delivered the opinion of the Court. It was objected at the trial, that the plaintiffs had not made out a prima facie case, and two questions were thereupon reserved for the consideration of the whole Court.

1. Whether by the terms of the contract between Hunting & Lawrence and Evans, the latter, under whom the defendant claims, was interested in the bricks in question as joint *181tenant or tenant in common, when they were made in pursuance of tnat contract and were fit for market.

2. If that were so, then whether, upon the facts proved, such a sale and delivery had been made by Evans at the time of the defendant’s attachment, as to divest his interest.

As to the first question, we are of opinion, that by the terms of the contract, the bricks when made were the joint property of the contracting parties. By this contract Hunting & Lawrence were to furnish the materials for manufactur ing the bricks, and to attend to the sale of them ; Evans on his part undertook to manufacture the bricks, to hire and board the laborers employed for that purpose, and to allow Hunting & Lawrence sixty cents per thousand for every thousand of bricks made or clay sold, as rent thereof; and after all expenses should be paid, then the parties agreed to share the profit and loss, as the case might be, one half each. That this amounts to a complete contract of partnership, cannot, we think, admit of a doubt. Partnership is defined to be a voluntary contract between two or more persons, for joining together their money, goods, labor, and skill, or either or all of them, upon an agreement, that the gain or loss shall be divided proportionably between them. Gow, 2. With this definition the contract in question fully agrees. It contains every essential requisite in a contract of partnership. The parties agreed to join together their property, skill and labor, for the purpose of accomplishing an enterprise, in which they were to have a communion of interest and a communion of profit and loss. The bricks, therefore, when made were their joint property, and when the partnership was dissolved, and Hunting & Lawrence assigned their share to the plaintiffs, the latter became tenants in common with Evans.

The plaintiffs offered to prove, for the purpose of showing .hat Evans had no property in the bricks, and was only entitled to a share of the proceeds of sale of them when disposed of, that it was usual and customary for the owners of yards, under similar contracts, to retain all in their hands, and account with the makers of the bricks for their share of the profits after the sales were made and proceeds collected. *182This evidence was rejected by the judge who presided at the trial, and we think very properly. The usages of trade may be admitted to aid in the construction of doubtful contracts , but the terms of the present contract are by no means doubtful. So far as the question of partnership or of the right of property is concerned, the contract is clearly and explicitly expressed, and the supposed usage, if admitted, could not affect its construction. It would only prove how other parties had considered similar contracts. Indeed, it would hardly prove so much, for if other owners of yards had retained possession of the property there manufactured, it might be by consent, or for the convenience of the parties, and not under the claim of any legal right. Besides, the contract expressly admits that Evans would be entitled to a share of the bricks, and stipulates that Hunting & Lawrence might retain the same as security for any balance which was or might be due from him to them ; so that the evidence of usage, if it were admissible, would be wholly immaterial.

The remaining question is, whether before the attachment by the defendant there was a valid sale from Evans to the plaintiffs. It is objected in the first place, that the contract of sale was not completed, because the bricks had not been counted according to the stipulation between the parties to that effect. And if the counting was intended by the parties to precede the completion of the sale, then undoubtedly the objection must prevail. The evidence, however, does not support this objection, but rather shows that the sale was considered as complete and absolute at the time when the settlement between Evans and the plaintiffs was made; or at least the jury would be warranted by the testimony of Hunting, to find that such was the intention of the contracting parties. The whole bricks were estimated at 370 thousand. Evans sold his share in the whole and received pay in account, and a balance was due to the plaintiffs which was to be paid for in carting the bricks, so far as that might go. It is true the bricks were to be counted, but that was to be done to enable the parties to come to a settlement of their accounts, and not for the purpose of completing the sale. Taking the whole of Hunting’s testimony together, th;s, we *183think, is the reasonable inference to be drawn from it. If the bricks had been actually delivered, there could have been no question that the sale would have been complete, notwithstanding the bricks were to be afterwards counted. The general principle is, that where any operation of weight, measurement, counting or the like, remains to be performed, in order to ascertain the price, the quantity or the particular commodity to be delivered, and to put it in a deliverable state, the contract is incomplete until such operation is performed. Brown on Sales, 44. But where the goods or commodities are actually delivered, that shows the intent of the parties to complete the sale by the delivery, and the weighing or measuring or counting afterwards would not be considered as any part of the contract of sale, but would be taken to refer to the adjustment of the final settlement as to the price. The sale would be as complete as a sale upon credit before the actual payment of the price. Nothing can be found in any of the numerous cases on this point, which militates against this position.

We come, then, to the second objection to the sale, namely, that there was no delivery. In answer to this objection it was said, as Evans agreed to cart the bricks and did actually cart one load after the sale, this may be considered as a delivery of a part under an entire sale, and so according to the authorities would amount to a constructive delivery of the whole. Perhaps this may be so, but we do not think, under the circumstances of this case, that any actual delivery was necessary. The plaintiffs were in fact as much in possession of the bricks as Evans was; he was their agent; the bricks were remaining in their yard, and under the circumstances proved, a delivery would be altogether an unmeaning ceremony. The plaintiffs accepted the bricks, gave orders to Evans to cart them, and in all respects treated them as their property. The sale, therefore, amounted to a transfer, and was so considered by the parties.

Then it was objected, that the sale was void by the statute of frauds ; but as here was a delivery of a part, that alone would take the case out of the statute. But that which fooK place was equivalent to a delivery of the whole, and there*184fore the statute of frauds can have no application. Whether this sale was void as against creditors, is a question not now to be considered ; nor have we considered the question, whether the plaintiffs, before the sale, had a lien on the brick as security for the balance due them from Evans, since our opinion as to the sale renders this question immaterial. These questions may be raised on another trial, but at present we confine ourselves to the two questions reserved by the report. As to one of these questions, namely, that touching the sale, evidence may be offered by the defendant which may have a material bearing ; but as the evidence is reported, we are all of opinion that the plaintiffs have made out a primá facie case, and the nonsuit must be set aside and a new trial granted.