Smith v. Moore
Smith v. Moore
Opinion of the Court
This is an action of contract for money had and received, brought by John J. C. Smith and Jesse A. Locke against Ira L. Moore and Gustavos D. Dows.
It is admitted that the defendants received the amount claimed; and the question is whether they received it for the use of the plaintiffs. The facts, as stated in the bill of exceptions, are complicated, but those which we deem material to the decision of the case are as follows :
In 1869, the plaintiff Smith and his brother, Michael Smith, held certain letters patent for the United States “for improvements in casting metals, under pressure.” Michael assigned to
The defendants did not succeed in making any sales under this indenture, and at a meeting of the executive committee, held May 20,1872, the plaintiff Smith was authorized to go to Europe and sell the patents for not less than ¿69000.
A meeting of the association was held on July 25, 1872, at which it was voted that said Smith, who was then in England, be authorized to sell the patents and property of the association in and for the territory of Europe for such sum as in his discretion he may think best for the interest of all concerned; “ the
On September 7, 1872, the said Smith, then in England, made a sale of the English letters patent to one Mackintire for eight hundred pounds sterling, payable May 1, 1878. By a subsequent agreement, the time of payment was extended to January 1, 1874. On that day, an agent of Mackintire in Boston went to the defendants, and, upon their representations that they were authorized to receive it, paid to them the said sum of eight hundred pounds, and the defendants entered into an obligation to do whatever was necessary to complete and make effectual the transfer to Mackintire. Said Smith was then in England; upon his return, he demanded the money of the defendants, who refused to pay it. Subsequently, on October 15, 1874, the said Smith entered into a contract with the defendants, in which, after reciting that “Ira L. Moore and G. D. Dows have in their hands eight hundred pounds sterling, paid them by the agent of James Mackintire for the assignment to him of certain English patents, which sum said Moore and Dows hold for certain parties interested,” and that, in order to complete the said assignment, it was necessary to pay certain sums in England, he authorizes said Dows to pay the same and authorizes “the said Moore and Dows to deduct from my shares of said eight hundred pounds all sums so paid; ” and the said Dows agrees to make such payments, “ and immediately to give notice thereof by mail to said Moore, who shall proceed to distribute forthwith said eight hundred pounds among the parties interested, paying first the bills of the association, and deducting from said J. J. C. Smith’s share the amount as above provided.”
Upon these facts, we are of opinion that the court should have ruled, as requested by the defendants, that the plaintiffs could not recover.
In the votes of July 25, 1872, it was the purpose of the association and of the executive committee that the money for which Smith might sell the English patents should be paid into the hands of the defendants, to be by them distributed among the shareholders. It was expected that the money would be paid in England, and therefore the mode in which it was to be placed to the credit of the defendants was specified. But this is merely incidental, the substantial thing being that they were to receive the money for the association and shareholders. When, therefore, the agent of Mackintire offered to pay the eight hundred pounds in Boston, the defendants were the proper persons to receive it; and when it was paid to them, they received it, not for the use of the plaintiffs, but for the use of the association and its members. The defendants were under no obligation to, and could not rightly, pay it over to the plaintiffs.
It is contended that those votes are void, because inconsistent with the declaration of trust. But, if they were inconsistent, it was competent for the parties by mutual consent to waive the provisions of the declaration of trust. One of the trustees was present and acting at both the meetings which passed the votes. The other, Smith, was in England, but his accepting and acting under the votes, and his contract with the defendants of October 15, 1874, are conclusive evidence that he assented to them, and therefore he must be held to have waived his right to object that they were inconsistent with the declaration of trust.
We are therefore of opinion, that, upon the undisputed facts, the plaintiffs cannot maintain this action, but that their remedy is by a bill in equity, in which the rights of all the members of the association, which is a partnership, can be finally adjusted.
The plaintiffs argue that the finding of the presiding justice of the Superior Court, “ that the defendants had no right to receive and hold the money as against the plaintiffs,” is conclusive, being a finding of fact. But we do not understand this to have been a finding of a fact based upon evidence not reported to us, but a conclusion of law from the facts and evidence reported. We do not think this conclusion is justified by the evidence. New trial ordered.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- John J. C. Smith & another v. Ira L. Moore & another
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published