Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co. v. Baltimore Trust Co.
Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co. v. Baltimore Trust Co.
Opinion of the Court
The Alabama Consolidated Coal & Iron Company is a complainant. It is a New Jersey corporation. It will be called the “Coal Company.” The other complainant is Joseph H. Hoadley. He is a citizen of New York. The bill alleges that he is a stockholder in the Coal Company. At the hearing it was admitted that he was not. The Baltimore Trust Company is the respondent. It is a Maryland corporation. It has succeeded the International Trust Company. The latter was also incorporated under the laws of Maryland. It is not material to distinguish between the two trust companies. Each of them will be referred to as the “Trust Company.”
The bill of complaint was filed in the forenoon of June 3, 1912. It said that the Trust Company held three notes of the Coal Company. These notes aggregated $330,000. They were, dated February 1, 1912. They had become due April 1st of the same year. One of .them, for $290,000, was indorsed by the complainant Hoadley as well as by two other persons. The others had each an individual in.dorser. They were further secured by the pledge of $1,250,000 of the Coal Company’s refunding and improvement “first-mortgage 50-year gold bonds” dated May 1, 1908. These bonds will be called the “third-mortgage bonds.” The complainants said that the Trust Company had advertised that it would sell these bonds at 1 o’clock in the afternoon of the day upon which the bill was filed. It is not denied that the Trust Company lent the Coal Company $330,000; that no part of this sum has ever been repaid; that at the time the loan was made neither party thought that the Trust Company was in any wise indebted to the Coal Company; that nothing has since taken place to give the latter any claim upon the former; that the notes were overdue, and that, under their express terms, the Trust Company had the right to sell the bonds when and as it said it was going to sell them. Nevertheless, complainants say that a court of equity should stop the sale. In the summer of 1904 the Coal Company had issued some bonds in exchange for some of its preferred stock. The bonds so put' out will be called “second-mortgage bonds.” The complainants said that such exchange had never béen validly made; that the bonds were invalid; that the Trust Company held a great many of them, and had received interest on them to which it was not entitled, and for which it should account to the Coal Company; that the payment of interest on these bonds had impaired the resources, and thereby injured the credit of the Coal Company; that the Trust Company had participated in the invalid conversion of preferred stock into these bonds, and was liable to respond in damages to the Coal
In January, 1903, the Coal Company had outstanding $490,000 first-mortgage bonds, $2,500,000 of 7 per cent, cumulative preferred stock, and $2,500,000 common stock. The United States Steel Corporation had recently converted its 7 per cent, preferred stock into 5 per cent, bonds. It was proposed that the Coal Company should follow so distinguished an example. Its business was then apparently flourishing, but for all that it had need of more ready money. Its directors therefore hit upon the plan of putting on their property a second mortgage to secure a bond issue of $3,500,000. Of these bonds $490,000 were to be used to take up the like amount of first-mortgage bonds then outstanding, $2,500,000 were to be exchanged for the outstanding preferred stock, and the remaining $510,000 were to be sold for cash. On January 27, 1903, the stockholders gave their sanction to this scheme. The mortgage was prepared. It bears date May 1, 1903. It was not, however, executed until more than a year after-wards. The delay appears to have been due primarily to what was about that time a growing stringency of the money market. No owner of preferred stock could be forced to make the exchange. The Trust Company itself, at that time a very large holder of such stock, apparently thought that the exchange of stock for bonds would do the Coal Company little good, unless the latter company was able to market the half a million bonds which were intended to bring cash into its treasury. The Trust Company said it would hold on to its preferred stock until the issue of $500,000 bonds was underwritten. In the then state of the financial pulse such underwritings could not be had. On October 9, 1903, the directors decided to postpone indefinitely further efforts to carry out this scheme. They notified the stockholders to that effect. They returned such certificates of preferred stock as had been turned in for exchange. Eight months later business conditions had changed for the better. The directors thought it was worth while to try again. They, however, for some reason thought it best to modify their original plan. They now attempted to extinguish only one-half, instead of all, the preferred stock. Every stockholder as a condition of being allowed to make the exchange was required to subscribe at 90 for bonds which at par were equal to 20 per cent, of the par value of the stock he proposed to turn in. In this altered form the scheme went through. On August 1, 1904, the directors accepted an offer of the Trust Company to furnish all the stock and to take all the bonds which the other stockholders did not. By August 24, 1904, the conversion appears to have been substantially, if not absolutely, completed.
At stockholders’ meetings held on November 23 and December 22, 1904, sanction was given to the action or recommendation of the di
The complainants have failed to show that on the 27th of January, 1903, the floating indebtedness of the Coal Company exceeded 10 per centum of the par value of its preferred stock then outstanding. They say it really makes no difference what the condition of the company was on that day, or what its stockholders then did. According to them, what the pompany subsequently did and did not do combined to extinguish any authority which had been given by the stockholders on that day. The exchange of stock for bonds' was not made until 17 or 18 months after the meeting in question.
• All this complainants confess, but seek to avoid. In making the exchange of bonds for preferred stock without making and recording the certificate required by law, they say the Coal Company attempted to do something ultra vires, and therefore void. They assert that the contract between the holders of preferred stock and the company by which the stock was converted into bonds was beyond the powers of the company. They quote:
“Having entered into the agreement, it was the duty of the company to rescind or abandon it at the earliest moment. * * * Though they delayed its performance for several years, it nevertheless was a rightful act when it was done.” Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 86, 25 L. Ed. 950.
. Upon this rock they claim to found their case. Is that case one which can be placed upon such a foundation?
A thing done or attempted by a corporation may be unlawful for any one of at least three different reasons. First, the bargain may be contrary to sound morals or to the public policy of the state as declared by its legislation or its courts. If it is, the agreement will be absolutely unenforceable, precisely as would be a similar contract of an individual. The latter, when seeking city contracts, could no more lawfully agree to pay a member of the municipal board charged with the duty of awarding such contracts an annual salary in consideration of the exercise of such member’s influence in the board on his favor than could a corporation. If such salary had been in fact paid for a number of years, neither the individual, if he had paid it, nor a corporation, if the money had come out of its treasury, could recover it back. The reason would be the same in either case.
It is here immaterial to inquire what would be the rights of persons who were stockholders of the company at the time the salary was paid, but who were ignorant of its payment, or how, if they have any rights, they could assert them. No such stockholders are before the court. The fact, if it be a fact, that a majority of the stock of the Coal Company is now held by different persons than those who held it when the conversion took place, is legally unimportant. The corporation remains the same. Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U. S. 206, 28 Sup. Ct. 634, 52 L. Ed. 1025. Moreover, if, to use the phrase of Mr. Justice Holmes in that case, the facts in this are approached from a business standpoint, none of the new stockholders have cause for complaint. When they bought their holdings, the conversion had been completed. They knew that the preferred stock of the company had been reduced, its bonds increased, and by what amount. It has not been quite easy to understand whether the complainants claim that the exchange of bonds for preferred stock was an agreement of the class which is against good morals and public policy. If such contention is made, it cannot be sustained.
The second class of unlawful contracts are those which a corporation has no power to make at all; such, for example, as to lease its franchises to another, to increase its. capital beyond the amount limited by its charter, to engage in transactions altogether foreign to the purposes for which it was chartered. It would be better if the phrase “ultra vires,” as used in connection with corporate transactions, be limited to this sort of attempted agreement.
Complainants say that the consequences which will follow from the entering by a corporation into an ultra vires contract is a question of general law upon which the federal courts will follow their own decisions, irrespective of what the state courts may do. Upon the facts of this case it is not necessary to question this contention, but, if it be sound at all, its application must be carefully limited, unless the federal courts are to put themselves with- reference to the enforcement of the state laws in a position akin to that of those legitimists who are more royal than the king; of those Catholics who are more papal than the Pope.
Thus far the case has been discussed upon the assumption that, if the second-mortgage bonds held by the Trust Company are invalid, the Coal Company would be entitled to the injunctive relief for which it asks. Is this assumption well founded?
The preliminary injunction asked for is therefore refused, and the restraining order heretofore granted dissolved.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- ALABAMA CONSOL. COAL & IRON CO. v. BALTIMORE TRUST CO.
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- 6 cases
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- Published
- Syllabus
- 1. Corporations (§ (¡8*) — Preferred Stock — Conversion into Bonds — Statutes. P. L. (N. J.) 1902, p. 217, prescribing the form in which New Jersey corporations may convert preferred stock into bonds, was applicable to all subsequent conversions of that character. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 181, 183, 449; Dec. Dig. § 68.*] 2. Corporations (§ 152*) — Dividends—Payment—Borrowing Money. Evidence that some of the money actually paid to stockholders by a corporation as dividends was borrowed for that purpose did not show that the dividend declared and paid had not been earned. LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 564-567; Dec. Dig. § 152.*] 3. Corporations (§ 68*) — Preferred Stock — Exchange for Bonds — Meetings of Stockholders. Where at certain meetings of stockholders of a corporation all that was done with reference to a proposed conversion of preferred stock into bonds was to vote that some of the stock which the stockholders originally intended to redeem should not be converted, and all of the exchanges which were ever made wore consummated some months before such meetings were held, it could not be said that the exchange was illegal because authorized at such meetings, and that at that time the corporation’s floating debt was such that the exchange could not be legally made. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent Dig. §§ 181-183, 449; Dec. Dig. § 68.*] 4. Corporations (§ 68*) — Preferred Stock — Change into Bonds. Where the affidavit of the treasurer and auditor of a corporation, stated that the time a vote was taken authorizing the conversion of certain preferred stock into bonds, the company's floating indebtedness exceeded 10 per cent, of its outstanding capital stock, so that pursuant; to P. L. (N. J.) 1902, p. 217, the conversion could not be authorized, lrat it appeared that if the auditor had not included an item for taxes and interest on bonds, not shown to bo due, and for certain proportionate salaries not shown to have been earned, the floating debt would not have exceeded the statutory amount, such affidavit was insufficient to show that such was the fact. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Gent. Dig. §§ 181-183, 449; Dec. Dig. § 68.*] 5. Corporations (§ 68*) — Preferred Stock — Conversion into Bonds — Time. Where a corporation voted to convert certain preferred stock into bonds, as authorized by P. L. (N. J.) 1902, p. 217, the statute not having prescribed any particular period within which such conversion should be .accomplished after having been .voted, the fact that it did not consummate the transaction until 17 or 18 months after the vote did not invalidate it. [Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 181-183, 449; Dec. Dig. § 68.*] 6. Corporations (§ 68*) — Preferred Stock — Conversion into Bonds — Floating Indebtedness — Reduction. P. D. (N. J.) 1902, p. 217, authorizes corporations to convert preferred stock into bonds at a time when the floating indebtedness does not exceed 10 per cent, of such stock. Held that, where a corporation had cash in its treasury sufficient to reduce its floating indebtedness to an amount less than such 10 per cent, limit at the time such conversion was actually made, the transaction was not invalid because the indebtedness at that time was slightly in excess of the legal limit; it having been within the limit when the conversion was voted. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ .181-183, 449; Dec. Dig. § 68.*] 7. Corporations (§ 68*) — 'Preferred Stock — Conversion into Bonds— Rights of Stockholders. A preferred stockholder of a corporation cannot be compelled to exchange his stock holdings for bonds in pursuance of a corporate resoluj tion under authority conferred by N. J. Pub. Daws 1902, p. 217. [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 181-183, 449; Dec. Dig. § 68.*] 8. Corporations (§ 68*) — Preferred Stock — Exchange for Bonds — Abrogation of Plan — Delay. Where the stockholders of a corporation authorized the conversion of preferred stock into bonds as provided by P. D. (N. J.) 1902, p. 217, the action of the directors in thereafter voting to postpone such conversion indefinitely and to return the shares of preferred stock deposited under the agreement because of a stringency in the money market did not necessarily abrogate the plan, nor deprive them of the authority to subsequently proceed with the conversion at a more favorable opportunity. ' [Ed. Note- — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 181-183, 449; Dee. Dig. § 68.*] 9. Corporations (§ 68*) — Preferred Stock — Conversion into Bonds — Change of Plan. Where a corporation voted to convert its preferred stock into bonds, and thereafter the directors changed the plan so as to make a partial conversion only, such change was not objectionable except at the instance of a stockholder denied his right to exchange. [Ed. Note. — For o.ther cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 181 — 183, 449; Dec. Dig. § 68.*] 10. Corporations (§ 471*) — 'Preferred Stock — Conversion into Bonds — Statutory Conditions — Compliance—Estoppel. Where a corporation converted certain of its preferred stock into bonds without filing a certificate that the corporation’s indebtedness did not exceed 10 per cent, of its preferred stock as required by P. D. (N. J.) 1902, p. 217, such bonds so issued having been treated as valid by the corporation for more than seven years, and having been bought, sold, exchanged, and pledged, without their validity being in any wise questioned, the corporation was estopped ’to deny that they were valid because .of a failure to file such certificate. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1833-1836, 1838, 1840; Dec. Dig. § 471.*] 11. Corporations (§ 68*) — Preferred Stock — Exchange for Bonds — Ultra Vires. _ . _ An exchange of corporate preferred stock for bonds, having been authorized by P. L. (N. J.) 1902, p. 217, such conversion could not be held contrary to public policy or immoral. LEd. Note — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 181-183, 449; Dec. Dig. § 68.*] 12. Corporations (§ 487*) — Contracts—Invalidity—Ultra Vires. Where a contract or transaction by a corporation is ultra vires in the sense that the corporation has no power so to act at all, the courts of the United States will not enforce the invalid transaction nor can any defense be predicated thereon, but, if there is nothing essentially immoral therein, the court will strive to do justice between the parties so-far as it can he done, without in any wise relying on the illegal act. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1893-1898; Dec. Dig. § 487.*] 13. Corporations (§ 385*) — Ultra Vires Acts — Executed Transaction. Where an ultra vires transaction has been consummated by a corporation. so that the usurpation of power is at an end and each party has received from the other what he bargained for, the courts will leave the parties where it found them. [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig.'§§ 1545-1547; Dec. Dig. § 385.*] 14. Corporations (§ 388*) — Ultra Vires Act — Estoppel. Where a transaction accomplished by a corporation was ultra vires only in the sense that it was not performed in a proper way, power to do it in a prescribed way having been expressly conferred, the corporation as against third persons would be estopped to deny that the method prescribed was pursued. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1556-1567; Dec. Dig. § 388.*] 15. Courts (§ 366*) — Federal Courts — State Daws as Bules oe Decision. Since the only reason for holding illegal or ultra vires contracts of state corporations made and to be performed within the state of their incorporation is that to give them validity would be contrary to the policy of the state, what that policy is is for the determination of the state courts. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 954r-957, 960-968; Dee. Dig. .§ 366.* State laws as rules of decision in federal courts, see notes to Wilson v. Perrin, 11 C. O. A. 71; Hill v. Hite, 29 C. C. A. 553.] 16. Injunction (§ 108*) — Conditions Precedent — Tender. A corporation having issued certain second-mortgage bonds in exchange for preferred stock without having filed the requisite certificate with the Secretary of State, years after the exchange sought to borrow $330,000 from defendant trust company, having every means of knowing that the certificate had not been filed, and also that defendant held a very large amount of the second-mortgage bonds, obtained the money, and pledged as collateral for the payment thereof a million and a quarter of its third-mortgage bonds, the validity of which was not denied. Held, that the corporation on making default in the payment of the loan was not entitled to an injunction restraining a kale of the collateral on the ground that the second-mortgage bonds were invalid, without offering to pay the amount of the debt. [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 184-186; Dec. Dig. § 108.*]