*717Kathleen O'Connell Gavin, Stephen M. Schenning, Office of the United
States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for United States of America., Stuart Oswald Simms,
Brown Goldstein and Levy LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant., On November 15, 2017,
the Grand Jury returned a Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 31) adding a tenth count
for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). On January 19, 2018, this
Court ordered that Count Ten be severed from Counts One through Nine. (ECF No. 55.)
The Superseding Indictment, like the initial Indictment, includes a forfeiture count
in which the Government seeks forfeiture of at least $15,300 allegedly paid to Defendant
Oaks over the course of the bribery scheme., Pending now are (a) the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Count Four (Honest Services Wire Fraud) (ECF No. 58) and (b) the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts Five through Nine (Travel Act Counts) (ECF
No. 57). The underlying premise in both motions is that Oaks' filing of a request
with the Maryland Department of Legislative Services for the drafting of legislation
in the form of a bond bill in September of 2016 was not an official act within the
meaning of honest services wire fraud, as charged in Count Four, or the Travel Act
violations, as charged in Counts Five through Nine., The Defendant is charged in
a ten-count Superseding Indictment that was returned by the Grand Jury on November
15, 2017. (ECF No. 31.)1 Counts One through Nine stem from an alleged scheme in
which the Defendant agreed to assist a purported real estate developer identified
as "Mike," who was actually an undercover FBI agent, in pursuing a housing development
project in Baltimore. Counts One through *719Three charge wire fraud, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. These first three counts allege that the Defendant made oral
and written communications-which allegedly contained falsehoods-expressing support
for Mike's project to a representative Oaks believed worked at the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")., Count Four charges honest
services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346. The Superseding
Indictment alleges that "[i]t was the purpose of the scheme for Oaks to secretly
use his official position to enrich himself by accepting cash bribe payments from
Mike in exchange for favorable official action." (ECF No. 31 at 7.) Specifically,
the Superseding Indictment alleges that "Oaks agreed to use his official position
... to file a request for bond bill legislation with [the Maryland Department of
Legislative Services] in exchange for a cash bribe payment from Mike." (Id. ) The
Superseding Indictment further alleges that on September 22, 2016, in exchange for
a $5,000 cash payment from Mike, the Defendant "submitted a request, in person,
to DLS for the drafting of legislation in the form of a bond bill for the 2017 Maryland
General Assembly Session that would authorize the issuance of state funds to a company
associated with Mike in the amount of $250,000 for the 'Multi-Family Housing Development
at Druid Park Lake." (Id. ) The Defendant allegedly received a completed draft bond
bill from the Maryland Department of Legislative Services and forwarded the draft
by email to Mike, (Id. at 7-8.), The Superseding Indictment provides additional
factual context regarding the legislative process in question. A bond bill "was
legislation filed by a member of the General Assembly to obtain State of Maryland
funding for local capital projects.... [F]or such funding to be considered by the
General Assembly, it had to be introduced by both a member of the House of Delegates
and a member of the Senate." (Id. at 6.) The Maryland Department of Legislative
Services ("DLS") is described as "a Maryland governmental entity ..., which provided
legal, fiscal, committee, research, reference, auditing, administrative, and technological
support to the members of the Maryland General Assembly .... These services included
the drafting of legislation for legislators." (Id. ), Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an indictment "be a plain, concise and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."
Under Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v), a Defendant may file a motion to dismiss challenging
an indictment for failure to state an offense. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has instructed that '[a]n indictment must contain the elements
of the offense charged, fairly inform a defendant of the charge, and enable the
defendant to plead double jeopardy as a defense in a future prosecution for the
same offense.' " United States v. Loayza , 107 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting
United States v. Daniels , 973 F.2d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1992) ); see also United
States v. Palin , 874 F.3d 418, 424 (4th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. Hooker ,
841 F.2d 1225, 1231 (4th Cir. 1988)., In reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment
for failure to state an offense, a district court must accept all factual allegations
in the indictment as true. See Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,
343 n.16, 72 S.Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952), and the Court should construe the indictment
in a "practical," rather than "purely technical," manner. United States v. Matzkin
, 14 F.3d 1014, 1019 (4th Cir. 1994) ; see United States v. Terry , 257 F.3d 366,
371 (4th Cir. 2001) (King, J., concurring) ("It is elementary that a motion to dismiss
[a count of the] indictment implicates only the legal sufficiency of its allegations,
not the proof offered by the Government.")., In 1987, the Supreme Court "stopped
the development of the intangible-rights doctrine in its tracks." Skilling, at 401,
130 S.Ct. 2896 (discussing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875,
97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987) ). In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875,
97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the federal mail fraud statute
did not proscribe schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to the
honest services of their representatives. 483 U.S. at 356-361, 107 S.Ct. 2875. "Rather
than constru[ing] the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous
and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good
government for local and state officials," the Supreme Court read the statute "as
limited in scope to the protection of property rights." Id. at 360, 107 S.Ct. 2875
(emphasis added). "If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly."
Id., Once more, federal prosecutors brought cases against private sector officials
for allegedly depriving their employer (and/or its shareholders) of the officials'
honest services. In 2010, the Supreme Court again narrowed the scope of honest services
wire fraud. In Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d
619 (2010), the Supreme Court held:, In terms of the facts of the Skilling case,
the indictment charged three Enron executives, including its former CEO Jeffrey
Skilling, with conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud by "depriv[ing] Enron
and its shareholders of the intangible right of [his] honest services." Id. at 369,
130 S.Ct. 2896. Specifically, the executives had deceived investors by manipulating
the company's publicly reported financial results and by making other false *723statements.
Id. The Government did not, however, allege that Mr. Skilling had solicited or accepted
side payments from a third party in exchange for making these misrepresentations.
The Supreme Court therefore ruled out the honest-services theory, which requires
such third-party payments to fulfill the "bribe-and-kickback core of the pre- McNally
case law." Id. at 409, 413, 130 S.Ct. 2896. The court remanded the question of whether
the case presented harmless error given the viability of the alternative theory
of securities fraud. Id. at 414, 130 S.Ct. 2896., In 2016, former Governor of Virginia,
Robert McDonnell, argued that the United States Supreme Court should vacate his
convictions for conspiracy to commit honest services fraud, honest services wire
fraud, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion, and Hobbs Act extortion. McDonnell
v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2355, 195 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016). McDonnell
and his wife allegedly received $175,000 in loans, gifts, and other benefits from
Virginia businessman Jonnie Williams, the CEO of Star Scientific, a Virginia-based
company that had developed a nutritional supplement. Id. at 2361. In exchange for
those benefits, McDonnell allegedly arranged meetings with state officials, hosted
events at the Governor's Mansion, and contacted other officials to generate support
for studies of the new supplement Id. In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court
clarified the scope of honest services wire fraud, finding that "hosting an event,
meeting with other officials, or speaking with interested parties is not, standing
alone" an official "decision or action" under the federal definition of bribery.
Id. at 2368. The Court added that "a decision or action to initiate a research study-or
a decision or action on a qualifying step , such as narrowing down the list of potential
research topics-would qualify as an 'official act.' " Id. at 2370 (emphasis added).
In applying this holding to the jury instructions at trial, the Court vacated Governor
McDonnell's convictions because the instructions exhibited errors that were not
harmless. Id. at 2375., The charges brought against Senator Oaks in this case do
not require this Court to wrestle anew with statutory interpretation or other constitutional
concerns. Rather, as discussed below, a straight-forward application of the Supreme
Court's decision in McDonnell , 136 S.Ct. 2355, establishes that Oaks' request
to the Department of Legislative Services for the drafting of legislation in the
form of a bond bill constitutes an "official act" under the relevant portions of
federal and state bribery law., Count Four of the Superseding Indictment alleges
that Oaks committed honest services wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346
(ECF No. 31 at 6-8), and the Defendant claims that this Count fails to state an
offense. (See ECF No. 58.) The wire fraud statute, § 1343, criminalizes the use
of wires to execute "any scheme or artifice to defraud." 18 U.S.C. § 1343. As explained
above, "the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice
to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
In Skilling , the Supreme Court held that " § 1346 covers only bribery and kickback
schemes," where "bribery" takes its meaning from the federal bribery statute. 561
U.S. at 368, 413, 130 S.Ct. 2896. Under the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. §
201, it is unlawful for a "a public official ... directly or indirectly, corruptly
[to] demand[ ], seek[ ], receive[ ], accept[ ], or agree[ ] to receive or accept
anything of value ... in return for [ ] being influenced in the performance of any
official act." § 201(b)(2)(A). The bribery *724statute further defines "official
act" as "any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding
or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought
before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's
place of trust or profit." § 201(a)(3)., In McDonnell, the Supreme Court provided
an in-depth breakdown of the two legal requirements of an "official act" for purposes
of federal bribery and honest services wire fraud. 136 S.Ct. 2355. "First, the Government
must identify a 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy' that
'may at any time be pending' or 'may by law be brought' before a public official."
Id. at 2368. The question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy "must
involve a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit
before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee."
Id. at 2373. The words "pending" and "may by law be brought" require the issue in
question to be "specific and focused"-"the kind of thing that can be put on an agenda,
tracked for progress, and then checked off as complete." Id. at 2369, 2373. Furthermore,
"may by law be brought" means "something within the specific duties of an official's
position-the function conferred by the authority of his office." Id. at 2369., "Second,
the Government must prove that the public official made a decision or took an action
'on' that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, or agreed
to do so." Id. at 2368. In addition to reaching agreements, the decision or action
requirement may also be fulfilled by "exert[ing] pressure on another official to
perform an 'official act,' or [ ] advis[ing] another official, knowing or intending
that such advice will form the basis for an 'official act' by another official."
Id. at 2372. The primary holding of McDonnell , based upon the facts of that case,
is that "setting up a meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event
(or agreeing to do so)-without more-does not [qualify as an] 'official act.' "
Id. The Supreme Court in McDonnell provided further guidance, explaining that "a
decision or action to initiate a research study-or a decision or action on a qualifying
step , such as narrowing down the list of potential research topics-would qualify
as an 'official act.' " Id. at 2370 (emphasis added)., In his briefs, Senator
Oaks argues that the facts alleged in the Superseding Indictment are not sufficient
as a matter of law. Specifically, the Defendant asserts that a request for a draft
of a bond bill, without allegations that he introduced it or promised to introduce
it,6 does not constitute an "official act." The Defendant concedes that the question
of whether to enact a bond bill favorable to Mike's business is sufficiently focused
and specific to qualify as a "question or matter" under the first requirement for
"official action," but Defendant asserts that the alleged conduct "entails far less
decision or action than 'setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling another
official'." (Reply 2, 4 (quoting McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2370-71 ).) He also argues
that it is "irrelevant that only a legislator can submit such drafting requests
to DLS." (Def.'s Count 4 Mot. 7, ECF No. 58). In urging this Court to *725disregard
the unique authority of only a member of the Maryland General Assembly to make such
a request, he cites Valdes v. United States , 475 F.3d 1319, 1329-30 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (en banc), in which the D.C. Circuit held that a police officer's use of
"unique access" to a police database to find information to sell was insufficient
to make the conduct an "official act." He also argues that many things a legislator
can do by virtue of his or her position (e.g., use official letterhead, rely on
staff support, and host official government events) do not constitute "official
acts" under McDonnell ., The Government has responded that it is "irrelevant" that
the bond bill was never introduced because the Defendant took the first step in
requesting a draft to form the basis for a bill, which would be contemplated by
the General Assembly for state funding, (Gov't Resp. 4.), and it emphasizes that
only a legislator may submit a request to the Department of Legislative Services
for a draft bill, id. at 7, 9 (citing Office of Policy Analysis, Dep't of Legis.
Serv., Guidelines for the Submission of Individual Bond Bill Requests to the Maryland
General Assembly 3, 6 (Nov. 2015) ). Furthermore, the Government distinguishes Valdes
by noting that the D.C. Circuit went on to explain that "inappropriate influence
on decisions that the government actually makes," would constitute an "official
act[ion]" under 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). 475 F.3d at 1325. Enacting legislation, or
promising to do so, is exactly the kind of decision that a legislator actually makes.
(See Resp. 7-8 (citing United States v. Skelos, 707 Fed.Appx. 733 (2d Cir. 2017)
; United States v. Fattah , 223 F.Supp.3d 336, 343 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ).), At the hearing
on March 16, 2018, Defense Counsel argued that under a proper reading of McDonnell
, the act of drafting government documents, such as a bond bill or an indictment,
can never qualify as an official act. In the Defendant's view, the act of typing
words on a computer screen should not constitute an official act for the purposes
of federal bribery law. The Defendant urged this Court to limit "qualifying step,"
as noted by the Supreme Court in McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2370, to the research study
context at issue in that case. Counsel for the Government emphasized that drafting
a bill constitutes a qualifying step and goes to the heart of a legislator's official
purpose., As an initial matter, this Court notes that the Superseding Indictment
alleges an agreement to take "official action," the element in question. (ECF No.
31 at 7 ("It was the purpose of the scheme for Oaks to secretly use his official
posit[i]on to enrich himself by accepting cash bribe payments from Mike in exchange
for favorable official action.").) In demanding more facts to support the "official
action" element, the Defendant relies on the statement in United States v. Palin,
874 F.3d 418, 424 (4th Cir. 2017), that "[w]hen the words of a statute are used
to describe the offense generally, they 'must be accompanied with such a statement
of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offence,
coming under the general description, with which he is charged,' " but that passage
directly quotes Hamling v. United States , 418 U.S. 87, 117-118, 94 S.Ct. 2887,
41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), in which the Fourth Circuit clarified that specific facts
need not accompany statutory language when the language in question is "sufficiently
definite in legal meaning to give a defendant notice of the charge against him."
Hamling , 418 U.S. at 118-119, 94 S.Ct. 2887 ; see also United States v. Amend ,
791 F.2d 1120, 1125 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that specific acts need not be alleged
where the defendant has adequate notice of the nature of the charges). The Fourth
Circuit in the Palin case did not announce a new, heightened pleading requirement
regarding the elements of the *726offense, and Senator Oaks does not attack the
Superseding Indictment for failure to provide him with adequate notice., Rather,
the Defendant argued at the hearing that an honest services indictment must allege
everything McDonnell requires in jury instructions. In the aftermath of the McDonnell
decision, one court has already rejected this argument. United States v. Williams
, No. 316CR00003TCBRGV, 2016 WL 10649420, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2016), report
and recommendation adopted , No. 3:16-CR-00003-TCB, 2017 WL 1030804 (N.D. Ga. Mar.
16, 2017). This Court finds no basis to extend the full breadth of McDonnell to
indictments, which should be judged by their "practical" purpose. See United States
v. Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1019 (4th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, even under McDonnell,
an agreement to take official action "need not be explicit, and the public official
need not specify the means that he will use to perform his end of the bargain."
136 S.Ct. at 2371.7 The precise question before this Court is whether a state legislator's
request to a state administrative or legislative agency for a draft bond bill constitutes
an "official act" as defined in the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).,
In this case, the Defendant's alleged request for a draft bond bill falls squarely
within the confines of "a decision or action on a qualifying step." McDonnell ,
136 S.Ct. at 2370. The parties agree that obtaining a draft bond bill does not automatically
trigger formal consideration by the legislature, but under the "qualifying step"
prong that detail is of no moment. Beyond the fact that the Defendant's transmission
of the completed draft to Mike may establish an implicit agreement to actually introduce
the bill, see supra (citing McDonnell , 136 S.Ct. at 2371 ; Malkus, 696 Fed.Appx.
at 252 ; Tavares , 844 F.3d at 57 ; Jones, 207 F.Supp.3d at 582 ), the draft request
also represents an essential exclusionary decision like the example of research
topic selection in McDonnell and the bid-ranking process in Conley. To be clear,
the Superseding Indictment alleges that the draft bond bill would, if passed, authorize
$250,000 in state funding for the "Multi-Family Housing Development at Druid Park
Lake." (ECF No. 31 at 7.) The draft bill identifies a single project as the recipient
of state funding. It does not leave the recipient information blank or even identify
a group of candidates. The time to decide which of Mike's ventures to support had
passed. Bond bills can support a range of economic developments, including "health
facilities, historic preservation projects, museums, and sports and recreation facilities."
(Id. at 6.), In Maryland, "[b]ond bills must contain certain technical information
to legally permit funds to be disbursed. Therefore, after DLS drafts a bond bill,
the sponsor and requesting organization should refrain from altering the language
in the bill." Office of Policy Analysis, Dep't of Legis. Serv., Guidelines for
the Submission of Individual Bond Bill Bequests to the Maryland General Assembly
4 (Nov. 2015).8 If a change is necessary, the sponsor is directed to call DLS to
request the change. Id. This unique, technical, and formal process distinguishes
draft bond bills from, e.g., a handwritten or computer-generated draft prepared
by a legislator's personal staff member, without any request to the Department
of Legislative Services. Drafting a bond bill is also the first required step in
enacting any bond bill.9 It was only through Defendant's authority as an elected
member of the House of Delegates that he was able to procure a draft bond bill from
DLS. Id. at 3, 6. The Superseding Indictment further provides that, at the time
of the offense, a bond bill "had to be introduced by both a member of the House
of Delegates and a member of the Senate." (ECF No. 31 at 6.) Sending a draft bond
bill to the bill's purported beneficiary also *728makes the ultimate introduction
of the bill a foreseeable next step. These alleged facts represent something "more"
than the mere meetings, calls, events at issue in McDonnell. See McDonnell , 136
S.Ct. at 2372.