of the Debtor's estate. Whatever their outcome, the Debtor’s estate will be unaffected. Thus, the Court lacks ‘related to’ jurisdiction over these claims.”).
. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaría v. Wiscovitch-Rentas (in re E. Net-Velazquez), 625 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992)); see also Noonan v. Rauh (In re Rauh), 119 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 1997) ("A party may not raise new arguments for the first time on appeal.”).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.