Howland v. Acting Superintendent of Buildings & Inspector of Buildings
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- People ex rel. Wordell v. City of Chicago (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)
- Klehr v. Zoning Board of Appeals (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)
- Coleman v. City of Walla Walla (Wash. 1954)
- Howland v. ACTING SUPT. OF BLDGS. & INSP. OF BLDGS. (Mass. 1951)
- MacNeil v. Town of Avon (Mass. 1982)
- MacNeil v. Town of Avon (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)
- Giovannucci v. Board of Appeals of Plainville (Mass. App. Ct. 1976)
- Mitchell v. Zoning Board of Appeals (Ill. App. Ct. 1970)
- Town of Marblehead v. Deery (Mass. 1969)
- Alley v. Building Inspector of Danvers (Mass. 1968)
- State, Ex Rel. Thomas v. Ludewig, Commr. (Ohio Ct. App. 1962)
- State ex rel. Jack v. Russell (Ohio 1954)
- Daniel Webster Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Appeals (Mass. 1952)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This is a bill in equity brought in the Superior Court by way of appeal against the "acting superintendent of buildings and inspector of buildings” of Cambridge and the board of appeal of Cambridge, growing out of the alleged refusal of the "acting superintendent of buildings and inspector of buildings” to-grant the plaintiff’s “request for permission to subdivide” his property “so as to permit the
The case against the “acting superintendent of buildings and inspector of buildings” can be shortly disposed of. We find nothing in the statutes or in so much of the ordinances of Cambridge as appears in the record which gives authority to a superintendent of buildings or to an inspector of buildings or to any officer of that general character by whatever name called (see G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 143, § 6, as appearing in St. 1946, c. 363, § 4, as amended by St. 1949, c. 541, § 1) to grant “permission” for the “subdivision” of property to permit separate sales of portions thereof or authority to control sales of land or the boundaries of land to be sold, or which recognizes any right to appeal to the board of appeal from any refusal of such a superintendent or inspector to act in such matters. The bill was rightly dismissed as to the “acting superintendent of buildings and inspector of buildings.”
In so far as the plaintiff’s application to the board of appeal related to the refusal to act of the “superintendent of buildings and inspector of buildings” it also is disposed of by what has been said; but so much of that application as seeks the board’s approval of the proposed subdivision of the plaintiff’s property seems to us, for reasons which will more clearly appear when the facts are stated, to be in substance a petition for a variance within the jurisdiction of the board. . G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, § 30, eighth paragraph, subparagraph 3, as appearing in St. 1933, c. 269, § 1, as amended by St. 1935, c. 388, § 2. The board so treated it.
It further appears that the zoning ordinance of Cambridge
The plaintiff’s first contention is that since his land and buildings existed in their present physical condition before any zoning ordinance had been enacted, he is entitled to dispose of his property as he sees fit free from the limitations of the zoning ordinance.
It would seem that one answer to this contention is that if the plaintiff has an existing nonconforming usé which he does not propose to change he needs no variance and is not aggrieved by his failure to obtain one. But the case has been argued more broadly and we prefer to decide it on broader grounds. In our opinion the proposed division of the plaintiff’s lot into three separate lots owned by different persons would change the use of his land to a different use which would be contrary to the ordinance and beyond the protection of the previously existing use. At the present time there is but one single lot in a single ownership the whole of which in a sense pertains to all the buildings. See Orr v. Fuller, 172 Mass. 597; Trustees of Boston University v. Commonwealth, 286 Mass. 57, 64. It may fairly be in
The plaintiff also argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to him, citing Pittsfield v. Oleksak, 313 Mass. 553, and Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183. But the record fails to disclose that the application of the or
The final decree of the Superior Court in so far as it dismisses the bill as to the superintendent and inspector is affirmed. In so far as it relates to the board of appeal it should be amended to agree with the form set forth in Lambert v. Board of Appeals of Lowell, 295 Mass. 224, 228.
So ordered.
Except as herein set forth the record fails to disclose what those “height, area or yard provisions” were.
This provision is in accordance with the enabling statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, § 26, as appearing in St. 1933, c. 269, § 1.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.