Worthington v. Cowles
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Huston v. Tyler (Mo. 1897)
- Patrick v. Bowman (Supreme Court of the United States 1893)
- Pike v. Sheffield (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1967)
- John Minder & Son, Inc. v. L. D. Schreiber Co. (District Court, S.D. New York 1947)
- Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Poirier (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1937)
- United States Shipping Bd. Merchant Fleet Corporation v. Harwood (Supreme Court of the United States 1930)
- Insurance Co. of North America v. Fourth Nat. Bank of Atlanta (United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 1926)
- Dublin Fruit Co. v. Neely (Tex. App. 1915)
- Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Coomer (Mo. Ct. App. 1901)
- Bailey v. Galbreath Bros. (Tenn. 1898)
- Meyer v. Richards (Supreme Court of the United States 1896)
- Meyer v. Richards (Supreme Court of the United States 1896)
- Brown v. Ames (Minn. 1894)
- Sidney Smith & Son v. McNair (Kan. 1877)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This is an action of contract upon the implied warranty of the genuineness of the signature to a note sold by the defendants to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that in the purchase of the note he dealt Solely with the defendants, and upon their credit. The defendants claimed that they were acting as agents of Hanson in the transaction, and that their principal was disclosed to the plaintiff. Upon these points, the evidence was conflicting. The defendants asked the court to rule “ that if the defendants were in fact agents for Hanson, and disclosed their agency to the plaintiff, or the plaintiff knew it, or had reasonable cause to know it, the defendants would not be liable.”
Considered as an abstract proposition of law, this is too broad. It omits the necessary element that, in the dealing or transaction in question, they were acting as such agents. It may be true that the defendants were agents of Hanson, and known to be such by the plaintiff, and yet if, in the purchase of this note, it was understood by the parties that the plaintiff was dealing with and upon the credit of the defendants, they would be liable. An agent may deal so as to bind himself personally ; it is always a question of the intention and understanding of the parties. The presiding judge properly refused to give the instructions in the form requested by the defendants. Instead thereof, he ruled in substance that the question was, from whom did the plaintiff understand that he was buying the note—from the brokers or from Hanson? and that if such a state of facts occurred, that the plaintiff understood, or ought to have understood as a man of rea
These instructions were correct, as applied to the facts of the case. The plaintiff dealt with the defendants. His evidence tended to show that he contracted with them as principals. To meet this prima, facie case, the defendants undertook to show that in this transaction they were dealing as agents of a disclosed principal. Unless from their disclosures or other sources the plaintiff understood, or ought as a reasonable man to have understood, that he was dealing with Hanson, he had a right to assume that he was dealing with the defendants as principals. The instructions given were to this effect, and were as favorable to the defendants as the instructions requested, with the addition of the necessary qualification that the defendants were in this transaction dealing as the agents of Hanson. Wilder v. Cowles, 100 Mass. 487. Merriam v. Wolcott, 3 Allen, 258.
Exceptions overruled.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.