Eagle Wood Construction v. CKS Woodbury Nominee Trust
Opinion of the Court
Defendants move for the Court to reconsider its denial, on August 23, 2006, of defendants’ previous motion to vacate the default judgment dated July 26,2006 and to grant defendants leave to file a responsive pleading. Plaintiffs present motion for reconsideration is accompanied by several affidavits which provide important facts which were not presented previously to the Court.
Suit was filed on May 12, 2006, alleging that payment of $56,560 remained unpaid on account of work performed under a construction contract regarding modifications to Shorters’ home in Lexington, Massachusetts. Defendants assert that work began in September 2005, but that on November 30, 2005, plaintiff demanded an unanticipated increase in contract price and threatened to quit work unless it was paid. On March 23, 2006, defendant’s then-counsel, Joseph C. Steinkrauss, advised plaintiff in writing that the con
Defendant asserts it would be a “gross miscarriage of justice” to be required to pay almost $58,000 as a result of the dereliction of his first attorney, Steinkrauss.
It does appear from the additional affidavits filed that the Shorters took reasonable steps to have their counsel defend the case, but that Steinkrauss incompetently failed to do so. It also appears from Shorter’s affidavit that there is a bona fide dispute, so that there could be “manifest injustice” if the default judgment is permitted to stand. As stated in Berube v. McKesson Wine and Spirits Co., 7 Mass.App.Ct. 426 (1979), at 431, courts are generally “reluctant to attribute to the parties the errors of their legal representatives.” Considering the factors bearing on the removal of a default judgment which are enumerated in Berube at 430, the Court finds that defendants (as distinguished from their counsel) “did act properly after entry of the judgment,” that defendants have “asserted facts by affidavit that the claims sought to be revived have merit,” that the “neglectful conduct occurred before trial” (indeed, it occurred only a couple of months after suit was filed), that “no prejudice has resulted to the other parly,” except unnecessary legal expense, and that “tire error is chargeable to the party’s legal representative rather to the party himself.” While Steinkrauss did consciously “choose a course of conduct” which foreseeably resulted in the default, all of the other factors enumerated in Berube militate against allowing the default to stand.
ORDER
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for reconsideration is ALLOWED, and the default judgment is VACATED. Defendants are given leave to file, within seven business days from the docketing of this Order, their responsive pleadings. Defendants shall pay to plaintiff its reasonable attorney fees and costs that have resulted from defendants’ failure to promptly respond to the complaint.
If the parties cannot agree on the amount of these reasonable attorney fees and costs, they may make application to the Court in regard thereto.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.