Commonwealth v. Jones
Commonwealth v. Jones
Opinion of the Court
**541*706A grand jury returned indictments charging the defendant, Dennis Jones, with trafficking a person for sexual servitude, G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a ), and deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute, G. L. c. 272, § 7. At the time of his arrest, the Commonwealth seized a cell phone from the defendant. During its investigation of the defendant, the Commonwealth developed information leading it to believe that the contents of the cell phone included material and inculpatory evidence. The Commonwealth thereafter applied for and was granted a search warrant to search the cell phone. The search warrant has yet to be executed, however, as the Commonwealth was -- and currently remains -- unable to access the cell phone's contents because they are encrypted. The contents can only be decrypted with the entry of a password.
The Commonwealth sought to compel the defendant to decrypt the cell phone by filing a motion for an order requiring the defendant to produce a personal identification number access code in the Superior Court. The central legal issue concerned whether compelling the defendant to enter the password to the cell phone would violate his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Commonwealth argued that under our decision in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt,
Several months later, the Commonwealth renewed its motion and included additional factual information that it had not set forth in its initial motion. The judge denied the renewed motion, noting that because the additional information was known or reasonably available to the Commonwealth when the initial motion was filed, he was "not inclined" to consider the renewed motion under the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure. The judge concluded that even if he were to consider the renewed motion, the Commonwealth had still failed to prove that the defendant's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion.
The Commonwealth then filed a petition for relief in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3 ; the single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court. The single justice asked the parties to address three specific issues, in addition to any other questions they thought relevant. Those issues are the following:
*707"1. What is the burden of proof that the Commonwealth bears on a motion like this in order to establish a 'foregone conclusion,' as that term is used in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt,468 Mass. 512 , 520-526,11 N.E.3d 605 (2014) ?
"2. Did the Commonwealth meet its burden of proof in this case?
"3. When a judge denies a ' Gelfgatt' motion filed by the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth thereafter renews its motion and provides additional supporting information that it had not provided in support of the motion initially, is a judge acting on the renewed motion first required to find that the additional information was not known or reasonably available to the Commonwealth when the earlier motion was filed before considering the additional information?"
We conclude that when the Commonwealth seeks an order pursuant to our decision in Gelfgatt ( Gelfgatt order or motion) compelling a defendant to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, art. 12 requires the Commonwealth to prove that the **543defendant knows the password beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception to apply. We also conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden in this case. Finally, we conclude that a judge acting on a renewed Gelfgatt motion may consider additional information without first finding that it was not known or not reasonably available to the Commonwealth at the time the earlier Gelfgatt motion was filed.
We therefore reverse the judge's denial of the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion, and we remand the case to the Superior Court for entry of an order compelling the defendant to enter the password into the cell phone at issue.
Background. The relevant undisputed facts are taken from the parties' submissions to the motion judge.
1. The investigation and the defendant's arrest. In December 2016, the police responded to a report of a stolen purse at a hotel in Woburn. Upon arriving, the woman whose purse was stolen, Sara,
During their investigation, police linked a cell phone, later determined to be an LG brand cell phone (LG phone), to the defendant. Sara stated that she communicated with the defendant by contacting the LG phone. Specifically, she "talk[ed] on the phone and [exchanged] text messag[es] with [the defendant]" while he used the LG phone. Additionally, the LG phone's telephone number was listed in the contacts section of Sara's cell phone as "[ ]Dennis."
*708Sara told police that the LG phone was used by the defendant **544and a female associate to conduct prostitution. Specifically, Sara explained that the defendant would regularly respond to customer text messages by using the LG phone, but that his female associate would answer telephone calls from customers so that the customers would hear a "female voice." Additionally, an examination of Sara's cell phone revealed several communications between her phone and the LG phone related to prostitution, including screenshots of customer communications sent to the LG phone in response to online advertisements seeking to arrange prostitution transactions with Sara; messages from the LG phone explicitly instructing Sara on how to perform sexual acts on customers; messages from the LG phone trying to convince Sara to return to the defendant after she had attempted to flee from him out of fear; and messages from the LG phone apologizing for the defendant's behavior. Police also discovered several Internet postings on the website Backpage.com advertising Sara as an escort that listed the telephone number of the LG phone as the principal point of contact for customers seeking to engage in a prostitution transaction with her.
The police arrested the defendant shortly after commencing their investigation. At the time of the arrest, the police recovered two cell phones in his possession, one of which was the LG phone. The LG phone was found in the defendant's pants pocket.
Soon after the arrest, the police applied for a search warrant to perform a forensic search of the LG phone. The application was granted. The police thereafter attempted to execute the search warrant, but discovered that its contents were encrypted such that they could be accessed only after the entry of a password to unlock, and thereby decrypt, the cell phone.
**5452. The Commonwealth's Gelfgatt motions. As discussed supra, the Commonwealth filed a Gelfgatt motion seeking a court order compelling the defendant to decrypt the LG phone by entering its password. The Commonwealth argued that compelling the defendant to enter the password would not force him to incriminate himself because the act itself would not reveal any information that the Commonwealth did not already know. Following a hearing, a judge denied the motion, concluding that because the Commonwealth had failed to "demonstrate[ ] with reasonable particularity that [the defendant] possesses the [password] for the LG phone," the defendant's knowledge of the password was not a foregone conclusion under the Fifth Amendment.
When the Commonwealth renewed its motion, it presented additional factual information that it argued proved that the defendant's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion, including the *709LG phone's subscriber information that tended to link the defendant to the LG phone, subsets of the LG phone's cell site location information (CSLI) records, and a prior statement the defendant had made to police during his booking in an unrelated criminal matter in which he identified the LG phone as his telephone number. The judge denied the renewed motion.
The Commonwealth filed a petition for relief in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. The single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court, asking the parties to address the three questions quoted supra.
Discussion. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Similarly, art. 12 provides that "[n]o subject shall ... be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." Accordingly, it is a "fundamental principle of our system of justice" that a person enjoys the "right to be free from self-incrimination" under the Fifth Amendment and art. 12. Commonwealth v. Borans,
The privilege against self-incrimination applies when the "accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating." Fisher v. United States,
The Commonwealth may, however, compel testimonial acts of production without violating a defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment or art. 12 where the "facts conveyed [by the act] already are known to the government, such that the individual 'adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information.' " Gelfgatt,
*710Although the foregone conclusion exception originated in the context of the compelled production of documents in response to a government subpoena, see Fisher,
Accordingly, for the foregone conclusion exception to apply, the Commonwealth must establish that it already knows the testimony that is implicit in the act of the required production. Id. at 522-523,
With this analytical framework in mind, we turn now to the **549reported questions.
a. Burden of proof under the Fifth Amendment. Although several State and Federal courts have applied the foregone conclusion exception in the context of compelled decryption, apparently only one court has meaningfully articulated the standard of proof the government bears to establish that a defendant's knowledge of the password to decrypt an electronic device is a foregone conclusion under the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1,
The parties have not identified, and we have not found, a United States Supreme Court case -- in Fisher or any subsequent cases -- or any United States Court of Appeals case that has specifically addressed these issues. We need not speculate what the United States Supreme Court would decide is the appropriate standard of proof under the Fifth Amendment, however, as we conclude that art. 12 requires the Commonwealth to prove that a defendant knows the password to decrypt an electronic device beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception to apply. See Lego v. Twomey,
b. Burden of proof under art. 12. The adoption of a standard of proof "represents an attempt to instruct the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of [his or her] factual conclusions.' " Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,
In determining the reach of art. 12's protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, we also are attentive to the difference in wording of art. 12 from the Fifth Amendment. Article 12 protects a defendant from being compelled to "furnish evidence" against himself or herself, as opposed to becoming "a witness against" himself or herself. Based in part on this textual difference, we have "consistently held that art. 12 requires a broader interpretation [of the right against self-incrimination] than that of the Fifth Amendment."
With these considerations in mind, we conclude that when the Commonwealth seeks a Gelfgatt order compelling a defendant to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, art. 12 requires that, for the foregone conclusion to apply, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knows the password.
Most critically, the imposition of this burden is also necessary to respect the meaning and purpose of the foregone conclusion exception. Indeed, as its very name suggests, the government must be certain that the facts conveyed by a compelled act of production are already known before it can properly be considered a foregone conclusion. See Black's Law Dictionary 762 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "foregone conclusion" as "[an] inevitable **554result; a foreordained eventuality"). The term, as it is used in this legal context, draws its roots from the Supreme Court's decision in Fisher,
Our cases addressing the foregone conclusion exception also suggest holding the Commonwealth to a high standard of proof. For example, in Gelfgatt, where the Commonwealth sought to compel the defendant to decrypt several computers, we concluded that the exception applied because the defendant had already admitted to investigators that he had the ability to decrypt the seized computers.
*716Gelfgatt,
"If the defendant should produce the [firearm], he would be making implicitly a statement about its existence, location and control .... [that] would deal with just those matters **555about which the Commonwealth desires but does not have solid information.... [T]he Commonwealth is seeking to be relieved of its ignorance or uncertainty by trying to get itself informed of knowledge the defendant possesses" (quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 592,
These decisions make clear that the Commonwealth must be certain that the compelled act of production will not implicitly convey facts not otherwise known to the Commonwealth. Accordingly, we conclude that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard burdens the Commonwealth with the appropriate level of certainty to prove the fact of a defendant's knowledge of the password to an encrypted electronic device to be a foregone conclusion under art. 12. To require anything less would defeat the meaning and purpose of the exception.
The Commonwealth argues that the privilege against self-incrimination can be adequately protected by the clear and convincing evidence standard. We disagree. Permitting the Commonwealth to prove a defendant's knowledge of the password to an encrypted electronic device by a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt creates a greater risk of incorrectly imputing knowledge to those defendants who truly do not know the password. Such an error would bring steep consequences. Indeed, beyond the fact that an error would directly violate the defendant's art. 12 rights, the practical consequence of the erroneous imputation of knowledge would be the issuance of a Gelfgatt order with which the defendant could not possibly comply. The defendant's inevitable failure to comply would likely then lead to a finding of civil or criminal contempt potentially resulting in incarceration. See, e.g., United States v. Apple MacPro Computer,
2. Second reported question: application to this case. We turn now to the second reported question: whether the Commonwealth **556met its burden in this case. We conclude that the factual record put before the motion judge by the Commonwealth in its initial Gelfgatt motion and its *717renewed motion
At the start of the investigation of the defendant, Sara made statements to police tending to show the defendant's regular use of the LG phone. Sara stated that she would speak directly with the defendant by calling the LG phone and that she also communicated with him by exchanging text messages with the LG phone. She also explained that the defendant would regularly respond to customer text messages by using the LG phone. Additionally, an examination of Sara's phone revealed that the LG phone's telephone number was listed in the contacts section of her phone as "[ ]Dennis," creating the reasonable inference that, at the very least, Sara understood that the defendant could be reached by contacting the LG phone.
The record also reveals that the LG phone was in the defendant's possession at the time he was arrested by police. Indeed, it was recovered from his front pants pocket. Additionally, the motion judge acknowledged that the record revealed that the defendant had characterized the telephone number of the LG phone as his telephone number to police while he was being booked following an arrest in an unrelated criminal matter approximately one month before he was arrested in this case. Subscriber information for the LG phone also revealed that the LG phone subscriber had listed a "backup" telephone number. Police records pertaining to this backup telephone number showed that it belonged to a "Dennis Jones" with the same Social Security number and date of birth as the defendant. Finally, the LG phone's CSLI records revealed that at various times, the LG phone was in the same location at the same time as another cell phone that was confirmed to be the defendant's phone. The CSLI records also revealed that the phone calls were made from the LG phone when that phone was confirmed to be miles away from the female associate who assisted the defendant in conducting prostitution **557(and who had her own personal phone). These facts undoubtedly create the reasonable inference that the defendant regularly used the LG phone and that he therefore knew its password.
The defendant principally argues that his knowledge of the password is not a foregone conclusion because the Commonwealth has failed to prove that he had sole ownership and control of the LG phone. Specifically, the defendant points to evidence in the record showing that the LG phone was used by more than one person and to CSLI records confirming that, at various times, the LG phone and the defendant were in different locations.
Although proof of ownership or exclusive control of the LG phone would certainly further support the Commonwealth's argument, we explained supra that the Commonwealth is only required to establish the defendant's knowledge of the password beyond a reasonable doubt, not his ownership or exclusive control of the LG phone. That multiple people may have used the LG phone and therefore may know its password does not disprove the defendant's knowledge of the password; exclusive control of the phone is not required. This is especially so in light of *718Sara's characterization of the LG phone as the defendant's business phone that was used by both the defendant and a female associate to arrange and direct prostitution transactions -- a characterization that was corroborated by the record.
The defendant's possession of the phone at the time of his arrest, his prior statement to police characterizing the LG phone's telephone number as his telephone number, the LG phone's subscriber information and CSLI records, and Sara's statements that she communicated with the defendant by contacting the LG phone, taken together with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knows the password to the LG phone. Indeed, short of a direct admission, or an observation of the defendant entering the password himself and seeing the phone unlock, it is hard to imagine more conclusive evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the LG
**558phone's password. The defendant's knowledge of the password is therefore a foregone conclusion and not subject to the protections of the Fifth Amendment and art. 12. The motion judge's denial of the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion is therefore reversed.
3. Third reported question: consideration of additional information. The third and final reported question asks us whether a judge may consider additional information included in a renewed Gelfgatt motion only after first finding that the additional information was not known or reasonably available to the Commonwealth at the time the earlier Gelfgatt motion was filed.
We consider first the legal question posed in the reported question. "Upon a showing that substantial justice requires, the judge ... may permit a pretrial motion which has been heard and denied to be renewed." Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (5), as appearing in
Accordingly, we answer the third reported question as follows: a judge acting on a renewed Gelfgatt motion may consider additional information without first finding that it was not known or not reasonably available at the time of the first filing.
We turn now to whether the motion judge abused his discretion in this case. See Haskell,
Our conclusion is informed by the particular qualities of a Gelfgatt motion. Much like a search warrant application, a Gelfgatt motion is an investigatory tool that aids investigators in obtaining material and relevant evidence related to a defendant's conduct. Indeed, the purpose of a Gelfgatt motion is to enable the Commonwealth to gain access to an encrypted electronic device, thereby allowing it to further its investigation of a defendant. As a result, one might reasonably expect that some relevant existing facts might be overlooked or missed by investigators when an initial Gelfgatt motion is filed, especially when such a motion is filed early on in an investigation.
We do not consider the judge's apparent analogizing of Gelfgatt motions to motions to suppress to be an apt comparison, as the validity of motions to suppress are based upon the information known at the time of the challenged government conduct. The factual record before the court is therefore a much more fixed target than the one at issue in a Gelfgatt motion; a motion which, as explained supra, is directed at obtaining information necessary for an ongoing investigation, and is informed by that investigation. For example, in reviewing a defendant's motion to suppress that challenges whether there was sufficient probable cause to authorize a search warrant, the reviewing judge is limited to reviewing the four corners of the affidavit in support of a warrant application to determine whether probable cause existed. Commonwealth v. O'Day,
Given the different nature and purpose of a Gelfgatt motion, the motion judge committed an error of law by imposing the tighter constraints required for renewed motions to suppress. The Commonwealth should not have been barred from renewing its initial Gelfgatt motion simply because it failed to ascertain all available facts bearing on a defendant's knowledge of the password to an encrypted device at *720the time it filed its first Gelfgatt motions. As is allowed for subsequent search warrant applications, the Commonwealth should have been permitted to renew its Gelfgatt motion upon the further development of the factual record of the case. This is especially so in light of our holding today that the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's knowledge of the password beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard of proof is rigorous, and the Commonwealth may use a renewed motion to bring additional factual information that it may have missed in preparing its initial motion to the reviewing court's attention in an attempt to meet this burden. Cf. United States v. Greenfield,
This is not to say that courts are required to consider renewed Gelfgatt motions under every circumstance. Incomplete, careless, repetitive, or tardy police or prosecution work need not be tolerated. Decisions concerning whether to consider renewed motions remain in the sound discretion of the motion judge, and will depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. A judge may not, however, decline to consider a renewed motion simply because the additional factual information contained in the renewed motion was either known or reasonably available to the Commonwealth at the time the Gelfgatt motion was first filed.
In this case, the renewed filing should have been considered and allowed. Indeed, the Commonwealth had reasonable grounds **561to believe that its initial motion as filed was sufficient to prove that the defendant's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion. The original motion included critical facts bearing on the defendant's knowledge of the password to the LG phone, including the fact that the LG phone was found in his possession at the time of his arrest and the victim's detailed description of the defendant's use of the LG phone. These facts created a strong inference that the defendant knew the LG phone's password. We understand, however, that the novelty of the question and the relative uncertainty of the proper legal standard in the compelled decryption context made this initial motion difficult for both the judge and the parties. The additional factual information included in the renewed motion, however, certainly resolved any reasonable remaining doubts that may have existed in the initial motion. Although some, if not all, of the additional information included in its renewed motion may very well have been available to the Commonwealth at the time it filed its initial motion, in light of the nature and purpose of Gelfgatt motions and the circumstances of this case, the judge erred in concluding that he need not consider the additional information "[a]bsent a showing of new evidence not otherwise available to the Commonwealth." The motion judge therefore abused his discretion in denying the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion.
Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, the motion judge's denial of the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order compelling the defendant to enter the password into the cell phone at issue.
So ordered.
We understand the word "password" to be synonymous with other terms that cell phone users may be familiar with, such as Personal Identification Number or "passcode." Each term refers to the personalized combination of letters or digits that, when manually entered by the user, "unlocks" a cell phone. For simplicity, we use "password" throughout. See generally, Kerr & Schneier, Encryption Workarounds,
We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Committee for Public Counsel Services, and Professor Orin S. Kerr. We also acknowledge the amicus submission of Professor Laurent Sacharoff.
These submissions included the Commonwealth's initial search warrant application, and exhibits attached thereto; various affidavits of law enforcement officers, and exhibits attached thereto. The motion judge did not hear testimony from any witnesses or make any credibility findings. He denied the motion based on the documentary record.
A pseudonym. See G. L. c. 265 § 24C.
We recognize that ordinary cell phone users are likely unfamiliar with the complexities of encryption technology. For instance, although entering a password "unlocks" a cell phone, the password itself is not the "encryption key" that decrypts the cell phone's contents. See Kerr & Schneier, supra at 995. Rather, "entering the [password] decrypts the [encryption] key, enabling the key to be processed and unlocking the phone. This two-stage process is invisible to the casual user." Id. Because the technical details of encryption technology do not play a role in our analysis, they are not worth belaboring. Accordingly, we treat the entry of a password as effectively decrypting the contents of a cell phone. For a more detailed discussion of encryption technology, see generally Kerr & Schneier, supra.
For example, the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated when the government seeks "to compel an individual to be the source of real or physical evidence by, for example," furnishing a blood sample, taking a breathalyzer test, producing a voice exemplar, providing a handwriting exemplar, standing in a lineup, or putting on particular clothing. Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt,
Several other courts have done the same. See, e.g., United States v. Apple MacPro Computer,
In Gelfgatt, we noted that by entering the passwords, the defendant implicitly conveyed the fact that he knew the computers were encrypted, that he knew the passwords to decrypt the computers, and that he had "ownership and control of the computers and their contents." Gelfgatt,
The Commonwealth's Gelfgatt motions in this case requested that the defendant "produce" or "provide" the password to the LG phone. Although it is not perfectly clear what the Commonwealth meant by "produce" or "provide," its proposed order suggested that it sought to require the defendant to make a written disclosure of the actual password to the LG phone. There is some debate among courts and commenters as to whether the foregone conclusion exception can apply in cases where the government seeks to compel the defendant to disclose -- whether orally or in writing -- the actual password, as opposed to cases requiring merely physically entering it into the device. Compare Stahl,
The motion judge interpreted our decision in Gelfgatt to require that the Commonwealth establish "(1) the existence of the evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of that evidence by the defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the evidence." What the motion judge meant by evidence in this context is not particularly clear, nor were we as clear as we might have been in our analysis in Gelfgatt. We clarify that the evidence at issue in the compelled decryption here is the password itself, not the contents of the phone.
As we explained supra, the only testimony that would be conveyed by compelling the defendant to enter the password is the fact that the defendant knows the password, and therefore has the ability to access the phone. The entry would convey no information about the contents of the LG phone. See Stahl,
The concurrence suggests that in addition to proving the defendant's knowledge of the password, the government must also demonstrate that it "already knows, with reasonable particularity, the existence and location of relevant, incriminating evidence it expects to find on that device." Post at ----, 117 N.E.3d 702. Without this added requirement, the concurrence argues, the government may obtain "unlimited ... access," post at ----, 117 N.E.3d 702 note 4, to a "trove of potential incriminating and highly personal data on an electronic device" by proving only "that the accused knows the device's pass[word]," post at ----, 117 N.E.3d 702. This is not correct.
It is well established that under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the police are ordinarily required to obtain a search warrant before a search of the contents of an electronic device may take place. See, e.g., Riley v. California,
Accordingly, under these circumstances, the Commonwealth was required to abide by two sets of constitutional protections. Requiring this dual protection does not, as the concurrence contends, sound a "death knell" of constitutional protection in the digital age. Post at ----, 117 N.E.3d 702. Nor do we read the two constitutional protections in "splendid isolation." Post at note 1. Each has its own purpose, function, and requirements, and they work together to form a double protection of digital privacy before particular files on the phone can be accessed.
Moreover, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals cited by the concurrence in support of its proposed standard do not support its application to cases where, as here, the government seeks only to compel the entry of the password to an electronic device. Post at ----, 117 N.E.3d 702. For example, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Subpoena Duces Tecum was a case where the government "served [the defendant] with a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to ... produce the unencrypted contents located on the hard drives of ... laptop computers and five external hard drives" (emphasis added). Subpoena Duces Tecum,
Professor Orin Kerr, as amicus curiae, argues in favor of imposing the clear and convincing evidence standard under the Fifth Amendment as well, advocating that the standard is both "consistent with the Supreme Court decision" in Fisher"that established the foregone conclusion doctrine," and "a fair approximation of [the] burden needed to eliminate" the prosecutorial advantage that can be obtained from compelling testimonial acts of production. He takes no position, however, on the appropriate standard under art. 12.
Indeed, the Fifth Amendment requires the voluntariness of a confession and the waiver of Miranda rights to be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. See Colorado v. Connelly,
The motion judge required the Commonwealth to prove the defendant's knowledge of the password, and the existence of information relevant to the charges against the defendant within the LG phone, with "reasonable particularity." This standard has been used to define the level of particularity required in the identification of subpoenaed documents. See, e.g., Subpoena Duces Tecum,
The additional information included in the renewed motion should have been considered by the motion judge. See part 3, infra. We therefore consider it in evaluating whether the Commonwealth met its burden.
The motion judge, without explanation, appears to have declined to consider Sara's statements related to the connection between the defendant and the LG phone, concluding that he could not "put much stock in the statements of the complaining witness."
The record revealed several communications between Sara's phone and the LG phone related to prostitution, including screenshots of customer communications in response to online advertisements for prostitutions transactions with Sara; messages from the LG phone explicitly instructing Sara on how to perform sexual acts on customers; and several Internet postings on the website Backpage.com advertising Sara as an escort and listing the LG phone's telephone number as the principal point of contact.
We recognize that a defendant may learn through discovery more about what the police knew at the time of the search, thereby justifying a renewed motion to suppress, but this is still a more fixed, time defined inquiry than one connected to an ongoing criminal investigation.
Concurring Opinion
*721I write separately because, unlike the court, I think that compelled decryption of a cellular telephone or comparable device implicates more than just its passcode; what the government seeks is access to the files on the device, which the government believes will aid in inculpating the defendant. Given that the foregone conclusion doctrine is a narrow exception to the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the government may compel a defendant's decryption of such a device only when it can show that any testimonial aspect involved in that act of production is already known to the government. In other **562words, the government must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused knows the passcode to the device and that the government already knows, with reasonable particularity, the existence and location of relevant, incriminating evidence it expects to find on that device. Because here the government met these requirements, I concur in the result. I also agree with the court that the appropriate standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the judge should have allowed the Commonwealth to present new evidence in an additional motion to compel.
Act of producing files. "A person's right to be free from self-incrimination is a fundamental principle of our system of justice," secured both by art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Borans,
The "foregone conclusion" doctrine, first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Fisher, and relied upon in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt,
Compelled decryption. Although these Fifth Amendment doctrines find their provenance in cases involving subpoenaed paper **563documents, courts since have applied their underlying principles to electronic documents in the context of compelled decryption. See, e.g., United States v. Apple MacPro Computer,
For the foregone conclusion exception to apply, the government also "must be able to 'describe with reasonable particularity' the documents or evidence it seeks to compel." Apple MacPro Computer,
Because the Commonwealth here has demonstrated its prior **566knowledge of the existence and location of specific files contained on the LG telephone, however, I conclude that it has met its burdens. More specifically, the government made plain its knowledge of (1) specific text messages, sent from the LG telephone, related to illegal, commercial sex acts; (2) several online advertisements for commercial sex services that featured the woman's image, posted by the LG telephone, on specified dates; (3) particular text messages sent to the alleged victim from the LG telephone; (4) precise dates for CSLI location information for the LG telephone that corresponded to the location of the defendant and the locations where some of the sex services were provided; (5) distinct "screenshot" photographs of conversations with clients from the LG telephone; and (6) records of a hotel reservation, where the defendant was arrested, using the LG telephone's number and the defendant's electronic mail address. Such a comprehensive showing of the government's prior knowledge of these particularized files on the LG telephone compels the conclusion that the Commonwealth has met its burden in this instance.
Conclusion. The court's decision today sounds the death knell for a constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination in the digital age. After today's decision, before the government may order an individual to provide it with unencrypted access to a trove of potential incriminating and highly personal data on an electronic device, all that the government must demonstrate is that the accused knows the device's passcode. This is not a difficult endeavor, and in my judgment, the Fifth Amendment and art. 12 demand more. That is, before the government may compel an accused's assistance in building a case against that accused, the government must demonstrate that it already knows, with reasonable particularity, of files on the device relevant to the offenses charged, and that the defendant knows the passcode to unlock them. Because I conclude that the government here met those burdens, I join in the court's result.
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and their relationship to each other in the criminal context have long been understood in different ways by judges and legal scholars. See generally Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices,
As discussed, I do not contend that the contents of the files contained on the phone are protected by the Fifth Amendment, or are the focus of the foregone conclusion inquiry in the context of the compelled decryption of the device itself.
Likewise, Apple MacPro Computer,
Permitting the government to undertake a "quintessential fishing expedition" by ordering an individual to enter a passcode and to provide the government with unlimited, unencrypted access to a personal electronic device is precisely the sort of act against which the Fifth Amendment was designed to guard. See United States v. Hubbell,
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