Leonard v. State
Leonard v. State
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment on conviction of violating gambling laws. The only question presented is whether a motion to quash a search warrant was properly denied and evidence obtained by search under the warrant was properly admitted. The sufficiency, in law and in fact, of the evidence (if admissible) is not questioned. The question is, whether the facts stated in the affidavit and application for the search warrant are sufficient to show probable cause.
The affidavit and application of Captain Emerson, dated May 10, 1951, states that: The premises in question are “the premises on the second floor, combination restaurant and poolroom, 1019% W. North Avenue, a two-story brick building”. On May 7, 1951, a named officer watched the premises from 7 to 8:15 p.m. At
Apparently baseball betting differs in some respects from the pattern, judicially familiar to us, of numbers betting and much bookmaking. In baseball betting most of the customers do not make flying visits. In view of this difference, and the fact that these premises had an ostensible lawful use, “combination restaurant and poolroom”, we put no stress on the numbers that entered the premises. But we think the conversations between persons some of whom immediately entered the premises — and the statement, to the “watchman”, of one who left money there without entering — furnished ample probable cause for belief that a baseball betting establishment was being maintained there. These statements were not hearsay from unknown sources, but were significant verbal acts of men who “suited the action to the word and suited the word to the action”. Cf. Carpenter v. State, 200 Md. 31, 88 A. 2d 180, just decided.
Defendant says the application did not sufficiently identify the premises as all the second floor. We think, this is a hypercritical interpretation of the words of the affidavit. The premises were the second floor of a two-story building. There were “steps” at the doorway, i.e., the doorway was the usual upstairs entrance to a two-story building of which the two storys were used, presumably or possibly, by different persons for different purposes. We think “the premises on the second floor, combination restaurant and poolroom”, does not mean “part of the premises” or “one of the premises” on the second floor.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Reference
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- LEONARD v. STATE
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