State of Maine v. Dana A. Healey

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2024 ME 4 Docket: Fra-22-59 Argued: October 4, 2022 Decided: January 23, 2024 Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE v. DANA A. HEALEY

LAWRENCE, J.

[¶1] Dana A. Healey appeals from a judgment of conviction for domestic violence assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2020),1 entered by the trial court (Franklin County, Davis, J.) following a jury trial. Healey contends that the court exceeded its discretion by failing to “permit voir dire examination to be conducted by the parties or their attorneys,” 15 M.R.S. § 1258-A (2023), during jury selection and by denying Healey’s requests to cross-examine the victim about her recanted domestic violence allegation against another person and the text messages that the victim sent to Healey after his arrest. Although we are unable to reach a majority opinion as to the voir dire issue, we unanimously disagree with Healey’s other contentions and affirm the judgment and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND [¶2] “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the trial record supports the following facts.” State v. Murray, 2021 ME 47, ¶ 2, 259 A.3d 1276. On the evening of December 8, 2020, in the parking lot outside of a restaurant in Farmington, Healey and the victim, his then-girlfriend, got into a dispute.2 During this dispute, Healey shoved the victim, grabbed her by the hair, and shook her head, causing the victim to lose clumps of her hair.

[¶3] On December 22, 2020, Healey was charged by complaint with intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person who is a family or household member, in violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A).

A. Voir Dire

[¶4] Before jury selection, Healey filed a proposed questionnaire that included twenty-one questions covering several themes including, but not limited to, gender bias and domestic violence.3 The court denied Healey’s

Healey’s questionnaire then posed the following questions: • “Do you believe that men are more likely than women to be the aggressor in [] situations involving domestic violence?” • “Do you believe that false allegations of domestic violence are ever made to gain an advantage in a custody case or divorce?” • “Do you believe that false allegations of domestic violence are ever made so that the accuser can avoid being arrested for domestic violence?” • “Do you believe that false allegations of domestic violence are ever made out of spite or for revenge?” • “Do you believe that a man should not use violence against a woman even if allowed by law

(for example, in self-defense or to protect his property from being taken or damaged)?” • “Do you believe that a man who is physically attacked by a woman should try to leave rather than defend himself with even a small amount of force?” • “If a man and a woman accuse each other of domestic violence, are you more likely to believe the woman?” • “Do you believe that almost all allegations of domestic violence are true?” • “Do you believe that almost all men charged with domestic violence by the police are guilty?” • “Do you believe that it is worse for a man to use force or violence against a woman than for a woman to use force or violence against a man (using the same amount of force)?” • “Have you or any member of your immediate family been charged with a domestic violence crime?” • “Have you or an immediate family member been the victim of domestic violence?” • “Do you believe that the victim of domestic violence is usually a woman?” • “Do you believe that men are naturally more violent and aggressive than women?” • “Have you or an immediate family member been the defendant in a ‘protection from abuse’

(domestic restraining order) case?” • “Have you or an immediate family member ever been the plaintiff in a ‘protection from abuse’

(domestic relations restraining order) case?” • “Have you ever reported someone to the police for domestic violence?” request to use his proposed questionnaire and used the court’s standard domestic violence questionnaire instead.4 After the court denied Healey’s request to use his own questionnaire, Healey requested that the court ask his proposed questions, “if not in written form” then “verbally of the jurors.” Healey also cited to 15 M.R.S. § 1258-A for the proposition that parties must be permitted to conduct voir dire under the court’s direction. The court denied Healey’s request without any explanation.

[¶5] The court proceeded by calling each of the twenty-five prospective jurors who had responded “yes” to the first question on the administered questionnaire (“Have you, a close family member, or a close friend ever been

• “Have you ever contributed money to or been a member of a group that advocates against domestic violence (e.g., ‘Safe Voices’)?” • “Do you believe that too many people get away with domestic violence?” • “Have you ever had contact with victims or alleged victims of domestic violence as part of your employment?” • “Is there any reason why you could not consider evidence fairly, impartially, and objectively in a case involving allegations of domestic violence?”

[¶6] During individual voir dire, Healey asked the court whether he could ask a prospective juror a couple of follow-up questions, to which the court responded, “No.” The court did not attempt to ascertain the nature of Healey’s questions, nor did it explain why it was denying Healey’s request. During a short pause in between the questioning of prospective jurors in chambers, Healey asked the court “whether [the court’s] ruling is that the attorneys are not allowed to ask any further questions or request to ask further questions is a standing ruling.” The court responded, “Yes. The Court will inquire.” The court did not provide any further explanation, and Healey never articulated, nor attempted to articulate, to the court the additional questions concerning domestic violence that he wished to ask prospective jurors during individual voir dire. Two of the prospective jurors who were subjected to this individual voir dire were later assigned as final jurors.5

[¶7] Separately, after the court’s initial voir dire into whether the prospective jurors knew any of the parties or witnesses involved in the case, Healey requested to ask the prospective jurors additional questions. In support of his request, Healey asserted that multiple prospective jurors “knew one or more of the witnesses,” and that, although the prospective jurors affirmed that they could be fair and impartial, he still wanted “the opportunity for additional questioning.” The court again denied Healey’s request without explanation and without ascertaining what questions Healey might pose. Of the thirteen prospective jurors who indicated that they knew a witness or party, none were assigned as final jurors.

B. Evidentiary Rulings

[¶8] On March 3, 2022, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude, pursuant to Maine Rules of Evidence 402 and 403, (1) text messages sent by the victim to Healey after his arrest, (2) evidence that the victim had

[¶9] During the trial, the court’s evidentiary rulings evolved as the court suggested they might. While cross-examining the victim, Healey attempted to introduce evidence of text messages the victim sent to him, including the text message the victim sent him on the day of his arraignment. Upon objection by the State, the court ruled that all of the text messages were excluded pursuant to Rule 403. The court also denied Healey’s request to reconsider its exclusion

[¶10] The jury returned a guilty verdict on March 7, 2022. On March 9, 2022, Healey was sentenced to 180 days in jail, with all but fourteen days suspended, and placed on probation for two years. Healey timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Voir Dire

[¶11] Healey argues that the court erred by failing to allow defense counsel to conduct voir dire examination of prospective jurors, as required by 15 M.R.S. § 1258-A, and by denying his attorney’s requests to ask prospective jurors additional questions. Although we are unable to reach a majority opinion as to the issue Healey has raised regarding juror voir dire, we agree that the judgment should not be vacated on this basis and affirm the court’s

7In the text message, which the victim described as “sarcastic,” the victim offered to “rub [Healey’s] leg.” rulings on that issue without further discussion. We therefore turn to Healey’s contentions concerning the court’s evidentiary rulings.

B. Evidentiary Rulings

[¶12] Healey argues (1) that the court abused its discretion by denying his request to cross-examine the victim about her recantation of a domestic violence allegation against another person and the text messages that she sent to Healey after his arrest, and (2) that these evidentiary rulings violated his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to confront witnesses against him.

[¶13] We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for clear error or abuse of discretion, reviewing determinations on relevancy for clear error and reviewing decisions on admissibility for an abuse of discretion. State v. Filler, 2010 ME 90, ¶ 14, 3 A.3d 365. Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

[¶14] We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Healey’s request to cross-examine the victim about her recanting a domestic violence allegation against another person. Healey appears to have assumed that the victim would have admitted that she falsified her other domestic violence allegation. Although evidence of the victim’s recanted domestic violence claim may have been relevant, its probative value as to the witness’s truthfulness or untruthfulness was minimal. See State v. Ericson, 2011 ME 28, ¶ 20, 13 A.3d 777. This evidence’s probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues for the jury.8 See id. at ¶ 22. “[A]lthough we recognize that exposure of a complaining witness's motivation is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination,” the court acted within its discretion under Rule 403 in excluding evidence of the victim’s separate, recanted domestic violence claim. Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[¶15] The court, however, erred in excluding at least one of the victim’s wide ranging text messages to Healey: the message stating, “We’re even,” which the victim sent to Healey on the date of his arraignment proceeding. Contrary to the State’s contention, this evidence was relevant because it could have

[¶16] When constitutional rights are at issue, such as the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination, “the appropriate . . . inquiry is whether, after review of the whole record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17, 711 A.2d 851; see M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(a). Here, although evidence of the excluded text messages may have undermined the victim’s credibility,

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Christopher S. Berryment, Esq. (orally), Mexico, for appellant Dana Healey Alexandra Winter, District Attorney, and Ellex St. Pierre, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Office of the District Attorney, Farmington, for appellee State of Maine Franklin County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2020-731 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

In the recording, the witness told the dispatcher that a man had “put his hands on a woman.” The witness’s testimony was supported by his mother’s testimony at trial, who was also on the 9-1-1 call.