The plaintiff, Richard E. Brown, Jr., appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court which affirmed the decision of the defendant Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (board). The board’s decision upheld an earlier action of the defendant Registrar of Motor *600Vehicles (Registrar), refusing to reinstate Brown’s license. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We affirm.

On January 12, 1982, Brown was found guilty by a judge of the Wrentham Division of the District Court Department of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and of operating a motor vehicle recklessly. After receiving notice of the convictions, the Registrar, on February 9, 1982, revoked Brown’s operator’s license. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (b), as appearing in St. 1964, c. 200, § 1, and § 24 (2) (b), as amended by St. 1964, c. 200, § 4. Brown then appealed, requesting a trial de nova in the jury of six session of the District Court. On March 16, 1982, Brown appeared before a judge of the District Court, sitting in the jury of six session. Brown agreed to participate in an alcohol education program, and his case was continued without a finding, for one year, until March 16, 1983.

On March 24, 1982, Brown requested that the Registrar return his license. The Registrar denied the request, stating that the license was to remain “revoked until case is terminated in favor of [the] defendant.” Brown appealed the Registrar’s action to the board. See G. L. c. 90, § 28. After a hearing, the board affirmed the Registrar’s action.

Brown’s claim is that he was entitled to retain his license, pending completion of an alcohol education program, once his case was continued without a finding in the jury of six session. He argues that G. L. c. 90, § 24D, as amended by St. 1975, c. 758, § 4, and § 24E, as appearing in St. 1975, c. 505, § 2, provided for an alternative disposition for persons who enroll in an alcohol education program and required the Registrar to reinstate the license once a case was continued without a finding. We disagree.2

*601We turn to consider the language of G. L. c. 90, §§ 24, 24D, and 24E, as they existed at the time of Brown’s conviction.3 General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (b), provided, in relevant part, that a person who has been convicted of operating of motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor shall have his license revoked immediately by the Registrar and that “no appeal . . . shall operate to stay the revocation of the license.”4 General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (c), as amended through St. 1974, c. 647, § 2, provided, in relevant part, that “[t]he registrar, after having revoked the license . . . shall not issue a new license ... to such person, except in his discretion if the prosecution of such person has terminated in favor of the defendant . . . until one year after the date of revocation following a conviction . . . except as provided in section twenty-four D.”5

Read literally, the statute imposed a duty on the Registrar to revoke, for one year, the license of a person convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor unless the prosecution has terminated in *602favor of that person. Since a conviction after a bench trial was a conviction within the meaning of the statute, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (d), the Registrar was bound to revoke the license. The Registrar was not relieved of that duty because Brown appealed his conviction to the jury of six session. G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (b). Further, a continuance without a finding was not a termination of the prosecution in Brown’s favor, Commonwealth v. Eaton, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 732, 737 (1981), and did not serve to relieve the Registrar of his duty to revoke the license for a period of at least one year. This general scheme has not been thought to offend constitutional principles. See Boyle v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 368 Mass. 141 (1975); Almeida v. Lucey, 372 F. Supp. 109 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 419 U.S. 806 (1974). See also Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 622 (1976) (noting that conviction after a bench trial may have adverse collateral consequences for a defendant).

Brown argues, however, that once he enrolled in an alcohol education program and had his case continued without a finding, the terms of G. L. c. 90, §§ 24D6 and *60324E,7 required the Registrar to issue a new license.8 He seeks to draw an inference from certain language of § 24E, which provided that a license may be revoked in certain circumstances.9 He claims that this language is evidence that the Legislature intended that every person who has had his case continued before the jury of six session and entered an alcohol education program would have a new license issued to him, regardless of a bench trial conviction.

Reliance on either § 24D or § 24E does not carry the day for Rrown. Section 24D did not contemplate any automatic issuance of a new license. It only states that the Registrar *604is to report to the court “whether said person should later be eligible for early reinstatement of his license.” G. L. c. 90, § 24D. Section 24E did not support Browns position either. It provided a means through which a person may obtain an early dismissal of the charge. If the charge were dismissed, the prosecution would be terminated in the defendant’s favor, and the Registrar would be authorized to issue the person a new license. The language which Brown points to would then be relevant. The license obtained after the dismissal of the charges could be revoked later if the court determined that either the person has failed to comply satisfactorily with the driver alcohol education program or the person’s operation of a motor vehicle constituted a threat to the public safety. Thus, this language does not manifest a legislative intent that a new license will be issued before a termination of the prosecution in favor of the defendant. The Registrar therefore had no authority on March 24, 1982, to issue a new license to Brown.10

Judgment affirmed.