Bezek v. First Mariner Bank
Opinion of the Court
(3) payments, incentives and/or prizes received from Genuine Title;
(4) communications with Genuine Title without any limitations; and
(5) First Mariner's relationship with Genuine Title.
(Bezek , Mem. 7-8, ECF No. 4-2 (citing First Mariner Subpoena, Ex. 1).)
Genuine Title went bankrupt in 2014, and Plaintiffs' counsel, Smith, Gildea, & Schmidt, began to obtain access from Genuine Title's Receiver to the company's documents and records, including its computer servers. (Bezek , Mem. 17, ECF No. 4-2.) In early 2015, Plaintiffs' counsel used these records to identify and notify affected borrowers and prospective plaintiffs. (Id. ) By June 2015, Plaintiffs' counsel was "able to pull data ... that appears to *531represent ... buyers' names, addresses, telephone numbers, property addresses, settlement dates, lender and in some cases mortgage broker information." (Id. 18 (quoting Fangman , ECF No. 150-2 at 7).)
On January 2, 2015, plaintiffs in Fangman filed a First Amended Complaint naming other financial institutions. (See Fangman , ECF No. 47.) That First Amended Complaint in Fangman alleged violations of RESPA, Maryland's state-law analog to RESPA, and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. (See
In addressing motions to dismiss by various defendants in the Fangman case, this Court ruled that equitable tolling may be available under RESPA and that those plaintiffs' claims were not time-barred. Fangman v. Genuine Title, LLC ,
Plaintiffs' counsel has undergone a large-scale review of Defendant Genuine Title's computer system. It is only through this review, aided by early discovery and a proprietary software system, that potential plaintiffs have been identified. The Second Amended Complaint, filed by Plaintiffs' counsel, clearly states that "[a]ll Plaintiffs learned of the illegal kickbacks less than one year prior to filing of the [Second Amended] Complaint and could not have known about the Kickback Scheme until contacted by undersigned counsel." Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 94, ECF No. 138. In light of these unique circumstances, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that equitable tolling is warranted in this case and that all Plaintiffs, with the exception of the Eagle National Plaintiffs, brought their claims within one year of the date they could have first known of their cause of action through due diligence.
Fangman,
Following discovery concerning Genuine Title's business practices and relationship with other lenders, some defendants (e.g., Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, and PNC) have struck class settlements which have been the subject of public filings and class notices. (See, e.g., Fangman , ECF No. 479, Final Approval Order regarding PNC settlement.)
II. Enforcement Actions by the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Maryland Attorney General
Meanwhile, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") and the Maryland *532Attorney General initiated an enforcement action in this Court on January 22, 2015 against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. predicated on similar schemes involving Genuine Title. (See CFPB v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , Case No. RDB-15-0179 (D. Md.) ("Lender Enforcement Action ").) The pendency and ultimate settlement of the Lender Enforcement Action in January 2015 was widely publicized. Specifically, the CFPB issued a press release on January 22, 2015, and local and national news media, including The Baltimore Sun , CNN, and the Wall Street Journal , published stories about the case. (See Dobbins, et al. v. Bank of America, N.A., RDB-17-540 (D. Md.), ECF Nos. 17-3, 17-4.)
The CFPB and Attorney General also filed an enforcement action on April 29, 2015 directly against Genuine Title, its principals, and affiliates arising out of the same alleged scheme. (See CFPB v. Genuine Title LLC , Case No. RDB-15-1235 (D. Md.) ("Genuine Title Enforcement Action ") ). The CFPB issued a press release on April 29, 2015 in which the CFPB outlined the enforcement action against Genuine Title based on the same facts alleged by the Fangman plaintiffs. On May 1, 2015, the CFPB and Maryland Attorney General announced a settlement with Genuine Title, and this Court entered a Stipulated Final Judgment and Order approving the settlement. (See Genuine Title Enforcement Action , ECF No. 18.) As with the Lender Enforcement Action , the Genuine Title Enforcement Action settlement was also reported by various news media outlets and other publications in May 2015. (See Dobbins, ECF No. 17-4.) The settlement orders in these enforcement actions explicitly contemplate related litigation by affected consumers (see, e.g., Genuine Title Enforcement Action , Genuine Title Order 5, ECF No. 18), but neither the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau nor the Office of the Attorney General of Maryland required that any financial institutions issue formal notices to the public (see Lender Enforcement Action , JPMorgan Chase Order, ECF No. 10; Lender Enforcement Action , Wells Fargo Order, ECF No. 11).
I. Bezek et al v. First Mariner Bank (RDB-17-2902)
Plaintiff Jill Bezek closed on the refinancing of her residential mortgage loan in December 2010, and Plaintiff Michelle Harris closed on the refinancing of her residential mortgage loan in October 2012. (Compl. ¶¶ 63, 72, ECF No. 1.) On September 29, 2017, Plaintiffs jointly filed this action alleging that both Ms. Bezek and Ms. Harris refinanced their homes through Tony Sergi, who was a branch manager of First Mariner. (Compl. ¶¶ 55, 63, 72, ECF No. 1.) Mr. Sergi, who worked in the same branch office as Angela Pobletts, allegedly referred Plaintiffs to Genuine Title in exchange for "Referring Cash" paid through Competitive Advantage Media Group ("CAM"), a company formed by Brandon Glickstein, Genuine Title's lead marketing and account representative. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 65, 73.) Plaintiffs seek to represent the following purported class:
All individuals in the United States who were borrowers on a federally related mortgage loan (as defined under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act,12 U.S.C. § 2602 ) originated or brokered by First Mariner Bank for which *533Genuine Title provided a settlement service, as identified in Section 1100 on the HUD-1, between January 1, 2009, and December 31, 2014. Exempted from this class is any person who, during the period of January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2014, was an employee, officer, member and/or agent of First Mariner Bank, Genuine Title, LLC, Competitive Advantage Media Group, LLC, Brandon Glickstein, Inc., and/or Dog Days Marketing, LLC.
(Compl. ¶ 92.) Defendant First Mariner filed the currently pending Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 4) on October 23, 2017.
III. Consolidated Hearing on Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' counsel, who has been in possession of Genuine Title's records since 2014 and who processed the data-including buyers' names-by June 2015, has filed the following seven class actions against other lenders who, like the defendants in Fangman , allegedly engaged in kickback schemes with Genuine Title.
1. Edmondson v. Eagle National Bank , et al., Civil Case No. RDB-16-3938 (D. Md.)
2. Dobbins, et al. v. Bank of America , N.A., Civil Case No. RDB-17-540 (D. Md.)
3. Callum v. Priority Financial Services , Civil Case No. RDB-17-0623 (D. Md.)
4. James v. Acre Mortgage & Financial , Civil Case No. RDB-17-1734 (D. Md.)
5. Baugh, et al. v. The Federal Savings Bank , Civil Case No. RDB-17-1735 (D. Md.)
6. Ryman v. First Mortgage Corporation , Civil Case No. RDB-17-1757 (D. Md.)
7. Bezek, et al. v. First Mariner Bank , Civil Case No. RDB-17-2902 (D. Md.)
On October 31, 2017, Miles & Stockbridge, defense counsel in both Edmondson (RDB-16-3938) and Bezek (RDB-17-2902), requested a consolidated hearing on ripe motions to dismiss. (Bezek , ECF No. 5.) Plaintiffs' counsel, Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, agreed to a consolidated hearing for the ripe motions to dismiss in five of the seven cases-namely, Edmondson (RDB-16-3938); Dobbins (RDB-17-540); James (RDB-17-1734); Baugh (RDB-17-1735); and Bezek (RDB-17-2902). (See Bezek , ECF No. 6.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) Generally
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Generally, to withstand a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal ,
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. ,
II. Statute of Limitations & Equitable Tolling
A 12(b)(6) motion is an appropriate vehicle through which the Court may evaluate the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations "if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense clearly appear on the face of the complaint." Goodman v. Praxair, Inc. ,
Even if a statute of limitations defense appears to have merit based upon the face of the complaint, a Court may exercise its equitable authority to toll the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court has held that "the diligence prong ... covers those affairs within the litigant's control."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has emphasized that "equitable tolling is appropriate 'in those rare instances where-due to circumstances external to the party's own conduct-it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.' " Cunningham v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue , No. 17-1433,
DISCUSSION
The Plaintiffs concede that RESPA's one-year statute of limitations would bar this lawsuit, which was filed almost five years years after the Plaintiffs closed their loans and two years after Plaintiffs' counsel processed Genuine Title's data. However, the parties dispute whether equitable tolling saves the Plaintiffs' claim.
I. Materials Considered
As an initial matter, the Defendant asks this Court to consider materials that are not integral to the Complaint (e.g., court filings and news coverage related to the Fangman and CFPB and Maryland Attorney General enforcement actions). (Mem. 6 n.2, 9 n.3, ECF No. 4-2.) The Plaintiffs acknowledge that this Court may take judicial notice of items or matters in the public record, but contends that (a) the securities fraud cases cited by the Defendant do not support judicial notice of news articles in this case, (b) newspaper articles are inadmissible hearsay, and (c) the First Mariner Subpoena in Fangman does not qualify for the public record exception because it is a "proverbial needle[ ] in a haystack." (Mem. Opp'n 15-19, ECF No. 7-1.)
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. ,
*536In re Human Genome Sciences Inc. Sec. Litig. ,
This Court finds that the court filings and news articles offered by the Defendant will help resolve the question of equitable tolling by establishing various dates of notice, rather than the truth of the matter asserted. Regarding the First Mariner Subpoena in the Fangman action (Fangman , ECF No. 150-3 at 126-30), Plaintiffs' argument that it would be hard to find among the Fangman filings does not limit its status as a matter of court record subject to judicial notice, especially when Plaintiffs make no challenge to the document's authenticity, accuracy, or admissibility under the rule against hearsay. See 21B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5106.4 (2d ed. 2017) (discussing hearsay as the primary limitation on noticing court records). The consideration of these materials through judicial notice does not transform this Motion to Dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Tellabs,
II. Equitable Tolling
A. Due Diligence
The parties have devoted considerable briefing and oral argument to disputing the content of the due diligence requirement in the wake of Menominee , --- U.S. ----,
The parties further disagree on whether the efforts and knowledge of Plaintiffs' counsel may stand in for the Plaintiffs' own diligence to fulfill whatever level of diligence is required after Menominee . Plaintiffs assert that they cannot be charged with the knowledge of their own attorneys from before the attorney-client relationship was established. (Mem. Opp'n 25, ECF No. 7-1.) If judged by Plaintiffs' own conduct, Defendant asserts that the Complaint does not include "any allegation of any specific inquiry or diligence." (Mem. 11, ECF No. 4-2.) Defendant asks this Court to follow Cunningham v. M & T Bank Corp.,
Even if Plaintiffs can establish that they were "pursuing [their] rights diligently," Menominee ,
B. Extraordinary Circumstances
In an effort to establish the "extraordinary circumstances" element, the Plaintiffs assert that "affirmative misrepresentations on HUD-1 forms constitute independent acts of concealment," (Mem. Opp'n 8, ECF No. 7-1 (citing In re Community Bank of No. Va. Mortg. Lending Prac. Litig., PNC Bank N.A. ,
The Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failed to plead fraudulent concealment with particularity, especially when nondisclosure on a HUD-1 is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling of a RESPA violation claim. (See Reply 18-20, ECF No. 8.) The Defendant generally argues that Plaintiffs' theory "re-writes RESPA and makes Plaintiffs' counsel-and not the terms of the legislation passed by Congress-the master of the RESPA statute of limitation." (Mem. 5, ECF No. 4-2.)
Even assuming arguendo that the initial HUD-1 non-disclosure and alleged "sham" agreements establish fraudulent concealment *538with sufficient particularity,
Furthermore, the Defendant's alleged concealment effort did not "st[and] in [Plaintiffs'] way" up until the time they were contacted by counsel. Menominee ,
The Plaintiffs have made no allegation that the Defendant's actions or a lack of access to public records, news, the internet, TV, or a phone placed such information outside their reach.
In Fangman , this Court found that the Defendants' concealment efforts contributed to "unique" circumstances warranting equitable tolling, Fangman ,
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their case presents one of "those rare instances where ... it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against [them] and gross injustice would result." Cunningham ,
The Plaintiffs therefore fail to fulfill the extraordinary circumstances element required to equitably toll their claim. Menominee,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED.
A separate Order follows.
At the consolidated hearing in this case, see Background, Section IV, infra , this Court and the parties discussed and directly referenced press releases and an exemplar list of news articles that were attached as exhibits to the motions to dismiss in Dobbins, et al. v. Bank of America, N.A., Civil Case No. RDB-17-540 (D. Md.) and Bezek, et al. v. First Mariner Bank , Civil Case No. RDB-17-2902 (D. Md.).
Plaintiffs' counsel requested that Callum (RDB-17-0623) and Ryman (RDB-17-1757) be addressed separately. (Edmondson, ECF No. 21.) Callum is currently stayed pending settlement-related discovery. (See Callum , ECF No. 10.) Ryman "involves complex successor liability and jurisdictional issues not present in most of the other cases." (Edmondson, ECF No. 21.)
As this Court confirmed in Fangman , equitable tolling applies to RESPA claims. Fangman, No. CV RDB-14-0081,
In applying this test to the facts of the Menominee case, the Supreme Court found "no extraordinary circumstances" and therefore it had no need to "decide whether the Tribe was diligently pursuing its rights."
While frequently relevant to evaluating the stock markets' knowledge in securities fraud cases, press coverage may also be relevant to evaluating discoverable information in the context of equitable tolling. Plaintiffs argue that the heightened pleading standard in the securities context renders In re Human Genome Sciences Inc. Sec. Litig. ,
This assumption is consistent with this Court's holding in Fangman ,
Plaintiffs' counsel's oral argument to the contrary is belied by the plain text of the settlement orders.
This time period is when the Genuine Title Enforcement Action settlement was reported by various media outlets and publications (see Dobbins, ECF No. 17-4), but this Court notes that Plaintiffs' claims may have been discoverable even earlier. In January 2, 2015, plaintiffs in Fangman filed a First Amended Complaint naming other financial institutions, including Eagle National Bank. (See Fangman , ECF No. 47.) On January 22, 2015, the CFPB and the Maryland Attorney General issued a press release regarding their joint enforcement action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Dobbins , ECF No. 17-3.), and local and national news media, including The Baltimore Sun , CNN, and the Wall Street Journal , published stories about the case (see Dobbins , ECF No. 17-4). In April 2015, the CFPB and Attorney General filed an enforcement action directly against Genuine Title, its principals, and affiliates arising out of the same alleged scheme. (Genuine Title Enforcement Action , RDB-15-1235, ECF No. 1).
Plaintiffs note that at least one of the news sources offered by the Defendant "require a subscription to view" (Mem. Opp'n 18 n.13, ECF No. 7-1), but there is no allegation that Plaintiffs were unable to view a print copy, initiate a free trial, or purchase a subscription. Again, any subscription requirements did not place the news coverage outside Plaintiffs' control, and Plaintiffs do not allege any lack of access to the public court filings in the Fangman and enforcement actions.
Compare, for example, the State of Maryland's three-year statute of limitations for civil actions such as fraud or personal injury claims.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.