Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1912

Dame v. C. H. Hanson & Co.

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Decided May 24, 1912 · Morton

212 Mass. 124; 98 N.E. 589; 1912 Mass. LEXIS 883

Cases that cite this one

19 later published cases cite this decision.

Tope v. Brattain (Wash. 1933)
In re Detroit Macaroni Co. (District Court, E.D. Michigan 1942)
Johnson v. County of Los Angeles (Cal. Ct. App. 1939)
E. L. Jones & Co. v. Unruh (Superior Court of Delaware 1935)
Pacific States Savings & Loan Co. v. Strobeck (Cal. Ct. App. 1934)
Walker v. Houston (Cal. 1932)
Nevada Motor Co. v. Bream (Nev. 1928)
Davies-Overland Co. v. Blenkiron (Cal. Ct. App. 1925)
Jeffries v. Pankow (Or. 1924)
In re Russell Falls Co. (District Court, D. Massachusetts 1918)
Town of Grand Isle v. McGowan (Vt. 1914)
Carleton C. Rust v. Hart Garage Co. (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1940)
King v. Cordrey (Superior Court of Delaware 1935)
Gurnett & Co. v. Poirier (1st Cir. 1934)
Package Confectionery Co. v. Perkit (Mass. 1933)
Rowe Vending Machine Co. v. Morris (Mass. 1931)
Olson v. Veum (Wis. 1928)
Federal Trust Co. v. Bristol County Street Railway Co. (Mass. 1915)
Keepers v. Fleitmann (Mass. 1913)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

Morton, J.

The property in question was sold by the defendant to one Terrell, upon what are termed “ conditional sales or leases.” *126The condition was as follows: “Signed by me [Terrell] and payable to C. H. Hanson & Co., Inc., or order that if said goods and chattels or any part thereof shall be attached or if I shall sell, mortgage, pledge or attempt to sell, mortgage or pledge the same or any part thereof, or shall fail to pay said note at maturity, said C. H. Hanson & Co., Inc., shall have the right without any demand or notice to take immediate possession of said property and hold the same absolutely free from all claims and demands from me.” Taking the condition as it reads, the title to the property would seem to have passed to Terrell subject to be divested at the option of the defendant upon the happening of either of the contingencies named and the taking possession of the property by the defendant pursuant to the condition.

But however that may be, and assuming that the title was in the defendant, it was held by it subject to the performance by Terrell of the conditions named, and Terrell had therefore a right or interest which he could and did convey in mortgage to the plaintiff. Chase v. Ingalls, 122 Mass. 381. Currier v. Knapp, 117 Mass. 324. Swallow v. Emery, 111 Mass. 355. Day v. Bassett, 102 Mass. 445. Upon tender of the amount due by Terrell or his assignee before possession was taken by the defendant, the title vested in Terrell or his assignee. Bailey v. Colby, 34 N. H. 29, 37. Cutting v. Whittemore, 72 N. H. 107, 111. The case differs from those cases relied on by the defendant where no right or interest whatever passed until the goods were paid for by the purchaser according to the contract. In Cottrell & Sons Co. v. Carter, Rice, & Co. 173 Mass. 155, possession was taken several months before a tender was made. In the present case possession was not taken till after the tender when the rights of the plaintiff to redeem had become fixed. It is not necessary to consider the scope or effect of R. L. c. 198, § 11.

Decree affirmed.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.