M'Gregor v. Brown
Opinion of the Court
It is clear from the case of Waterhouse v. Waite that it is not incumbent on the officer to cause an
We see no valid objection to the admission of the parol evidence. It did not add to, nor contradict the return, but was introduced to show that the land levied on under one description was the same as that which had been attached under a different description.
As to the right of property, it is said that the subsequently attaching creditors cannot hold the land, for that they had notice of the plaintiffs’ attachment; and the case has been likened to one in which a party has notice of a prior unrecorded deed. But the same principle does not apply in the case of a prior attachment. It does not appear that the intervening creditors knew that the plaintiffs would recover a judgment and would levy on the land; and besides, all creditors who are in pursuit of satisfaction of their debts by means of attachment, are considered as running a race on equal ground, and each is entitled to take advantage of defects in the proceedings of the others. See Cushing v. Hurd, 4 Pick. 253.
This is now made a part of the duty of the officer, by Revised Stat c 73, § 17.
The time of returning into the clerk’s office an execution extended on land, is not material, if it has been recorded in the registry of deeds within three months after the extent. Emerson v. Towle, 5 Greenl. 197; Welsh v. Joy, 13 Pick. 481.
See Revised Stat. c. 73, § 18; M'Mechan v. Griffin, 3 Pick. (2d ed ) 154 157, notes, and cases there collected.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.