Nason v. City of Boston
Nason v. City of Boston
Opinion of the Court
This case does not raise the question whether the railroad track, and the ridge of snow which was thrown up by ithe cars, were, of themselves, defects in the street. Those ciricumstances are relied on merely as showing a special cause, other than the elements, for the condition of the sidewalk.
The defect alleged, which occasioned the accident, was the slippery condition of the walk. This condition was produced by snow loosened and thrown up in the street by the cars, “and then being carried upon the sidewalk and trodden down by the ordinary travel of persons crossing the streets, and standing and waiting for the cars.”
The defendants’ counsel asked the court to apply the rule of law established in the case of Stanton v. Springfield, 12 Allen, 566, and in Hutchins v. Boston, Ib. 571, note. This the court declined to do; but apparently held that role to be limited to cases where the slippery condition of the way is occasioned by the mere operation of natural causes, such as the fall of rain or snow; and ruled that such condition, when produced in the manner described in this case, would be a defect for which the city would be liable, if, in the judgment of the jury, it rendered the street unsafe and dangerous.
This distinction cannot be maintained. The liability of the
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.