Joyce v. Maine Insurance
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision.
- Rush v. Hartford Mutual Insurance (District Court, W.D. Virginia 1987)
- Insurance Company of North America, a Pennsylvania Corporation v. Nina Howard (9th Cir. 1982)
- Reid v. Hardware Mutual Insurance Insurance Co. of the Carolinas, Inc. (S.C. 1969)
- Northern Assurance Co. v. Spencer (District Court, W.D. North Carolina 1965)
- Public Fire Insurance v. Crumpton Ex Rel. Crumpton (Fla. 1933)
- Johnson v. Inland Empire Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance (Wash. 1929)
- Taylor v. Security Mutual Fire Insurance (Minn. 1903)
- People ex rel. Esper v. Detroit & Saline Plank-Road Co. (Mich. 1900)
- Niagara Fire Insurance v. Johnson (Kan. Ct. App. 1896)
- Kircher v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Mutual Insurance (Wis. 1889)
- Strong v. City of Stevens Point (Wis. 1885)
- Smead v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. (Mich. 1885)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the Court was drawn up by
In the defence of this action, which is on a policy of insurance against a loss by fire, the opinions of certain persons, who were shown to have had experience in the business of insurance, as to the comparative risk of a dwellinghouse, which had been vacated after the occupation thereof, and when the occupation had continued; — and, whether the premiums of insurance would or would not be increased in consequence of the owner vacating the house, were offered, and, on the plaintiff’s objection, excluded.
None of the inquiries related to matters of science and skill. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 440. A witness cannot give his views on the manner in which others would probably be influenced, if the parties acted one way or the other. Therefore, the opinion of a person conversant with the business of insurance, upon a question whether a premium would have been increased by the communication of certain specified facts, has been held inadmissible. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 441 and note (1) and (2).
The defendants offered to prove that a small stable, standing on a lot adjoining the one upon which the dwellinghouse insured was situated, owned by a third person, was removed to a spot nearer to the • house insured, than that on which it stood at the date of the policy, and had been raised in height, and increased in other respects; this evidence was excluded 'on the plaintiff’s objection.
It is stated in the policy, that “ this policy is made and ac
By the former of the two periods, quoted from the conditions, the acts of the assured, therein specified, are to be followed by a forfeiture of all benefit from the policy. In the latter, it is otherwise. If the evidence offered would embrace such a case as last described, which may well bo doubted, but upon which no opinion is given, such use of the neighboring premises does not avoid the policy; but prompt notice to the company is alone required by the terms of the condition. The company cannot assume that they would have terminated the insurance, if the notice had been given of the removal of the stable from one part of the lot to another, of which the plaintiffs had no control, and, as the fire which destroyed the building was not due to the removal of the stable, no injury would be proved to have been done to the company, if- this evidence had been admitted.
We are satisfied that the rulings were free from legal error. — According to the agreement of the parties, judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.