Selden & Co. v. Snow, Church & Co.
Opinion of the Court
This bill is filed by the plaintiffs, who claim the exclusive right to the use of the name Snow, Church & Co., in this city, in connection with their law and collection agency, to restrain the defendant from the use of that name. The defendant was incorporated on the 17th of January, 1889, under the general law, under the name of Snow, Church & Company of Baltimore City, for the purpose of conducting a law and collection agency in this city. If therefore the plaintiffs are entitled to the exclusive use of that name as claimed by them, the relief asked must be granted, for the incorporation of the defendant under the identical name, and its undertaking to do business accordingly is a manifest infringement of the plaintiffs’ right. The primary consideration in cases of this character is always as to the plaintiffs’ own title, and if they do not clearly establish their exclusive right to the use of the disputed name, they are in no position to ask the Court to restrain its use by another. In this case the plaintiffs’ title is disputed by the defendant upon two grounds. First. It denies that the plaintiffs ever had the exclusive right to the name. Second. It alleges that whatever right they may at one time have had has been lost by their abandonment of it. Assuming, for the purpose of the present argument, that the original title of the plaintiffs to the disputed name was free from doubt, I am of the opinion that their own acts and declarations have amounted to a full and complete abandonment. That the exclusive right to a trade name may be lost by abandonment has been said to be too clear for argument. (Sebastian on Trade-Marks, 99).
Whether there has been an actual abandonment or not is always a question of intention, and this intention may be shown, as in other cases, either by the expresss declarations of the party abandoning, or by such acts and conduct on their part as clearly to warrant the inference of such intention. The burden of proof is, however, upon the defendants to establish the abandonment where the plaintiffs have shown their right at one time to the exclusive use of the name.
The facts bearing on this question in the present ease are as follows:
In 1877, John F. Snow and Walter L. Church established in this city a law and collection agency, under the firm name of Snow, Church & Co.; prior to that time the same parties had established in various other cities offices for the conduct of the same business under the same name. In 1878 Snow and Church dissolved their partnership, Snow taking the business and the right to use the firm name in points east of Cincinnati, and Church retaining similar rights as to that city and all points west of it. Snow continued the business under the firm name in this city as sole owner until November, 1884, when Bolling Selden, one of present plaintiffs, became a partner with him. This partnership under the same firm name continued until December, 1885, when it was dissolved, Selden thereafter, and until October 1, 1888, conducting the business here under the same name, only with the addition of the words “of Baltimore.” On October 1st, 1888, Selden sold onelialf interest in his business in this city to Chas. Poe, the other plaintiff in this case. Simultaneously with the formation of this partnership the new firm issued a circular which was sent to all of their subscribers, to their various correspondents and attorneys throughout the country, who had claims for them in hand for collection, and which was generally circulated among all those with whom they did business. This circular stated that the present plaintiffs had that day formed a co-partnership under the firm name of Selden & Company for the conduct of the general law and collection busi
None of the above facts are disputed. No explanation of them is offered— nor can any be made — consistent with the contention of the plaintiffs that they never intended to abandon the old name. They rely for proof of their
But however this may be, and drawing the most liberal inference in favor of the plaintiffs from their use of this stationery and from the notice, what does it prove? Simply that they are the successors to the business of the old firm of Snow, Church & Co. This fact is not disputed; it is conceded that all the business which was entrusted to the old firm and which is not yet completed, belongs to the plaintiffs, but that is not the issue.
The question with which we have to deal is not whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the business of the old firm of Snow, Church & Co., but whether in succeeding- to that business they have shown an intention to continue the use of the old firm name, and upon this point the notice and the use of the stationery stamped as it is furnish evidence against, the plaintiffs’ position. The notice is signed Selden & Company, and every piece of stationery used by them, whether check, draft, telegram, letter or other written or printed matter is also signed in that name. Manifestly the test by which we are to determine what the firm name of a concern is, must be the signature; it furnishes the best and most conclusive evidence, and we find that not once since October 1st, have the plaintiffs signed any paper with the name of Snow, Church & Co., or Selden & Company, successors to Snow, Church & Co.; but every signature has been with the name of Selden & Company. This fact, taken in connection with their formal announcement to the public of their intention to use the new name, is proof as strong as any of the other facts heretofore recited of their final and deliberate abandonment of the old name.
Being of the opinion, therefore, that the abandonment is clearly and fully established, the bill must be dismissed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.