Bent v. Erie Telegraph & Telephone Co.
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision.
- Horse Creek Conservation District v. Lincoln Land Co. (Wyo. 1936)
- In re the Controversy Between the Rexburg Investment Co. (Idaho 1922)
- Wilkinson v. Prichard (Iowa 1909)
- In re Abrams and Brennan (Cal. Ct. App. 1905)
- Jordan v. Lobe (Wash. 1904)
- James v. Southern Lumber Co. (Mass. 1891)
- Franks v. Franks (Mass. 1936)
- Goerke Kirch Co. v. Goerke Kirch Holding Co. (N.J. 1935)
- State v. Dahms (N.D. 1914)
- Nay v. Boston & Worcester Street Railway Co. (Mass. 1906)
- Plaisted v. Cooke (Mass. 1902)
- Erie Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Bent (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts 1889)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
We think that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to accept the award. The Pub. Sts. c. 188, give to that court jurisdiction over an award made and returned to it in accordance with the provisions of the chapter. Section 2 requires that the submission shall be by an agreement signed and acknowledged by the parties before a justice of the peace, one of the particulars of which is that the award shall be made and reported to the Superior Court within one year. Section 5 is in these words: “ The time within which the award shall be made and reported may be varied according to the agreement of the parties, but no award made after the time fixed by the agreement shall have any legal effect or operation, unless made upon
Under these provisions, the agreement of submission must fix the time within which the award must be returned into court, and the court has jurisdiction only of an award returned to it within that time. The expressions, “ the time fixed by the agreement ” in § 5, and “ the time limited in the submission ” in § 9, have the same meaning. The parties may agree upon a different time from the year named in the statute, but the time within which the award shall be returned is a material part of the submission, and must be fixed by an agreement signed and acknowledged by the parties before a justice of the peace.
If, after the agreement is executed, the parties can extend the time, or alter the submission in any other material respect, they can do it only by a supplemental agreement executed in the manner required by the statute. Tudor v. Peck, 4 Mass. 242. Abbott v. Dexter, 6 Cush. 108. Heath v. Tenney, 3 Gray, 380. Burghardt v. Owen, 13 Gray, 300. Franklin Mining Co. v. Pratt, 101 Mass. 359. Lazell v. Houghton, 32 Vt. 579.
This case comes up on appeal. As the appeal by the statute (§ 12) must be founded on matter of law apparent on the record, and the record does not show the grounds on which the court below ordered the award to be set aside, it cannot appear of record that the grounds were insufficient in law. If no sufficient reason appeared of record, it could not be said, as matter of law, that none such existed in fact. Standish v. Old Colony Railroad, 129 Mass. 158. The defendant’s remedy, if it had been aggrieved, would seem to have been by exceptions. This, however, is immaterial, because it does appear by the record that the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to accept the award.
Award rejected.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.