[After stating the other facts.] It appears by the accounts of the sales of the tin, that the net proceeds, after deducting the necessary costs and expenses of raising and sending them to Liverpool and the costs of sale, were less than half of the value of the shipment, though the gross sales without such deduction would exceed half the value. But the court are of opinion that the costs and charges ought to be thus deducted. The property would - probably bring little or nothing, as taken from the ship on the coast of Ireland; it must be taken to a market; the expenses of such transportation and of the sales at Liverpool were a necessary diminution of the value, and, as such, reduced it to a sum less than half the value of the shipment. All the boxes of tin were alike submerged and lay some time in the salt water, by means of which the tin plates were more or less tarnished and damaged; none of the boxes escaped entirely dry, and some were entirely broken and lost. We have not found it necessary to determine the question of fact, upon which the depositions were conflicting, whether, if the plates had been reshipped from Liverpool to Boston, their original destination, the cost of such transportation would have exceeded the value of the tin upon arrival.

The first question raised in this case is respecting the time construction of this exception, contained in a printed line in the very last clause in the body of the policy, without context to explain or give it effect. “ Partial loss on sheet iron, iron wire, brazier’s rods, iron hoops and tin plates, is excepted.” It is contended that as it stands it is senseless and void for uncertainty. The sentence is certainly elliptical *151and abbreviated to the fewest possible words, and so is obscure, as a new clause crowded into an old printed form is likely to be, having neither preamble nor recital to introduce it. But we think that the meaning cannot be mistaken. The main purpose of the whole contract was for one party to insure the other against certain maritime losses, some designated as total and some as partial. It is not repugnant, in the sense in which a clause is contradictory and so void for repugnancy; where a proposition is expressed in general terms, and in the same writing are other clauses limiting or qualifying the generality of this proposition, or excepting something out of it, though not in the same sentence, yet in the same instrument and going into operation at the same time, both may well stand together and have their full force, as if the words of qualification or exception were in immediate connection with the proposition. We can have no doubt that by the true construction of this clause the insurers were not to be liable for loss on tin plates, unless such loss, estimated according to the rules and usages of Boston, should amount to a total loss. It is somewhat like the provision in regard to goods perishable in their own nature, enumerated in another part of the policy. But it differs in one respect; those articles are not absolutely exempted, but the underwriter is liable for a partial loss, in case it be occasioned by the stranding of the vessel, and exceed seven per cent. It is manifest therefore, that if this exception had come under the memorandum clause, the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover, because it is manifest from the uncontested facts of the case, that this vessel was lost by stranding, and the damage to the goods was occasioned thereby and did greatly exceed seven per cent.

What then is the extent of this exception ? The natural construction is, that it leaves the insurer liable for all total losses; but it makes no distinction between absolute and constructive total losses ; and in case of a constructive total loss, which gives the assured a right to abandon, and he exercises the right, it becomes a legal total loss, as if absolute in its nature. The clause in the contract gives no intimation that it is any particular kind of total loss, whether absolute or technical; it simply excludes *152all kind of liability for a partial loss. By the natural construction of these provisions, it would seem that if the goods insured were placed by one of the perils insured against in that situation in which the assured has a right to abandon, and be-docs abandon, he has sustained a total loss, not within the exception.

But it has been argued that a constructive total loss is not within the exception, but that it must be an actual loss or destruction of the thing to take the case out of theroperation of the exception and render the underwriter liable as for a total loss. This is maintained as resulting from a series of decisions, as a well established principle of insurance law. It is not indeed insisted or claimed that there is any such rule, or any judicial decision to such effect, upon this special, unqualified exception of liability for partial loss on commodities of iron, brass and tin ; but the argument is, that there is a strict analogy between this exception and the common one applicable to memorandum articles “ warranted free of average, unless general, or the ship be stranded,” that the rule applicable to the one must include the other, and in case of such qualified exception there must be proof of an absolute total loss to take it out of the exception.

There is certainly a distinction of a practical character between these excepted articles and the memorandum articles which are subject to a limited and qualifiéd exception. The exception is of sheet iron, iron wire, brazier’s rods, iron hoops, tin plates, articles liable to be tarnished, corroded and damaged by contact with sea water to almost the whole extent of their commercial value, but indestructible in their nature. One reason given why a constructive total loss should not be made up of damage on memorandum articles, so as to allow of an abandonment for damage, was that in case of mere damage it was so difficult to distinguish between that part of the visible damage which proceeds from internal tendency to decay, and that part from perils of the sea, that it must have been the intention of the contracting parties to exclude it altogether. In this respect there is a marked difference between tin and brass goods liable to tarnish, and memorandum articles liable to decay. Another clause in the policy guards the insurer against loss by dampness *153or other indirect damage to goods, not caused by actual contact of sea water with the articles damaged. So that it is only when these polished but indestructible articles come into actual contact with sea water, and that by stranding or some one of the perils of the sea insured against, that the underwriter can become liable at all; and a loss of this character can in general be ascertained with as much certainty as a similar loss to dry goods, hardware, or other merchandise not perishable in its nature.

It seems a little singular that upon the construction of this special exemption of tin plates and other metal goods liable to tarnish by sea water, there is no judicial decision ; none was referred to in the argument, and we. have no reference to it in any of the cases, except perhaps where, in a few instances, they are simply enumerated with other memorandum articles. We say nothing now of a ease where there is a specific insurance on goods, and they arrive at the port of destination in specie, but having sustained damage by a peril insured against to an amount exceeding half their value. It would seem more consistent with the principles of insurance law, that the insured should be entitled to abandon and recover for a total loss, if the goods insured have been damaged by such peril, according to the American rule, to an amount exceeding one half their actual value, and, according to the English rule, to the amount of their entire value. But we say nothing of such a case here, because it is not necessary. This was an insurance on certain specific goods shipped and valued as one parcel, to be taken for all purposes as one subject of insurance, on board this vessel for this voyage. The ship on the voyage was cast away and lost, the goods were with some loss fished up, carried to the nearest market, and sold for a sum which, after deducting necessary expenses, amounted to less than half their value, they were duly and seasonably abandoned, and the court are of opinion, that 'his was a technical total loss, and such total loss as takes these goods out of the exception.

In considering what amounts to a constructive total loss, we must consider the different rule of law above alluded to as adopted and practised on in England and in this country. In *154England, a ship is not regarded as constructively wholly lost, so as to warrant the assured in abandoning, unless it would cost more to repair the ship, in the condition and circumstances in which she is placed, than her value when repaired; and the same rule applies to goods damaged by the perils of the sea. But by the American law, if a vessel is damaged by a peril of the sea to half her value, or, to speak more exactly, to such an amount that the assurer, after repair, and upon an adjustment as of a partial loss, would have to pay more than half the value; and in case of insurance on goods, if damaged by peril of the sea to more than half their value; the assured may, in either case, consider the adventure at an end, abandon to the underwriters, and claim for a total loss. The existence and qualifications of this latter rule, authorizing the assured on goods other than memorandum articles, upon an interruption of the voyage and a damage of the goods insured to half their value, to abandon, is established and illustrated in the case of Bryant v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. and the cases there cited. 6 Pick. 131, 9 Pick. 485, and 13 Pick. 543.

We have not thought it necessary to review the English cases on this subject, many of which were cited in the argument, for the reason already given, that they all related to memorandum articles, and not, like this, to a specific exception of goods liable to particular damage, but not perishable in their nature, and not embraced in the common memorandum.

Nor have we found it necessary to examine the English authorities upon another point of some difficulty, where the attempt has been to extricate a loss from the exception of partial loss on memorandum articles, by showing that the loss sought to be recovered was a total loss of part of the goods at risk; and this distinction has sometimes been carried to great extent, and perhaps beyond what the true principle of the law would warrant. It is admissible only, we think, where goods of the same kind are separately invoiced and insured, or where insurance is made specifically upon bales, boxes or other packages, valued and insured by the bale or package, or number of packages, in parcels less than the whole. The loss of an en*155tire package or parcel thus separately valued and insured is a total loss of memorandum articles, and may be recovered as such within the exception. This point has been put on a right footing and the previous cases ably reviewed by a judgment delivered by Jervis, C. J., in the case of Ralli v. Janson, in the Exchequer Chamber, in May 1856. 6 El. & Bl. 422.

In the present case, the goods insured, tin plates, were all of one kind, invoiced, shipped and insured in one lot, valued as an entire subject, the whole were to some extent damaged, some entirely lost, so that no question can arise of being one entire subject of insurance, and a loss of more than half of that entire subject.

There is no adjudged case which holds that when such goods, liable to particular damage, but not to decay or destruction, by sea water, are shipped and insured, with an exception of liability for the partial loss, and the goods are damaged to more than half their value by a sea peril, the goods left at an intermediate port, so that by the established rule of law here the assured has the right to abandon, and he does seasonably abandon, this is not a legal total loss, for which he may recover. Upon principle the court are of opinion, that this is a total loss, not within the exception, and the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.

Judgment for the plaintiffs.