Packer v. International Trust Co.
Opinion of the Court
The Old Colony Distilling Company in 1903 owned a lot of land in Cambridge, on which were buildings used as a distillery and warehouses in connection with its business of distilling spiritous liquors. • In the fall
With reference to those statutory provisions it was pointed out in Taney v. Penn National Bank of Reading, 232 U. S. 174, 181, that “ To insure collection of the heavy tax that is laid upon distilled spirits, the production is carefully supervised and the product is impounded.” Every distiller must provide at his own expense “ a warehouse, to be situated on and to constitute a part of his distillery premises, and to be used only for the storage of distilled spirits of his own manufacture until the tax thereon shall have been paid.” This warehouse, when approved by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, “ is hereby declared to be a bonded warehouse of the United States, to be known as a distillery warehouse, and shall be under the direction and control of the collector of the district, and in charge of an internal revenue store-keeper, assigned thereto by the Commissioner.” U. S. Rev. Sts. § 3271. As was said in the Taney case (page 182), “ While the statute provides that ‘ every distillery warehouse shall be in the joint custody of the store-keeper and the proprietor thereof,’ the control of the Government’s representative is made dominant, as in the nature of the case it must be in order to fulfill the purposes of the act. The warehouse, the statute continues, ‘ shall be kept securely locked, and shall at no time be unlocked, or opened, or remain open, unless in the presence of such store-keeper, or other person who may be designated to act for him, as provided by law; and no articles shall be received in or delivered from such warehouse except on an order or permit addressed to the store-keeper and signed by the collector having control of the warehouse ’ (§ 3274). Under the departmental regulations ‘the lock to the warehouse door must be the Government lock, the key of which must at all times be in charge of the store-keeper.’ . . . The building is his [the distiller’s], but the Government is in complete control. The spirits are his, but he is subject to
The Old Colony Distilling Company issued warehouse certificates for the larger part, if not the whole, of the thirty-two hundred- barrels. The certificates were negotiable in form; and when that company sold any of the rum it would deliver certificates for the same with its indorsement in blank thereon; and the holder could remove the rum upon paying the revenue tax and other charges. John E. Cassidy and Company on March 13, 1911, borrowed $3,750 from the defendant on their promissory note secured by a pledge of warehouse certificates calling for the delivery of two hundred and fifty barrels of Old Colony Distilling Company rum then on storage in the warehouse in question: and on March 31, 1911, the defendant loaned to the same firm the further sum of $3,000 secured by pledge of warehouse certificates calling for the delivery of two hundred barrels of' rum. Twenty-six of the certificates, calling for delivery of two hundred and fifty barrels, bear date of September 30, 1903; and twenty, calling for delivery of two hundred barrels, were dated March 1, 1911. The loans were not paid: the defendant held the certificates as security for its loans without taking possession of any of the rum, until March 25 and 26, 1912, when it surrendered the certificates and removed four hundred and twenty-nine barrels, after paying the United States internal revenue tax thereon. The receipts therefor, given by the teamster employed by the defendant, recited that the barrels were received from the Old Colony Distilling Company.
Meanwhile a mortgage, given by said company upon its real estate including the warehouse in question, was foreclosed in 1905. There were several hundred barrels of the
The plaintiff’s claim for storage is based upon the contention that the relationship between his assignors and the defendant was the usual one existing between a warehouseman and its customers, or that of bailor and bailee; and that the transferee of a warehouse receipt is liable for storage to the successors in title of the warehouseman. This view loses sight of the peculiar situation created by the internal revenue laws. As already shown, the dominant control of this warehouse was not in the owner but in the representative of the United States government. To insure the continuance of that control the statute requires that the distiller must be owner of the premises in fee simple, unincumbered; or that he file with the collector the written consent of the owner of the fee and of any mortgagee, judgment creditor or other person having a lien thereon, “ that the premises may be used for the purpose of distilling spirits, subject to the provisions of law,” and expressly stipulating that the hen of the United States shall have priority, and that in case of the forfeiture of the distillery premises the title should vest in the United States discharged from such incumbrances. U. S. Comp. Sts. (1916) § 5999. U. S. Rev. Sts. § 3262. Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co. 135 U. S. 326. Even when the use of the distilling premises by a successor in the business is permitted by the Commissioner
The finding of the trial judge that there was no contract, express or implied, rendering this defendant liable for storage charges prior to the time when it took possession of the rum, was warranted by the evidence. Vinal v. Nahant, 232 Mass. 412, 419. G. L. c. 105, § 37. Whatever obligation to pay taxes and storage was created by the terms of the warehouse receipts was one owed by the defendant to the Old Colony Distilling Company; and presumably the defendant would not be liable even to that company while holding the receipts merely as collateral security, subject to
Accordingly we are of opinion that there was no error in the judge’s adoption of the rulings requested by the defendant, or in his refusal to give those of the plaintiff which were applicable to the peculiar facts of this casé. Apparently the trial judge filed a “ Memorandum ” of his findings, but it was not embodied in the bill of exceptions. See Cressey v. Cressey, 213 Mass. 191; Norton v. Musterole Co. Inc. 235 Mass. 587. The plaintiff excepted to certain statements contained therein. In view of what has been said above, we cannot say as matter of law that the findings excepted to were not substantially correct.
Exceptions overruled.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.