Heywood v. Perrin
Heywood v. Perrin
Opinion of the Court
The first question which arises upon this report is, as to the admissibility of the parol evidence.
As it appears by the face of the note itself, that the memorandum, “ One half payable in 12 months, the balance in 24. months,” was not embraced in the body of the note, but was written at the bottom, after the attestation of the subscribing witness, it was competent for either pa ty to prove by parol
From the evidence thus admitted, it appears that after the note was written and signed, but before its delivery, the defendant objected to it as a note payable on demand ; that thereupon the memoradum thus recited was written, and then it was delivered as the contract of the defendant. We are then to consider the 'memorandum as a part of the contract, in the same manner as if it had been included in the body of the note, or placed over the defendant’s signature, and it is to be construed accordingly.
In construing a contract, every word and clause shall be taken into consideration, and have an effect given to it if possible. Here we think the memorandum was intended to limit and control the generality of the words “on demand.” If these words stood alone, the demand might be made immediately or at any future time. But the memorandum limits this right and restrains the promisee from making such demand, as to one half, to. 12 months, and the other to 24 months. A promise to pay on demand, after a certain number of days or months, is not an unusual form of promissory note ; it is an intelligible contract, and attended with no fatal repugnancy ; and we think, in its legal effect, the note under consideration is similar.
It has been contended, that the stipulation for a term ot credit was provisional, namely, if the defendant should remain
It has been further contended, that the memorandum, if it is to have any effect, is to be taken as a distinct collateral contract, not to sue or demand payment within the times specified ; upon the breach of which, if the defendant has sustained damage, he may have an action, but that it cannot be relied upon to control the original contract, within the principle of Dow v. Tuttle, 4 Mass. R. 414.
We think it is impossible to bring this case within that principle. Here the clause in question was part of the note, written and delivered at the same time. Besides, the terms of the memorandum are conclusive. The words are, “payable,” &c. that is, the money stipulated to be paid, is to be paid in a particular specified term of time. They constitute a part of the promise, and qualify it. It is impossible to regard them as a collateral and independent contract.
One instalment only being due by the terms of the note, when the action was commenced, judgment must be rendered for only one half of the amount of the note, with interest.
See Eaton v. Emerson, 14 Maine R. (2 Shepley,) 335 ; Hanson v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 506; Spring v. Lovett, 11 Pick. 420.
See Wheelock v. Freeman, 13 Pick. 167 to 169; Homer v. Wallis, 11 Mass. R. 309; Odiorne v. Sargent, 6 N. Hamp, R. 401; Ulmer v. Reed, 2 Fairfield, 293; Central Bank v. Willard, 17 Pick. 150; Hobart v. Dodge, 1 Fairfield, 156.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Daniel Heywood versus Horatio Perrin
- Status
- Published