[¶ 1] David Vaughan appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A) (2008) 1 entered in the Unified Criminal Docket (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) on his conditional guilty plea pursuant to U.C.D.R.P.-Cumberland County 11(a)(2).

[¶ 2] In 2007, Vaughan pleaded not guilty to operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A), and violation of a condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2009). We vacated the grant of Vaughan’s subsequent motion to suppress in State v. Vaughan (Vaughan I), 2009 ME 63, ¶ 14, 974 A.2d 930, 934, for reasons we need not reiterate here. On remand, with the agreement of the State and the approval of the court, Vaughan entered a conditional guilty plea for operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. 2411(1-A)(A), in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the violation of a condition of release charge. The court sentenced Vaughan to a $750 fíne and a ninety-day license suspension. Vaughan now appeals a second time.

[¶ 3] We do not address the substance of Vaughan’s contentions 2 because his con *501 ditional plea was entered in violation of U.C.D.R.P.-Cumberland County 11(a)(2), and Vaughan’s appeal is therefore not properly before us. Rule 11(a)(2), pursuant to which Vaughan purported to enter his conditional plea, expressly preserves for appellate review only a “pretrial motion and the ruling thereon.” U.C.D.R.P.Cumberland County 11(a)(2). In this appeal, however, Vaughan does not seek review of a pretrial ruling by the trial court; he is attempting to secure a second appellate review of the issues we decided in Vaughan I. In these circumstances, notwithstanding the agreement of the State and the approval of the court, a conditional plea was not a procedural mechanism available to Vaughan. We vacate the entry of Vaughan’s conditional plea and remand the case to the trial court.

The entry is:

Judgment vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.