Owings' Case
Opinion of the Court
Ordered, that this application to reinstate the case stand for hearing on-the fourth day of January next; — that depositions taken by either party on one day’s notice may be read in evidence at the hearing; — that the Chancellor will at the hearing require the personal presence of the complainant for the purpose of informing himself upon the subject of this application; but he desires it to be distinctly understood, that the complainant must not be removed from home so as to subject her to great personal inconvenience, or so as to endanger the
The taking of proofs and the hearing of this matter were several times postponed at the instance of the plaintiff’s solicitors; and a further short delay having been granted by an order of the 29th March 1827, the matter was soon after that brought before the court.
17th April, 1827.- — Bland, Chancellor. — The matter of the petition to reinstate this case standing ready for hearing, the solicitors of the parties were fully heard; all the proceedings and proofs were read; and the plaintiff, Colegate D. Owings, having been brought into the presence of the Chancellor, he interrogated and conversed with her as to the subject in controversy, and also on various matters having a tendency toward, or connected with it. All of which the Chancellor has deliberated upon and maturely considered.
The case is of a peculiar and extraordinary nature. It is not alleged, nor does it in any way appear, that at the institution of this suit any thing was done that ought not to have been done; or that this proceeding was an improper one with a view’ to the rights and interests of the plaintiff.
The order for dismissing it was given before the return of the commission for taking testimony; and, as it would seem, before all the testimony, pertinent to the matter and within reach of the parties, had been taken. For it appears, that some of the proofs collected under the petition might be brought to bear upon the principal case. I therefore deem it improper at this stage of the
It is not my intention to say any thing as to the commencement of the decline of the mental energy of the plaintiff; or to speak of the lucid intellectual efforts she maybe now capable of making; but, although it does not appear to he altogether settled according to the English authorities, that a writ in the nature of a writ de lunático inquirendo can be issued against any one who is merely in a state of dotage,
On the 23d of June 1827, the solicitors of the parties by a writing signed and filed by them, agreed, that all the testimony which had been taken in relation to the application to reinstate the case should be used at the final hearing, in like manner as if it had been taken under a regular commission.
After which the plaintiff’s solicitors filed a representation in which they say, that by virtue of the order of the 17th of April they deem it their duty to state, that the plaintiff had been living in peace and comfort’ with her daughter Mrs. Nesbit, and on her leaving home to go to the springs for her health, the plaintiff had gone to reside with her daughter Mrs. Goodwin, where she had every attention and comfort she required; that on the plaintiff’s expressing a wish to attend a camp-meeting, Mrs. Goodwin had gone with her, but found it necessary for the plaintiff to take shelter from a shower of rain, in the house of a neighbour, when, in the absence of Mrs. Goodwin, the defendant contrived in a rude and covert manner to have the plaintiff put into a carriage and conveyed to the city of Baltimore, and there placed her, against her consent, in a boarding-house, where she could not have those attentions, conveniences, and comforts of which, from her age and infirmities, she stood so much in need; that the defendant, independently of her want of means properly to support her mother, ought not, because of this controversy, to have the care of the plaintiff; and that the real and personal estate of the plaintiff had been and was then much neglected and exposed to waste and loss. Upon which they suggested, that the person of the plaintiff should be confided to the care of Mr. and Mrs. JVesbit; and that a receiver should be appointed to take care of her estate.
17th September, 1827. — Bland, Chancellor. — The Chancellor has read and considered the statement filed and submitted
On passing the order for reinstating this case, it seemed doubtful whether the plaintiff was then in such a state of dotage as to warrant the issuing of a writ de lunático inquirendo. Such a -writ was not asked for by any one. The expression of an opinion to that extent therefore, was not then considered necessary; and it was deemed best to leave the question as to the commencement and nature of her mental imbecility, as regards the matter in dispute, to be determined at the final hearing. Upon mature deliberation it seemed at that time, however, to be within the scope of the powers of this court to protect the- plaintiff, without the intervention of a writ de lunático inquirendo, from all personal restraint, or undue influence in any way, or by any one; and also, by the appointment of a receiver, or otherwise, to protect the property in litigation from waste, and to have its proceeds applied to her support until the matter in controversy could be, heard and determined. With a view therefore, as speedily as possible to release this aged plaintiff from all improper restraint, and of placing her in a condition of undisturbed comfort, and of having the property in dispute taken care of,
It is ordered, that any two or more of the medical professors of the University of Maryland, who have not heretofore expressed any opinion upon the intellectual condition of the said plaintiff Colegate D. Owings, be and they are hereby authorized and requested to visit and converse with her; and that she be permitted without the least molestation or undue persuasion whatever, from -any one, forthwith, or at any time to go to and dwell in the house of any one willing to receive her, as may be thought proper or advisable by the said physicians, or a majority of them. And the said physicians shall as soon as practicable make report to this court of their proceedings, and of their opinion of the health and present intellectual condition of the said plaintiff,
Nothing having been done under this order, the case was, on the 28th November 1827, ordered to stand for hearing at the then next December term, unless cause was shewn to the contrary; and no cause having been shewn, the case was brought before the court for a final decision.
20th February, 1828. — Bland, Chancellor'. — This case standing ready for hearing and having been submitted, without argument or notes, the proceedings were read and considered.
The bill charges, that the deed of the 15th of June 1824, was obtained by combination and fraud; which of itself, if true, would afford a sufficient ground for the relief prayed. But this allegation is especially bottomed upon the statement, that at the time the deed was executed, the plaintiff had been deprived of her intellectual faculties; and that she was then in truth entirely non compos mentis ; either from great age, or by reason of the disorder under which she was then suffering. She makes her own incapacity the chief basis of her prayer for relief. But, according to a maxim of the English law, no man can be allowed to stultify himself for the purpose of avoiding his own deed.
The application of this maxim to this case, therefore, meets us here, as a preliminary inquiry. Can the unfortunate or afflicted party himself make his own insanity a foundation of relief or defence? , Is it a principle or maxim of the law of Maryland, “that no man of full age shall be, in any plea to be pleaded by him, received by the law to stultify himself, and disable his own person ?”
In England, it is said, that the progress of this notion is somewhat curious; and although it has been handed down as settled law, yet, that later opinions, feeling the inconvenience of the rule, have in many points endeavoured to restrain it.
Mere weakness of mind alone, without imposition or fraud, forms no- ground for vacating a contract. But if there be any unfairness in the transaction, then the intellectual imbecility of the party may be taken into the estimate, to shew such fraud as will afford a ground for annulling it. Courts of justice disclaiming all pretension to measure men’s capacities, recognise' no legal distinc
It is said, that a man should not be permitted to stultify himself, “ because, when he recovers his memory, he cannot know what he did when hp was non compos mentis.” But this cause of the rule, as thus expressed, conveys a contradiction in terms, a solecism in itself. A man in madness is not himself; his mind is aliened and gone; the rational power has left its tabernacle, and is from home. It would be just as reasonable to say, that he who is absent from his dwelling, should not obtain redress for any injury done to it during his absence, because when he returned home he could not know what had been done there while he was abroad; as that a person 'should not obtain redress by stultifying himself, because he could not know what he had done during the time he was insane. It has been well said, that he who jests upon a man who is drunk, injures the absent. But an innocent and unfortunate person is much more really and totally absent from himself in his madness, than a man in his drunkenness.
It is said, that “ if the common law had given a writ of non compos mentis to him who has recovered his memory after alienation, certainly the law would have given him remedy for the maintenance of himself, his wife, children and family, although he recovered not his memory but continued non compos mentis.’
This however is not altogether correct. A right of property necessarily implies, that its owner has a remedy for the recovery of it; and also, that he is invested with the means of protection in the enjoyment of such property as the law allows him to dispose of without any other limit than that in doing so he shall not injure his fellow citizen. But if ‘the owner has a wife and children he is bound to maintain them, at least so far as his property affords him the means. This maxim applies only to the contracts of the lunatic; it does npt prevent him from vindicating his right to his property by an action of ejectment, trespass, trover, &c.
But we are told, that- although the lunatic himself may be fettered by this maxim, yet there is a mode in which he may obtain redress; and that his heirs and personal representatives are not bound by this maxim. A commission of lunacy may be taken out, he may be declared a lunatic, and a committee appointed to take charge of his person and estate; and such committee'may sue and have any deed, made by the lunatic, during his insanity, vacated for his benefit. But why this circuity? The issue joined between the committee of the lunatic and his grantee must be exactly the same, and it must be met by precisely the same proof as if the lunatic himself had been the párty. But even this circuitous mode of redress, is often lame, tardy, or wholly inefficient. It is, however, better than none at all.
But if a lunatic, in the condition of having been defrauded of his property, should recover his reason, then there is an end even of this circuitous remedy. He is discharged from the government and protection of his committee, and left to regain his property as
The heirs and personal representatives of the lunatic are, however, not restrained by this maxim. They may obtain the redress which has been denied to him. The heir may recover the imperishable realty; but of whom is reimbursement to be obtained for the years of waste and devastation that may have been committed upon it during the life of the lunatic ? The only remedy against the wrongdoer, in its best form, is a mere personal claim for an account of the rents and profits ; but he may be a beggar. The administrator of the lunatic may reclaim his personal property itself, if to be found; or if not, he may sue for its value, if the wrongdoer can be found; and recover from him its full value, if he should be worth as much. He who delays to pay what is due, pays less than is due; but suspended and indefinitely deferred justice is a tantalizing pernicious mockery. It appears to be most extraordinary, that any code of laws should recognise a case in which the existence of a wrong is admitted, and the redress for it is postponed until after the death of the injured individual,
There is, however, one highly respectable English lawyer who has attempted to vindicate this maxim. “ Insanity,” says he, “ being a quality annexed to the mind of the party who is subject to it, is a conclusion upon his state of mind to be drawn only from his own actions. A person therefore may.assume this disability, whereas he cannot feign infancy and duress, the proof not originating in himself and his actions, but subsisting independently. That being the case, the law (which is anxious to provide against the possibility of committing fraud, at the same time that it provides for the protection of rights,) removes the temptation to prac
The argument, here derived from considerations of public policy, results in this; that a greater amount of fraud and injustice would be likely to ensue by allowing men to stultify themselves, in order to avoid their contracts, than by refusing them permission to do so for that purpose; And this position is founded on an assumption of the fact, that it is exceedingly easy to counterfeit madness without being detected; or that of those who do deceitfully pretend to be insane the far greater number escape detection; and consequently, but for this maxim the appearance of lunacy would be very frequently put on, for the purpose of practising imposition and fraud. The position however, is not sustained by the fact. It is incumbent upon those who advance this argument to shew, that instances of feigned madness are common; and also that in those instances the detection of the deceit has been rare or difficult. In criminal cases, to defeat the progress of justice, and under various circumstances to escape from oppression or some imminent peril, the artifice of counterfeiting madness has often been resorted to; but no instances of fraud in civil cases, perpetrated by means of pretended lunacy, have been adduced, and I know of none.
It is admitted, that many of the wise and sound maxims of the law are founded on considerations of public policy. But it by no means follows, that they are each of them similar and in principle alike; or that they do, in any respect, sustain each other by analogy. Upon considerations of public policy, the law will not permit the verity of certain public acts and judicial records to be called in question; but the foundation of that rule, it is evident, is very different; — indeed it is admitted to be directly contrary from that of this maxim, in relation to contracts.
Upon the whole, I am clearly of opinion, that this English rule, which declares, that a man shall not stultify himself by his own plea, never has been, and ought not to be considered as a part of the law of 'Maryland. And having thus disposed of this preliminary point, upon the determination of which the nature of the further investigation of this case so essentially depended, I feel myself now at liberty to take every view of it which the pleadings and proofs will warrant; and to dispose of it upon the' established rules of equity, and the' broad principles of natural justice; and shall proceed accordingly.
Before I go into an examination of the proofs, it seems to be proper that something should be said respecting the general nature of insanity, or that unsound condition of the human mind, to which so large a portion of the testimony relates ; and, upon a just conception of which infirmity, a correct determination of this case so mainly depends. “Madness,” says Sir William Scott, “is a state of mind not easily reducible to correct definition, since it is the disorder of that faculty with which we are little acquainted; for all the study of mankind has made but a very moderate progress in investigating the texture of the mind, even in a sound state. In disease, where it has pleased the Almighty to envelope the subject matter in the darkness of disease, it will probably always continue so; but the effects of this disordered state are pretty well known. We learn from experience and observation all that we can know, and we see that madness may subsist in various degrees, sometimes slight, as partaking rather of disposition or humour, which will not incapacitate a man from managing his own affairs, or making a valid contract. It must be something more than this;
• The plaintiff has been subject to attacks from.a disorder, that has repeatedly darkened her understanding with delirium; the proofs exhibit some of her conduct as indicative of' lunacy ; and that dotage, or intellectual weakness, which the bill represents to be her present condition, is a species of insanity which does not appear to have been very attentively considered, either by the profession of medicine or of the law. Its approaches are most commonly so gradual as to be for some time imperceptible, and the early evidences of it are almost always exceedingly equivocal. Under the generic legal term, non compos mentis, is comprehended every species of mental derangement -which incapacitates a man from assenting to, or making a legal contract. But, for the purpose of obtaining as clear a view as may be of a subject so obscure, and without placing too much reliance upon any general definitions,
Idiocy is that condition in which the human creature has never had, from birth, any the 'least glimmering of reason; and is utterly destitute of all those intellectual faculties by which man, in general, is so eminently and peculiarly distinguished. It is not the condition of a deranged mind; but that of a total absence of all mind. Hence this state of fatuity can rarely or ever be mistaken by any, the most superficial, observer. The medical profession seem to regard it as a natural defect, not as a disease in itself, or as the result of any disorder. In law, it is also considered as a defect, and as a permanent and hopeless incapacity.
Delirium is that state of the mind in which it acts without being directed by the power of volition, which is wholly or partially suspended. This happens most perfectly in dreams. But what is commonly called delirium, is always preceded or attended by a feverish and highly diseased state of the body. The patient in delirium is wholly unconscious of surrounding objects; or conceives them to be different from what they really are. His thoughts seem to drift about; wildering and tossing amidst distracted dreams. And his observations, when he makes any, as often happens, are wild and incoherent; or, from excess of pain, he sinks into a low muttering, or silent and death-like stupor,
Lunacy is that condition or habit in which the mind is directed by the will, but is wholly or partially misguided, or erroneously governed by it; or it is the impairment of any one or more of the faculties of the mind, accompanied with, or inducing a defect in the comparing faculty. For, as has been observed by a great philosopher, those who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to
But this proteus disorder, in its 'milder forms, is not at all perceptible to a superficial observer, often escapes the notice of the most skilful, even .after being apprised of the existence of the malady; and it frequently happens that it cannot be detected without an examination of some time, and repeated observations. Although in law this state of the mind is held to be a course or hcibit, not a mere act, but .as having some continuance; yet it is considered as a distempered condition, occasioned by disorder or accident, from which the recovery of the patient is deemed possible and probable; and therefore he and his property are always disposed of with a view to a recovery.
Dotage is’that feebleness of the mental faculties which proceeds from old age. It is a diminution or decay of that intellectual power which was once possessed. It is the slow approach of death; of that irrevocable cessation, without hurt or disease, of all the functions which once belonged to the living animal. The external functions-gradually cease; the senses waste away by degrees; and the mind is imperceptibly visited by decay. The inert and dull senses transmit the passing occurrences so imperfectly to the serisorium, that they léave none, or but a very transitory impression there. Hence long past transactions are often remembered with much more exactness- than those which have taken place recently. In the second childhood, as in the first, all the present makes but a faint and fleeting impression upon the mind. Hence the judgment in both stages, is weak, and the conduct unsteady and frivolous,
It has been long and well established, that a contract made by a person who is, at the time, actually non compos mentis, either as in idiocy, delirium, lunacy, or dotage, is entirely void; indeed it would seem to be difficult to conceive how such a contract should ever have been otherwise considered than as an absolute nullity.
What is that degree of intellectual imbecility which may be taken into the estimate as one of the component parts of a ground for relief, in those cases where the boundary between mere weakness and a condition of non compos mentis is so narrow that it may be difficult to draw the line,
It has been laid down in general terms, that it is fraudulent to obtain a deed by the exercise of undue influence over a man whose mind had ceased to be a safe guide of his actions ;
_ The circumstances which, when taken in connexion with this weakness of mind, constitutes a foundation of fraud whereon to vacate a contract, are various.
This plaintiff, it appears, has until the latter years of her long life enjoyed a full share of sound well regulated mental capacity. But when this suit was instituted she had advanced beyond the
In relation to the epoch of the execution of the deed of the 15th of June 1824, the proceedings and the proofs are more distinct and particular. It is stated and admitted, that the plaintiff was subject to attacks of erysipelas, and was suffering under that disorder when the instrument of writing, which is the special subject of this controversy, was executed. From good medical authority we learn, that erysipelas is often preceded, or attended, or succeeded by delirium; that it is apt to affect the brain ; and
It appears from the testimony, that the plaintiff had been attacked with the erysipelas some days before the 15th June 1824; that one of the attending physicians was informed by the family, that the disorder of the plaintiff was a periodical one, and generally came on about eight o’clock in the morning. Dr. Marsh says, that during the paroxysms, there was always a determination towards apoplexy. Dr. Griffith visited the plaintiff on the 14th of June, (he thinks in the afternoon,) she then complained a good deal of her head, but was rational. The Doctor perceived no disarray of intellect; and he thinks she was at that time sufficiently possessed of her faculties to make a contract or dispose of her property. But after the Doctor left her, and in the evening of the same day, she was delirious; or as the witnesses say, out of her head; and her mind was entirely gone; that when roused she would speak incoherently and then sleep again; . insensible to any thing that passed; that there was some company in the plaintiff’s room, who were removed lest their conversation and noise should disturb or injure her.
About sunrisemf the morning of the 15th of June; the defendant came into the chamber of the plaintiff, and with a great noise hoisted the windows, threw open the shutters, and-let into the room a strong light; which however did not arouse the plaintiflj who had lain the whole night, and then was in a state of apparent preternatural sleep; insomuch so, that she did not notice an attendant, who, after the windows had been thus noisily opened, felt her forehead and took hold of her hand. Immediately after which the defendant was left alone in the room with the plaintiff -thus abed. What passed, if any thing, while these parties were so left together in the same room, does not appear. But in a short time afterwards, Thomas D. CocJcey and John Feudal, two justices of the peace, who had, the evening before, been sent for and requested, by the defendant, to attend there on that morning, were introduced into
These justices (one of whom, Fendal, only it appears but once ever saw the plaintiff at any other time during the illness under which she was then suffering,) both assert, that when they took her acknowledgment of the deed, she was in a sound state of mind. But other witnesses testify, that on the morning of that day she was in rather a weaker condition than on the, evening before ; that her mind was evidently wandering; and that she was manifestly incapable of judging of the propriety or effect of any deed or other
The instrument of writing, which was thus signed on the 15th of June 1824, had been prepared by Justice Feudal, as he states, for and at the request of the defendant about six months previous ; but the defendant admits, in her answer, that she had caused it to be prepared by him in 1822. During the greater part of the interval between the periods of its preparation and execution, the plaintiff had enjoyed her usual state of good health. About six months before this instrument was executed, in a conversation upon the subject of the provision which the plaintiff had promised, or intended to make for the defendant, the plaintiff declared to the defendant, that she would leave her no more than a life estate in her property. And the plaintiff often before and after made similar declarations. The defendant had always continued to reside with the plaintiff, who had latterly confided the management of her estate very much or altogether to the defendant, who had always conducted herself toward the plaintiff as a dutiful daughter ; .and the plaintiff had great confidence in the defendant.
Upon the whole then, and after the most careful investigation of this case, thus far, there appears to be no one ground upon which this deed can be permitted to stand. It was prepared at the sole instance of the defendant. It was never at any time submitted to
Thus far the plaintiff will obtain all the equity she asks. But he who asks equity must do equity. The plaintiff herself seems to admit in her bill, when taken in connexion with her late husband’s will, which she exhibits as a part of it, that she stands here in some sort encumbered -with an equity due to the defendant. And the only difference between these parties as to that claim is as to its extent. The defendant claims an absolute estate in fee simple in the property of the plaintiff after her death. While, on the other hand, the plaintiff insists, that the defendant’s claim extends no further than a life estate with remainder to her lawful children, should she have any.
The bill states, that the plaintiff was seized in fee simple of a tract of land called “John Thomas’ Forestthat at an early period of her life she married John C. Owings, who made his will,
From the proofs it appears, that John C. Owings and the plaintiff his wife during their marriage had eight children, who survived him; and that he had a large estate consisting of real and personal property within this State and elsewhere; that his uncle the late Thomas C. Deye, was seized of a considerable real estate, which by his last will he devised to four of the daughters of his nephew John C. Owings, each of whose share contained from four hundred and fifty to six hundred acres of land, the least of which was estimated as worth about $16,000; that John C. Owings, the late husband of the plaintiff, by his will, and otherwise, gave the whole of his real and personal estate to his two sons Thomas D. Owings and John C. Owings ; except some' personalty, which he gave to his wife, and some other property, which he gave to his daughters in payment of a debt he owed them. The property he gave to his son Thomas is said to have sold for $20,000.
In his will the late John C. Owings, the father of the defendant, says — “ I give to my daughter Charlotte Deye Owings a family Bible and a spinning wheel as a token of my affection, it being my
Thus it appears to have been the intention of the testator John C. Oioings so to dispose of his property as that the provision for each of his children, noticed in his will, should' be entirely or nearly equal. That is, of his eight children, he himself provided for two; his uncle had portioned four; and a seventh he left to be provided for by her mother. Of his eighth child, Cassandra, he takes no notice in his will; she had married, disposed of herself, and was then resident at a great distance from him. It appears in proof, that the “ desire and expectation,” thus expressed by this testator,- and the exclusion of his daughter Charlotte from any share of his property, was in consequence of, and founded upon an express promise made to him by the plaintiff, (at a time when it is admitted on all hands she was in a perfectly sound state of mind,) that she would give all her property after her death to their daughter, this defendant, in fee simple; and in full confidence, that this promise so made to him for the benefit of Charlotte would be faithfully observed and kept, he made his will, and in about one month after-wards died.
' Some time after the death of John C. Owings, his son John, being sick and in a rapidly declining state of health, declared his intention to devise his estate to his sister this defendant, when his mother, the plaintiff, dissuaded him from doing so, and induced him to give it to his sister Cassandra, promising him, that if he would do so, she the plaintiff would provide for the defendant. Upon the faith of which promise he made his will, devised his estate to his sister Cassandra, and died. There is nothing said in the pleadings about this devise by John to Cassandra; or as to John’s inducement for making it. But it may be fairly inferred, that the plaintiff was actuated by a strong feeling of equity towards all her children; and knowing, that she had promised to give her estate to the defendant, she wished John’s to take another direction, and be given to Cassandra, in order to provide for her; and also to prevent the defendant from obtaining a double portion. Taken in this point of view, I have deemed it a matter which might be noticed as a corroboration of the proofs in relation
There can be no doubt, that the plaintiff always admitted she had intended to give a life-estate, at least, in her property to the defendant. Much testimony has been collected in relation to what the plaintiff had said since the death of her husband, as to the manner in which she intended to provide for the defendant. But the greater part of these declarations are proved to have been made subsequently to that period of time when her mental decay had commenced; and therefore, so far as they may have been introduced as evidence of the affirmance of an equivocal or voidable promise, deserve little attention. But it is of no kind of importance to ascertain what were, at any time, the limits of the plaintiff’s intended bounty to the defendant; Because, as to that her will is the law. Therefore, all the testimony which relates to her declarations of benevolent intentions, may be at once put out of the case.
The question here is, not what the plaintiff at any time kindly intended; but whether she had' made such a promise as is alleged, and what have been her admissions and acknowledgments of that promise, if any. As to which, it appears, that when the plaintiff was called on, at a time about the commencement of her intellectual decay, to say whether she had actually made any such promise to her late husband in favour of the defendant, or not; and whether any thing was then said about her giving to the defendant any thing less than an absolute estate of inheritance? she distinctly acknowledged,That she had made such an unconditional promise; and that nothing was then said about an estate for life. And the plaintiff has since made similar acknowledgments as to the nature and extent of her promise. The circumstance, that one of her children had been cut off from any participation in the father’s property, because of her having promised to provide for such child, was calculated, from its very interesting nature, to make a strong and lasting impression, and likely to be distinctly recollected even after her mind had fallen into a great degree of decay.
These acknowledgments of the promise are mainly corroborated by the circumstances of the late John C. Owings’ family at the time of his death; and the disposition which he made of his estate by his will. His other children, there spoken of, having had estates
To constitute a valid contract, the performance of which may be enforced either at law or in equity, it must be founded on a sufficient consideration. That is, the moving cause of the contract must be some benefit to the person called on to comply with it; or' a benefit to a stranger; or some damage or loss sustained by the party claiming the performance ; which benefit or loss has accrued or happened at the request or instance of the party of whom the claim is made.
This promise, however, was not made by the plaintiff to the defendant; and yet it is, in general, essential to the nature of a consideration, that it should move from the party asking a performance of the contract: for if such party is a mere stranger to the consideration, having himself sustained no loss, nor conferred any benefit on the opposite party, he himself has no claim to have such contract fulfilled. But a father is under a natural obligation to provide for his children; and therefore, a promise made to him for their benefit, as in this instance, may well extend to them. As where a father was about to cut £1000 worth of timber to raise a portion for his daughter, the heir promised him, that if he would forbear from felling the timber, he, the heir, would pay the daughter £1000. The father did abstain, in consequence thereof, from cutting the timber, and died. It was held, that the contract with the father enured to the benefit of the daughter, was founded on a sufficient consideration, and that the daughter might sustain an action upon it against the heir, and recover,
This doctrine, which has been so long and so well established in England, has been finally and solemnly -recognised by the court of the last resort in this State. 'The case is to his effect: Charles Browne being seized of a considerable real estate in Maryland, declared his intention so to dispose of it, that if this eldest son and heir, James Browne, should inherit or succeed to the estate of Andrew Cochrane, in Scotland, then it should pass to and vest in his second son Basil Browne. Upon which James promised his father, that in the event of his obtaining Cochrane’s estate, he would convey the Maryland estate to Basil: provided his father would make no will, and permit the Maryland estate to descend to him, James, as his heir at law. Charles, the father, in consequence thereof, died intestate, and suffered the Maryland estate to descend to James ; who afterwards succeeded to the estate of Cochrane. Upon a bill filed by Basil, the promise was held to be founded on
The defendant having, as appears in proof, lost, or failed to. obtain an estate of inheritance, by reason of the plaintiff’s having undertaken to give her such an estate in her property after her death, it is clear, according to the established principles of equity, that the defendant should, in some form or other, have the full benefit of that promise assured to her. The whole controversy is now, perhaps, as fully presented to this tribunal as it ever can be hereafter, by any other or different form of procedure. It would, therefore, seem to be incumbent upon the court now, finally to dispose of the whole matter, as well on behalf of the defendant as on the part of the plaintiff. To stop short with decreeing, that the deed of the 15th of June should be annulled, would be to dispose of no more than the one-half of the matter in dispute. It would be leaving the claim 'of the defendant, which has been so fully developed by the pleading and proofs, to be determined at a future day, and most probably between other parties; the defendant, if she lives, on the one hand, and the representatives of the plaintiff on the other, who may be very numerous; and the proofs, which are now strong and satisfactory, may be then very much wasted, or totally lost.
There are many cases in which this court, in order to dispose of the whole matter in controversy, grants the relief to which the plaintiff has shewn himself to be entitled .upon terms. No one is allowed to take a fraudulent advantage of the weakness or necessities of another. As in cases of sales by expectant heirs; in cases between guardian and ward; in cases of Usury, and the like. But in all such instances, when the court grants the relief prayed, it is upon the terms, that the plaintiff who asks equity shall do equity. And therefore, the fraudulent securities are allowed to stand for what is really due, or they are vacated only upon condition, that the plaintiff performs that which in equity and conscience he ought to perform,
In such cases there can be no danger of surprise, or want of opportunity to adduce proof; because the indirect, inverted, or constructive decree, is confined to that subject alone, which the parties themselves have, ’by their pleadings, spread before the court. Here the bill and answer disclose the whole matter in dispute relative to the promise of the plaintiff, as fully as it' could be done by a cross-bill. The defendant not only sets out and relies upon the promise of the plaintiff, but attempts to sustain the deed of the 15th of June, upon the ground of its being a mere fulfilment of that promise. Thus representing the promise as the original contract. This allegation of the defendant has been put in issue as a material part of the subject in controversy; and like every other part of the matter in issue, it may, without the unnecessary circuity and expense of a cross-bill, be met by such a decree as justice requires, either in favour of, or against the plaintiff,
Here again, however, we are met by another obstacle, arising from the present unsound intellectual condition of the plaintiff. And that too, whether the decree in her favour be upon terms; or it be in part against her. But a change in the mental condition of a contracting party, by his becoming afterwards a lunatic, certainly ought not to release him from his liability. And it has accordingly been held, that the rights of the parties remain unchanged by such an act of God. The only difficulty is how to come at the remedy. If the legal estate is vested in trustees, a court of equity ought to decree a performance; but if it be vested in the lunatic himself, that, it was formerly held, might be an insuperable obstacle to any adequate relief here, because this court could by its ordinary powers
But here, although the legal estate is vested in the plaintiff herself ; yet if the matter were left at law no relief could there be obtained against the plaintiff during her life; nor could a specific performance be obtained at any time against any one at law: therefore, from the very nature of the case, the relief necessary to meet it, can only be obtained, if at all, in a court of equity. It is laid down, that if a man by age, or disease is reduced to a state of debility of mind, which though short of lunacy, renders him unequal to the management of his affairs, the court will, in respect of his infirmities, appoint a guardian to answer for him, or to do other acts, as his interests, or the rights of others may require,
It was upon these authorities, that I passed the order of the 17th of April last. I deemed it then necessary to extend to the plaintiff the especial protection of the court; because of her age and infirmities. And if by reason of that infirmity merely, the court can in no way cause that to be done, which when in a sound state of mind she had bound herself to do, the most manifest injustice might ensue; and that too not from any substantial, but merely because of a technical or formal objection. If, as has been said, this court can declare, that she shall not hereafter execute any deed without its consent; the converse of the proposition seems necessarily to follow — that this court can by its consent or decree direct a conveyance to be made by her to the defendant according to the promise by which she is bound.
There can be no doubt, that a specific execution of this promise would be decreed against the legal representatives of the plaintiff
Upon the whole, I am, therefore, of opinion, that there is now no other course left but to appoint a guardian for the plaintiff, who shall be directed to execute, in her name, to the defendant such a deed as shall be deemed a sufficient specific performance of her promise, to take effect after her death.
Whereupon it is decreed, that the said defendant, Charlotte C. D. Owings, be and she is hereby directed and required forthwith to bring into this court the original instrument of writing in the proceedings mentioned, purporting to be a deed made by the said plaintiff, Colegate D. Owings, unto the said defendant, Charlotte C. D. Owings, on the 15th-day of June 1824, to be cancelled and annulled; and the same is hereby declared to be null and void; and the record which hath been made of the said instrument of writing among the land records of Baltimore County Court shall be and the same is hereby declared to be utterly void and of no effect whatever, because of the said instrument of writing having been obtained from the said plaintiff Colegate D. Owings by fraud and at a time when she was non compos mentis.
And it is further decreed, that William Gwynn of the city of Baltimore be and he is hereby appointed' guardian of the said plaintiff Colegate D. Owings for the purpose, and with full power
And it is further decreed, that the. said plaintiff Colegate B. Owings forthwith execute, acknowledge, and deliver, according to law, by her said guardian William Gwynn, unto the said defendant Charlotte C. B. Owings a good and sufficient deed, thereby conveying all the real estate of the said plaintiff Colegate B. Owings in the proceedings mentioned, called “ John & Thomas’ Forest,” unto the said defendant Charlotte C. B. 'Owings, her heirs and assigns for ever; and also by the same deed conveying, transferring, and making over unto the said defendant Charlotte C. B. Owings, her executors, administrators and assigns, all the personal property of the said plaintiff Colegate B. Owings, which shall be and remain at the time of her death. And in the said deed of conveyance it shall be expressly stipulated and declared, that the same shall in no respect take effect or have any force or operation whatever during the lifetime of -the said plaintiff Colegate B. Owings ; but the same shall take effect and be in full force and operation upon and immediately after the death of the said plaintiff Colegate B. Owings. And it shall be further expressly stipulated and declared in the said deed of conveyance, that if the said defendant Charlotte C. B. Owings shall die without leaving any lawful issue, in the lifetime, and before the death of the said plaintiff Colegate B. Owings, then and in that case the said deed of conveyance and every part thereof shall -be utterly null and void to all intents and purposes whatever.
And it is further decreed, that the said defendant Charlotte C. B. Owings pay unto the said plaintiff Colegate B. Owings her full costs expended in this suit, to be taxed by the register.
Soon after the passing of this decree the plaintiff died, and yet an appeal was prayed in her behalf, and the case taken to the Court of Appeals. After which, by a petition signed by one of her solicitors the court was asked to pass an order directing the defendant to pay the costs as taxed by the register.
8th JYovemher, 1828. — Bland, Chancellor. — It may not be amiss here to observe, by the way, that in England an appeal from a decree in chancery may be had at any time within five years, with
Where a decree has been passed, as in this instance, affecting as well the real as the personal estate of the parties, and the suit abates by the death of either of them, as the realty passes to the heirs and'the personalty to the administrator or executor of the deceased, in order to embrace the whole subject of the decree, it should be revived by of against both the heirs and personal representatives of the deceased party. But such a comprehensive revival of the suit is not in all cases indispensably necessary, as each class of the representatives of the deceased may revive and prosecute the suit to the extent of their respective interests, and no further.
Whereupon it is ordered, that the said petition be and the same is hereby dismissed with costs.
After which the case having been brought before the Court of Appeals, the appeal was dismissed. Owings v. Owings, 3 G. & J. 1.
Wartnaby v. Wartnaby, Jac. Rep. 377.
1 Coll. Idiots, 80; Holman v. Holman, 3 Desau. 210.
Leving v. Caverly, Prec. Cha. 229; Wall’s Case, cited 3 Atk. 173; Ridgeway v. Darwin, 8 Ves. 66; Ex parte Cranmer, 12 Ves. 446; In re Holmes, 4 Russ. 182; 2 Mad. Chan. 732.
Donegal’s Case, 2 Ves. 408; Wartnaby v. Wartnaby, Jac. Rep. 377; Whitehorn v. Hines, 1 Mun. 557; 1 Coll. Idiots, 65, 67.
1 Mont. Dig. 39.
Chambers v. Donaldson, 9 East, 471; Horner v. Marshall, 5 Mun. 466.
Rothwell v. Boushell. — In this case the bill stated, that John Boushell the defendant was deranged and incapable of managing his affairs, and prayed, that a guardian ad litem, might be appointed to answer for him, &e. Afterwards the plaintiff by petition stated, that a writ de lunático inquirendo had, some time since, issued, upon which it had been found and returned, that Boushell was a lunatic, and that a trustee had been appointed, who had failed to give bond as required; whereupon she prayed, that a guardian ad litem might be appointed.
13th February, 1819. — Kilty, Chancellor. — On considering the above petition, and finding on examination of the proceedings, that a bond has not been filed; and, that therefore there is not, in effect, any trustee capable of acting, it is thought proper, and within the powers of the court, to appoint a guardian as prayed. It is therefore ordered, that Thomas W. Vcasy be and he is hereby appointed guardian for the purpose of answering for the said John Boushell to the bill of complaint of Ann Roth-well in the petition mentioned.
Ridgeway v. Darwin, 8 Ves. 67; Ex parte Tomlinson, 1 Ves. & Bea. 59; Shelf. Lun. 62, 399.
Beverley’s Case, 4 Co. 123.
Beverley’s Case, 4 Co. 123.
2 Blac. Com. 291; Thompson v. Leach, 3 Mod. 301; 1 Ld. Raym. 313; 2 Stra. 1104.
1 Coll. Idiots, 406; Copp. Med. Jur. 877.
1 Fonb. 48.
F. N. B. 466; 1 Pow. Cont. 19.
1 Lond. Jurist, 340.
Turner v. Meyers, 1 Hagg. Con. Rep. 414.
Webster v. Woodward, 3 Day, 90; Rice v. Peet, 15 John, 503; Horner v. Marshall, 5 Mun. 466.
g) 1 Fonb. 66.
Dr. Rush, in his observations on the diseases of the mind, has frequent recurrence to the poets for illustrations of the nature of madness; because, as he says, they view the human mind in all its operations, whether natural or morbid, with a
-“Poor Ophelia,
Divided from herself and her fair judgment,
Without the which, we are pictures, or mere beasts.” Hamlet, act 4, s. 5.
“If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away,
And, when he’s not himself does wrong Laertes,
Then Hamlet does it not, Hamlet denies it.
Who does it then? His madness.” Hamlet, act 5, s. 2.
By the statute of 33 Hen. 8, c. 20, a person who had, while sane, committed high treason, and after became mad, might be tried in his absence, without making his personal appearance, &c. From which it may be inferred, that by a legal appearance at the trial, in criminal cases, is meant the actual presence of the mind as well as the body ; thus recognising the position, that in a state of Insanity the mind has left the body, and cannot be brought before the court with it. — 4 Blac. Com. 25.
Beverley’s Case, 4 Co. 124.
3 Bac. Abr. 541.
Beverley’s Case, 4 Co. 127.
1 Coll. Idiots, 67; Rebecca Owings’ Case, ante, 290.
Shelf. Lun. 53.
1 Pow. Cont. 20.
The following observations of Messrs. Paris and Fonblanque, in their excellent work on Medical Jurisprudence, are”well worthy of attention : “ There are (say they) several objects, for the accomplishment of which persons are induced to simulate the existence of disease — such as, for obtaining military exemptions and discharges; or certain civil disqualifications; for the purpose of deriving parochial relief, or pecuniary assistance from benefit societies; or the comfortable shelter and retreat of an hospital; for exciting compassion and obtaining alms; for creating public interest and curiosity; for procuring a release from confinement or exemption from punishment; and, lastly, for the dishonest intention of recovering unjust compensation from some person selected for accusation, as the author of the pretended calamity.”
“The diseases which have been selected for the accomplishment of any of the purposes above enumerated are extremely numerous, although there are some few which may be said to be more generally preferred on such occasions. In general,
"Insanity has in all ages been feigned for the accomplishment of particular objects; we read of its having been thus simulated by David, Ulysses, and Lucius Brutus. In general, the detection of such an imposition will not be difficult; the feigned maniac never willingly looks his examiner in the face, and if his eyes can be fixed, the change in his countenance, on being accused, will be strongly indicative of his real state of mind. It is, moreover, very difficult to imitate the habits of a lunatic for any length of time, and to forego sleep. An insane person generally sleeps but little, and talks much during the night; but the pretender, if he thinks he is not watched, will sleep,' and only act his part when he believes his conduct to be observed.” — 1 Par. & Fonb. 335, 359; 3 ibid. 137; 1 Hale, P. C. 33, 35; 1 Hawk. P. C. 2; 3 Inst. 6; 4 Co. 124; Coop. Med. Jur. 266, 322; Rush on the Mind, 18, 216; 1 Sam. 21, v. 13; Con. Insa. 455; Shelf. Lun. 69.
It appears from the circumstances related by Messrs. Paris and_ Eonblanque, that during the wars arising out of the French Devolution, the French and English surgeons became exceedingly skilful in detecting recruits in their attempts to escape from service in the army or navy by feigned diseases. But in all ages, under arbitrary or corrupt governments, it has been common to endeavour to defeat oppression by fraud; and where that has failed, or could not be successfully practised, there have been frequent instances, in which the individual has voluntarily maimed and disabled himself from being made an instrument in the hands of his oppressor.— Gibbon, D. & F. chap. 17; Co. Litt. 127; 2 Diver. Pur. 21. But no instance is mentioned by Messrs. Paris and Fonblanque, nor have I any where met with any allusion to a case where a party feigned insanity as a means of evading the obligation of his contract.
Attorney General v. Parnther, 3 Bro. C. C. 441.
Sherwood v. Sanderson, 19 Ves. 286; 1 Pari. & Fonb. 315; Shelf. Lun. 70.
1 Pow. Cont. 22.
Turner v. Meyers, 1 Hagg. Cons. Rep. 414.
Conolly Ind. Ins. 62.
1 Par. & Fonb. 307; Rush on the Mind, 234; Shelf. Lun. intro, s. 2.
1 Par. & Fonb. 289, 308; Rush on the Mind, 292; Co. Litt. 246; 1 Hawk. P. C. 2, note; Donegal’s case, 2 Ves. 408.
2 Zoonomia, C. 2, 1, 7; Rees’ Cyclo. ver. Delirium; Rush on the Mind, 9, 298; 1 Par. & Fonb. 300.
1 Coll. Idiots, 7, 405; 1 Fonb. 68; Shelf. Lun. 43; Brogden v. Brown, 2 Add. Eccl. Rep. 441.
1 Zoonomia, sec. 34, 2, 1; 2 ibid. Cla. 3, 1, 2; Rees’ Cyclo. ver. Mental Derangement; Locke Hum. Und. b. 2, c. 11, s. 12 & 13; Con. Ind. Insanity, 114, 300; 1 Coll. Id. 8, 36; 1 Par. & Fonb. 302, 311, 318; Rush Mind, 72, 133, 14, 257; Shelf. Lun. cha. 3.
“ Oh matter and impertinency mixt!
Reason in madness!” Lear, act 4, s. 6.
“ My pulse, as yours, doth temperately keep time,
And makes as healthful music: It is not madness,
That I have utter’d: bring me to the test,
And I the matter will reword; which madness
Would gambol from.” Hamlet, act 3, s. 4.
Sir Henry Halford, a celebrated English physician, relates an instance in which this test, appealed to by Hamlet, was applied to a patient of his, who desired to make his will. The sick man was requested to give directions how his will should be made, and it was accordingly drawn, read to, and signed by him; but being suspected to be of unsound mind, after a short interval, he was requested to repeat the directions he had given, “ to reword the matter,” but' in endeavouring to do so, his mind gambolled from it, and wandered so materially from his first directions, that he was
A change came o’er the spirit of my dream.
The lady of his love; — Oh! she was changed
As by the sickness of the soul; her mind
Had wander’d from its dwelling, and her eyes
They had not their own lustre, but the look
Which is not of the earth; she was become
The queen of a fantastic realm; her thoughts
Were combinations of disjointed things;
And forms impalpable and unperceived
Of others’ sight, familiar were to hers.
And this the world calls phrenzy; but the wise
Have a far deeper madness, and the glance
Of melancholy is a fearful gift;
What is it but the telescope of truth 'l
Which strips the distance of its phantasies,
And brings life near in utter nakedness,
Making the cold reality too real! Byron’s Dream.
Such phantoms pride, in solitary scenes,
Or fear, or delicate self-love, creates.
From other cares absolv’d, the busy mind
Finds in yourself a theme to pore upon;
It finds you miserable, or makes you so.
For while yourself you anxiously explore,
Timorous self-love, with sick’ning fancy’s aid,
Presents the danger that you dread the most,
And ever galls you in your tender part.
Hence, some for love, and some for jealousy,
For grim religion some, and some for pride,
Have lost their reason; some for fear of want,
Want all their lives; and others every day,
For fear of dying, suffer worse .than death.
Dr. Armstrong on Healthy book 4.
White v. Wilson, 13 Ves. 88; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 508; Dew v. Clark, 1 Addams' Eccl. Rep. 279, and 3 Addams' Eccl. Rep. 79; Shelf. Lun. intro. 54 & 293; Conolly Ind. Insanity, 383, 446.
Cartwright v. Cartwright, 1 Phill. 90.
1 Coll. Id. 33; Beverley’s case, 4 Co. 124; Donegal’s case, 2 Ves. 408; Attorney General v. Parnther, 3 Bro. Ch. Ca. 441; Fitzgerald, a lunatic, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 437; Shelf. Lun. 36.
“ The soul in all hath one intelligence;
Though too much moisture in an infant’s brain,
And too much dryness in an old man’s sense,
Cannot the prints of outward things retain :
Then doth the soul want work, and idle sit;
And this we childishness and dotage-call. Davies.
Or, as has been said, it is that decline of all the powers of the man, when
Nature, as it grows again towards earth
Is fashion’d for the journey, dull, and heavy. Cowper.
Shakspeare’s As You Like It, act 2, s. 7, and second part of Henry 4th, act 1, s. 2.
Rees’ Cyclo. ver. Death; 1 Par. & Fonb. 308; Rush on the Mind, 61, 292, 294; Conolly Ind. Insanity, ch. 8 & page 440, 443.
Leving v. Caverly, Prec. Chan. 229; Ridgeway v. Darwin, 8 Ves. 66; Ex parte Cranmer, 12 Ves. 446; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 275.
Thompson v. Leach, 1 Ld. Raymond, 313; 3 Mod. 301.
Osmond v. Fitzroy, 3 P. Will. 130; Willis v. Jernegan, 2 Atk. 251; Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. 156; Lewis v. Pead, 1 Ves. jun. 19; 1 Fonb. 66.
Bennet v. Vade, 2 Atk. 325.
Ball v. Mannin, Shelf. Lun. 258.
Thoroughgood’s Case, 2 Co. 9.
Henry Pigot’s Case, 11 Co. 27; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 295.
Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 125; Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. 156.
Twyne’s Case, 3 Co. 83.
White v. Small, 2 Chan. Ca. 103.
Bennet v. Vade, 2 Atk. 325.
Bunch v. Hurst, 3 Desau. 292.
Wright v. Proud, 13 Ves. 138.
Portengton v. Eglington, 2 Vern. 189.
Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Will. 204.
Griffith v. Robins, 3 Mad. 191.
Kaimes’ Pri. Eg. b. 1, p. 1, c. 1, s. 3 & c. 2; Bates v. Graves, 2 Ves. jun. 289.
Shelf. Lun. 265.
Hervey v. Hervey, 1 Atk. 564; Mountain v. Bennet, 1 Cox. 353; Nantes v. Corrock, 9 Ves. 183.
White v. Small, 2 Chan. Ca. 103; Portengton v. Eglington, 2 Vern. 189; Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Will. 204; Donegal’s Case, 2 Ves. 408; Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. 627; Bennet v. Vade, 2 Atk. 324; Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden, 286; Wright v. Proud, 13 Ves. 136; Huguenin v. Basely, 14 Ves. 273; Harvey v. Pecks, 1 Mun. 518; Rutherford v. Ruff, 4 Desau. 350; Rowland v. Sullivan, 4 Desau. 518; Brogden v. Walker, 2 H. & J. 285; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 275.
2 Zoonomia, Cl. 2, 1, 3, 2; Rees’ Cyclo, ver. Delirium.
I have shewn in a former case, (H. K. Chase’s case, ante, 206) that a private acknowledgment of a deed of conveyance by a feme covert was introduced here as a substitute for a fine, and that such an acknowledgment was held to he as binding upon her, although not altogether as effectual against third persons, as a fine. A person non compos mentis cannot levy a .fine, or malee a conveyance of his properly in that mode, because the judges will not receive the acknowledgment of an insane p’érson; but if a judge does receive the acknowledgment of a fine from the most monstrous and visible idiot, it will be, held to be final and conclusive against him; because, as a judicial record, it cannot be questioned; — (Mansfield’s Case, 12 Co. 124, and 10 Co. 42;) yet a fine is said to be nothing more than a common conveyance. This pernicious incongruity between a conveyance by deed, and by fine in England, it is said, is about to be removed by a statute abolishing fines and recoveries, and substituting deeds of conveyance, which are to have the same effect without being considered as conclusive judicial records. — (Shelf. Lun. & Idiots, 248, note.) But in Maryland, the acknowledgment of a deed before justices of the peace, although in some particulars treated as the substitute of a fine, has never been considered, like a fine, as a judicial record, and to that extent conclusively binding upon the party. — (Lewis’ Lessee v. Waters, 3 H. & McH. 430.)
“A very apoplexy, lethargy, mulled, deaf, sleepy, insensible.” — Coriolanus, act 4, s. 5.
Thoroughgood’s Case, 2 Co. 9.
Attorney General v. Parnther, 3 Bro. C. C. 443; 1 London Jurist, 340; Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 413.
Fermor’s Case, 3 Co. 79.
Bennet v. Vade, 2 Atk. 325.
Bunn v. Guy, 4 East, 194; Violett v. Patton, 5 Cran. 150.
Dutton v. Poole, 1 Vent. 318; Martyn v. Hind, Cowp. 443.
Chamberlaine v. Chamberlaine, 2 Freem. 34; Oldham v. Litchford, 2 Freem. 284; Thynn v. Thynn, 1 Vern. 296; Drakeford v. Wilks, 3 Atk. 539; Reech v. Kennegal, 1 Ves. 124; Dixon v. Olmius, 1 Cox. 414; Stickland v. Aldridge, 9 Ves. 519; Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. 638; Chamberlaine v. Agar, 2 Ves. & Bea. 259.
Browne v. Browne, 1 H. & J. 430.
Twisleton v. Griffith, 1 P. Will. 310; Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Ves. 548; Nesbit v. Nesbit, 2 Cox. 183; Wharton v. May, 5 Ves. 27.
Done’s case, 1 P. Will. 263; Anonymous, 3 Atk. 691; Horwood v. Schmedes, 12 Ves. 316; Bodkin v. Clancy, 1 Ball & Bea. 217; Davis v. Walsh, 2 H. & J. 329; 1825, ch. 158.
Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Mun. 554, note.
The Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 9 Mod. 356; 2 Atk. 406.
Walker v. Preswick, 2 Ves. 622; Taylor v. Ficklin, 5 Mun. 25; McNiel v. Baird, 6 Mun. 316.
Chamley v. Dunsany, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 709, 718; Conry v. Caulfield, 2 Ball & Bea. 255.
Fife v. Clayton, 13 Ves. 546; Higginson v. Clowes, 15 Ves. 525.
Dorsey v. Campbell, ante, 356.
Stuart v. Worrall, 1 Bro. C. C. 581; The Bishop of Winchester v. Paine, 11 Ves. 199.
Penn v. Ld. Baltimore, 1 Ves. 454; Barclay v. Russell, 3 Ves. 436; Rex v. Leigh, 4 Burr. 2146.
Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 120; Stewart v. Mechanics and Farmers Bank, 19 John. 505.
Owen v. Davies, 1 Ves. 82; Pegge v. Skynner, 1 Cox. 23; Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 611; Shelf. Lun. 429.
Leving v. Caverly, Prec. Chan. 229; Sheldon v. Aland, 3 P. Will. 111, note; Bird v. Lefevre, 4 Bro. C. C. 100; Wilson v. Grace, 14 Ves. 172; Attorney General v. Waddington, 1 Mad. Rep. 321; Howlett v. Wildraham, 5 Mad. 423; Wartnaby v. Wartnaby, 1 Jac. Rep. 377; Ex parte Clarke, 2 Russ. 575; Chambers v. Donaldson, 9 East, 471; Whitehorn v. Hines, 1 Mun. 557; Horner v. Marshall, 5 Mun. 466; 1 Fonb. 64; Mitf. Plea. 103; Prac. Reg. 71.
Lord Donegal’s Case, 2 Ves. 408.
Goilmere v. Battison, 1 Vern. 48.
Drakeford v. Wilks, 3 Atk. 540.
1773, ch. 7, s. 1; 4 Geo. 2, c. 10; Kilt. Rep. 249; Bullock v. Bullock, 1 Jac. & Wal. 583.
1785, ch. 72, s. 13; 1826, ch. 159.
Shelf. Lun. 424.
1826, ch. 200, s. 14.
Ferrers v. Cherry, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 4.
2 Mont. Dig. 524.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.