Poncin v. Central Locating Service, Ltd.
Opinion of the Court
The defendants Central Locating Service, Ltd. (“CLS”) and Richard Bray (“Bray”) seek to exclude evidence that Bray tested positive for marijuana on March 5, 1998, the day following the explosion and three days after he performed the gas locate at issue in this case. According to Bray, he smoked marijuana for the first time on March 4 after learning of the explosion. In their supplemental memorandum, CLS and Bray urge this court to reconsider the May 5,2003 bench ruling allowing evidence that Bray failed the drug test to be introduced for the limited purpose of showing bias. Bray was not removed from CLS’s payroll until January of 2000 despite CLS’s policy of immediate dismissal of locators who test positive for drugs. On March 5, 1998 — the same day as the drug test and before he knew that CLS would retain him on the payroll — Bray told an investigator that CLS had not trained him that gas service could exist at a location with no exterior indication of service. Several years later, with knowledge that CLS had retained him on its payroll despite its policy, Bray testified that he had falsely stated on March 5, 1998 that he had no training that utilities could be located in the basement without an exterior indicator of gas service. Thus, the positive test result is relevant to bias. The extent to which Bray’s testimony helps or hurts CLS and varies from any prior statements made by Bray goes to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility to show bias. The jury will receive limiting instructions when the evidence is introduced and again in the charge, if requested. The probative value of the evidence with respect to bias outweighs the potential for prejudice.
Plaintiffs argue that, even without expert testimony as to the length of time that marijuana smoked on March 2,1998 would remain detectable by a drug test, the positive test result should be admissible as evidence from which the jury could infer that Bray was under the influence of a controlled substance when he performed the locate several days earlier. In Johnson v. MBTA, 418 Mass. 783 (1994), upon which the plaintiffs rely, the Court held that an employer properly terminated an employee for operating a bus while under the influence, based in part on a positive urine sample taken only one day following the alleged violation. Id. at 787-85. The primary issue in that case was whether the employer had probable cause to demand the drug test. Id. at 785-86.
The cases from other jurisdictions on which the plaintiffs rely for the proposition that a positive drug test may create an inference that an employee was under the influence at an earlier time are distinguishable in light of the nature of the other evidence in those cases suggesting drug use that is absent in this case. E.g., Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (not abuse of discretion to admit drug test performed two days after boat accident to show crew member under influence at time of accident where there was evidence of prior drug use and convictions by crew).
ORDER
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Supplemental Memorandum, to the extent that it is deemed to be a Motion for Reconsideration of the bench ruling allowing the test result to be introduced to show bias, be and hereby is DENIED. It is further ORDERED that Central Locating Service, Ltd. and Richard Bray’s Motion In Limine to Exclude Evidence that Bray Tested Positive for Marijuana After the Explosion is ALLOWED to the extent that it seeks to exclude the test results from being offered to support an inference that Bray was under the influence of drugs prior to the explosion.
he court’s ruling on whether the admission of post-accident dmg test evidence constituted an abuse of discretion was not essential to the decision because the court further found that “even if the court had abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, [the defendant] was not substantially prejudiced because the court expressly found that the crew’s dmg use did not cause the collision.” Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d at 505.
Evidence that the train operator was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the accident was the only basis for finding that the defendant had breached the applicable standard of care. Johnson v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 764 F.Sup. at 1573.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.