State v. John

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case comes up on a writ of error to Baltimore City Court, and the sole question which it presents for the decision of this court is, whether according to the principles of criminal pleading, it is necessary in an indictment for an assault with intent to murder, to state in the indictment, the instrument, or means made use of to effectuate the murderous intent. It is incontrovertibly true, that the main object of all pleadings, both civil and criminal, is to apprise the party charged, of the nature of the case, to which he is called upon to respond, so that he may not be taken by surprise, and that he may come prepared to defend himself against the allegations of the opposite party. But we do not think that the principles of criminal jurisprudence require in this case, any thing -more than that the offence should be charged in the language of the statute by which it is created. The indictment in this case, is founded upon the act of 1809, commonly called the penitentiary law— the offence as defined, and prohibited by that law is an assault with intent to murder. This is the character given to the assault charged in this indictment. It is averred that it was committed with intent to murder, and such averment we consider to be a full compliance with the requisitions of the law. The means of effecting the criminal intent, or the circumstances evincive of the quo animo, with which the act was done, are considered to be more properly, matters of evidence for the jury, to demonstrate the intent, than proper-to be incorporated into the indictment; because that intent may be proved or illustrated by such a variety *11of circumstances, as it would be very inconvenient, at all times, to embody in the indictment, or place upon the record; and if the means adopted, are necessary to be stated, it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence, that all the means, however multifarious, should be explicitly averred. Sir Matthew Hale observes 2 P. G. 193, “That in favor of life, great strictnesses have been in all times required, in points of indictments; and the truth is, that it is grown to be a blemish and inconvenience in the law, and the administration thereof. More offenders escape by the over easy ear given to exceptions in indictments, than by their own innocence; and many times gross murders, burglaries, robberies, and other heinous and crying offences, escape by these unseemly niceties, to the reproach of the law, to the shame of the government, and to the encouragement of villainy, and to the dishonor of God; and it were very fit, that by some law, this overgrown curiosity and nicety, were reformed, which is now become the disease of the law, and will, I fear, in time, grow mortal, without some timely remedy.” It must be admitted, that there is much good sense in the above remarks, which are entitled to great weight, when it is considered that they proceeded from one of the most enlightened, humane, and Christian judges, that ever graced or adorned the bench of British justice. That it is sufficient to charge the offence in the words of the prohibitory statute, will be found in 2d Burr. 103G, where the court says, “ It is enough for the prosecutor to bring the case within the general purview of the statute upon which the indictment is founded, if that statute has general prohibitory words in it; for where an indictment is brought upon a statute which has general prohibitory words in it, it is sufficient to charge the offence generally, in the words of the statute.”

In 3d Johns. N. Y. Rep. 511, the same principle is recognized, and affirmed when the court says, “ The intent to commit *12murder, was here charged in the words of the statute, and we think that was sufficient.”

This indictment is for an assault and battery, and the quo animo was to be collected from the circumstances. It was enough to state with the usual precision, the facts requisite to constitute an assault and battery, and to aver the intent with which it was made. This intent might have been inferred, and proved from the declarations of the defendant, previous to the assault. The indictment required no other facts, than were necessary to establish an assault and battery. The crime charged, was after all, but a misdemeanor. It was not a felony, though the intent was to commit one. The same principle has been affirmed and established by this court, in the case of the State vs. Cassel, 2 Harr. and Gill, 407. Upon the whole, we think, that the facts and circumstances evincive of the murderous intent, are matters of evidence, to be submitted to the jury, and are not necessary to be charged in the indictment.

The judgment of Baltimore City Court is therefore reversed.

judgment reversed, and procedendo awarded.