Wellington v. Inhabitants of Belmont
Cases that cite this one
19 later published cases cite this decision.
- Rowe Contracting Co. v. State Tax Commission (Mass. 1972)
- Duke Power Company v. Clayton (N.C. 1968)
- Southeastern Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue (Mass. 1981)
- Solite Corp. v. County of King George (Va. 1980)
- State v. Wertheimer Bag Co. (Ala. 1949)
- Assessors of Boston v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation (Mass. 1949)
- Schumacher Stone Co. v. Tax Commission (Ohio 1938)
- Iowa Limestone Co. v. Cook (Iowa 1930)
- Tilcon-Warren Quarries Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue (Mass. 1984)
- Hartman Tobacco Co. of Puerto Rico v. Secretary of the Treasury (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1959)
- Hartman Tobacco Co. of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Secretario de Hacienda (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1959)
- Descartes v. Tax Court of Puerto Rico (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1955)
- Descartes v. Tribunal de Contribuciones de Puerto Rico (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1955)
- Assessors of Haverhill v. J. J. Newberry Co. (Mass. 1953)
- Assessors of Springfield v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation (Mass. 1947)
- Waltham Watch & Clock Co. v. City of Waltham (Mass. 1930)
- Inhabitants of Leeds v. Maine Crushed Rock & Gravel Co. (Me. 1928)
- Boston & Maine Railroad v. Town of Billerica (Mass. 1928)
- Barron v. City of Boston (Mass. 1905)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff was an inhabitant of Belmont and was assessed there for the building and machinery as personal property. She was also assessed for them as personal property in Salem, where they were situated. If any part of the property (assuming it all to be personal) was properly taxable to her in Belmont, this action cannot be maintained. In such a case the remedy of the party aggrieved is by an application for abatement, and not by a suit at law to recover the alleged excess. Bourne v. Boston, 2 Gray, 494. Richardson v. Boston, 148 Mass. 508. It is admitted, in substance, that the plaintiff was taxable in Belmont unless the building and machinery were employed in manufacturing within the meaning of Pub. Sts. c. 11, § 20, cl. 2. The business carried on was “ that of quarrying and breaking stone to be used in macadamizing roads and for other similar purposes,” and the building and machinery were used in it. We do not see that the business of quarrying stone and breaking it up for use on roads and other similar purposes is any more a manufacturing business than mining coal and breaking it up into merchantable sizes, or farming and cutting ice. Byers v. Franklin Goal Co. 106 Mass. 131. Hittinger v. Westford, 135 Mass. 258. Ingram v. Cowles, 150 Mass. 155. Quarrying and dressing granite could hardly be said to be manufacturing it, though moulding clay into different sizes and shapes and then burning it fairly may be said to be manufacturing brick. Still less could simply crushing granite into smaller and smaller pieces be said to constitute manufacturing, as that word is ordinarily used, though there is a remote sense in which it may be true.
We think that the ruling of the court was right, and that according to the report there must be judgment for the defendant, and it is
So ordered.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.