John M. Thompson (Linda J. Thompson also present) for the petitioner., Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth., Background. Pinney was indicted in 2014 for the murder of Tayclair Moore. His trial commenced in January, 2016, and lasted several days. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Pinney moved for a required finding of not guilty, which the trial judge denied. He renewed the motion orally later that day at the close of all the evidence; the judge took no action on the motion at that time. Pinney renewed the motion again, in writing, several days later while the jury were deliberating; again the judge took no immediate action., After deliberating for several days, the jury reported to the judge that they were deadlocked, leading the judge to give them, the following day, an instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 101-102, 300 N.E.2d 192 (1973) (Appendix A), and Commonwealth v. Tuey, 8 Cush. 1, 2-3 (1851). Later that day, the foreperson informed the judge that one of the deliberating jurors had discussed the deliberations with the alternate jurors. The judge conducted an individual voir dire of the jurors, determined that the deliberating and alternate jurors had improperly communicated, and concluded that the jurors had engaged in misconduct. On this basis, Pinney filed a motion for a mistrial that the judge allowed. The judge later denied Pinney's renewed motion for a required finding of not guilty. Pinney subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a guilty verdict and that double jeopardy principles thus barred any retrial. The trial judge denied that motion as well., Discussion. In certain circumstances, allowing a retrial of a defendant whose first trial has ended in a mistrial would infringe on the defendant's double jeopardy right not to be tried twice for the same offense. One such circumstance is where the evidence at the first trial was legally insufficient to warrant a conviction. See Choy v. Commonwealth, 456 Mass. 146, 149-150, 927 N.E.2d 970, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 986, 131 S.Ct. 425, 178 L.Ed.2d 330 (2010) ; Neverson v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 174, 175-176, 546 N.E.2d 876 (1989). See also Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 818 & n.5, 37 N.E.3d 1054 (2015). "After a mistrial, the Commonwealth may retry a defendant [only] if it has **1002presented evidence at the first trial that, if viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, would be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." Brangan v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 361, 363, 84 N.E.3d 1269 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979). The issue here, then, is whether the evidence presented to the jury was legally sufficient to support a guilty verdict on the charge of murder. We conclude that it was. *1236Based on the extensive evidence presented to the jury, considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the following. The day before the victim's death, Pinney, his roommate Christopher Podgurski, and the victim, Podgurski's girlfriend, were together in Holyoke, where all three of them consumed illegal drugs. Pinney and the victim eventually returned to the home that he and Podgurski shared in Springfield. Podgurski, meanwhile, stayed in Holyoke-he went to a bar and to a friend's house and then went to his mother's house to stay the night. At 4:26 a.m. he received a text message from Pinney saying that the victim was "fucked up." He also received an unrelated telephone call from a friend at around the same time, on his mother's home telephone. The friend testified that Podgurski was sleepy and sounded "hammered" when they spoke on the telephone., Podgurski woke up at his mother's house at approximately 10:15 a.m. He called the victim, but she did not answer her telephone. He then drove to his home in Springfield to look for her and, upon arriving there, found her cellular telephone and glasses in the bedroom that they shared. He could not, however, find the victim. Podgurski knocked on Pinney's bedroom door and asked about the victim. Pinney responded (without opening the door) that she had gotten angry and "left." He eventually opened the door just enough to exit the room and then closed and locked the door behind him. Podgurski told Pinney that he wanted to see inside the room; Pinney agreed, went downstairs to get a key to the bedroom door, and returned with the key and a butcher knife. After Pinney unlocked the door, Podgurski glimpsed the victim's unclothed legs on the floor. Because Pinney was armed with a butcher knife, Podgurski pretended not to see the victim. He then left the house, parked his motor vehicle in the driveway blocking Pinney's truck, and telephoned 911., Items collected at the scene were tested for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), and the results of the tests were presented at trial. Among other things, swabs of red-brown stains taken from the victim's chest indicated the presence of Pinney's blood. Other DNA belonging to Pinney and the victim was recovered **1003from the house, including from the kitchen, stairs, and bathroom. A DNA profile from an electrical cord taken from Pinney's bedroom matched Podgurski, and Podgurski could not be excluded from a partial DNA profile from the victim's fingernail scrapings. The forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy testified that the victim died as a result of asphyxia by ligature strangulation by another. She further testified *1237that the victim's death was not caused by the presence of narcotics in her body or by manual strangulation. Additionally, the certificate of death indicated that the time of death was unknown., Pinney and the Commonwealth agree that the primary contested issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator. Pinney argues that the evidence suggests that Podgurski killed the victim. He points to evidence that Podgurski and the victim had been together for ten years, during which time the victim had obtained numerous abuse prevention orders against Podgurski. Additionally, there was evidence that Podgurski had been convicted of assault and battery on the victim, admitted that he had beaten and strangled her on a prior occasion, and had gone to a batterer's class. The victim herself suffered from a variety of drug addictions and had sought treatment., Although Pinney raises reasonable points about, among other things, Podgurski's apparently troubled relationship with the victim, the marijuana in the victim's system at the time of her death, and the fact that the exact time of death is unknown, these concern the weight of the evidence, not its legal sufficiency. He is free to argue these points to the jury, and to try to persuade them that Podgurski was the one who killed the victim. The Commonwealth is not required "to prove that no one other than the accused could have performed the act." Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533, 542 N.E.2d 249 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 175, 408 N.E.2d 841 (1980). That someone other than the defendant might have had the opportunity to commit the crime goes to the weight of the evidence, and that is a matter for a jury. See Casale, 381 Mass. at 175-176, 408 N.E.2d 841. For present purposes, we are satisfied that the evidence viewed most favorably to the Commonwealth, together with the permissible inferences, was more than sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Pinney killed the victim.